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Abstract
The mortgage market plays a crucial role in the UK economy. It enables
hundreds of thousands of consumers every year to buy their homes or to refi-
nance existing mortgages. In this thesis, we try to understand the mortgage
market and general credit conditions, from macro-, micro- and policy perspec-
tives.
First, we look at the mortgage market from a macro angle. We aim at
identifying the relative role of demand and supply conditions in driving the
erratic evolution of UK mortgage credit. We aim at distinguishing demand
from supply using a disequilibrium econometric model to then compare and
contrast credit cycles for the past 20 years. We found that the periods of
recession coincide with credit rationing and the periods of economic growth
coincide with excess supply.
Second, we look at the mortgage market from a micro perspective. In
particular, we analyse the role of mortgage intermediaries and whether their
incentives are misaligned with consumers they serve in terms of finding the best
deal. For example, mortgage intermediaries need to spend time and resources
to identify the right product for the borrower in terms of price, suitability and
likelihood of approval by the lender. Lenders pay commissions (procuration
fees) to intermediaries potentially distorting incentives of the intermediaries.
Moreover, borrowers have little information or do not have tools to compare
intermediaries. So we analyse how the price of similar mortgage products for
like-for-like consumers varies across intermediary firms and what the drivers
of the dispersion are. We find that the difference in average price of mortgage
products can be as high as £800 over the incentivised rate period for the
median loan amount. We find little evidence that intermediaries selling highly
priced mortgages also receive high procuration fees and that the average price
of the mortgages an intermediary sells is negatively correlated with the number
of lenders used.
Third, we evaluate impacts of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) pol-
icy that aims at reducing risks of financial instability in the economy by limit-
ing excessive household leverage in mortgages and unsustainable credit growth.
It recommends that "mortgage lenders do not extend more than 15% of their
total number of new residential mortgages at Loan to Income ratios at or
greater than 4.5". We are interested in understanding whether it has any
impact on consumers in terms of the redistribution consequences and price.
The paper finds that after implementation of the recommendation the average
loan size for high LTI mortgages increased by 4-7%. This suggests that lenders
originated high LTI loans for borrowers with higher incomes. As a result, we
find robust evidence of changes in composition of high LTI borrowers: 1) an
increase in the proportion of home movers; 2) a decrease in the proportion of
first-time buyers; 3) an increase in the proportion of joint income applicants.
After implementation, although the overall proportion of high LTI mortgages
to the total number of sales in the market stays around 10%, lenders’ individ-
ual exposure to high LTI mortgages changed. Some lenders, whose share of
high LTI mortgages had been closer to the 15% limit, reduced their proportion
of high LTI. In contrast, some lenders that previously had a low share of high
LTI mortgages increased their proportion of them. After controlling for bor-
rower, product, and lender characteristics, we find that post-implementation
the mortgage price for high LTI mortgages on average decreased. The fall in
the mortgage price was stronger for lenders that used to be closer to the 15%
constraint.
Fourth, we take a step back and look at the monetary and fiscal policies
in the context of New Keynesian models with real rigidities and an economy
at the zero lower bound. In this chapter, we are particularly interested in
identifying optimal fiscal and monetary policies under strategic interaction
among price- and wage-setting agents under zero lower bound. We found that
the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning interest rates at
the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of expected inflation
or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend crucially on the
assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to simple parametric
assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about the nature of
the labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour market
segmentation and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown to
have particularly significant consequences for the type of policy one might wish
to implement in an economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In
those circumstances, it is a good idea for governments to lean against the wind
in two different ways. First, an increase in government spending when output
is low (and vice versa) stabilises output (and prices) but this policy can be
justified almost wholly with reference to static public finance considerations.
Second, an increase in taxes when output is low (and vice versa) stabilises
prices via their impact on marginal cost. The results interact in interesting
ways with the initial conditions in the economy. With higher inherited debt,
fiscal sustainability considerations matter more for monetary and tax policy
and the explained differences across market structures grow larger.
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The mortgage market plays a crucial role in the UK economy. It enables hundreds
of thousands of consumers every year to buy their homes or to refinance existing
mortgages. In 2016 gross lending in the regulated first-charge residential mortgage
market was around £300bn and for many consumers a mortgage represents a very
significant financial commitment.1
The UK mortgage market have specific features that are different from other
mortgage markets researched in the academic literature (eg. US or Danish markets).
Before turning to research questions of the thesis, we are going to highlight the main
features of the UK mortgage market that are relevant to our study.
In recent years the vast majority of mortgage products sold in the UK have a
short-term introductory deal. Typically, the introductory period lasts two years
during which the interest rate is fixed. In 2016, for example, 62% of originated
mortgages were two-year fixed mortgages and variable (or discounted variable) rates
represent a small proportion of the market (a large literature investigates the choice
between fixed and variable rate mortgages, for example, Campbell and Cocco (2003),
Coulibaly and Li (2009) and Van Hemert (2010)).
The initial interest rate is mainly driven by the loan-to-value (LTV) ratio and
jumps discretely at different LTV thresholds (Best et al. (2015)). After the intro-
ductory deal the rate changes to a reversion rate, typically the lender’s standard
variable rate (SVR).
In addition to the interest rate, some mortgages have product fees, which could
be seen as hidden costs. A recent literature suggests that, when shopping around,
consumers may focus on salient features of the product and ignore hidden costs (for
example, Gurun et al. (2016) specifically on the mortgage market and Gabaix and
Laibson (2006) and Bordalo et al. (2013) more generally). An example of a typical
two-year fixed rate mortgage with a maximum LTV of 85%, has an initial rate of
3.25% and product fees of £999. The price of a mortgage is captured by the Annual
Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC) that takes into account interest rates and fees
of the product.
Borrowers may also have to pay fees to intermediaries and other third parties,
such as surveyors or conveyancers. Unlike in other countries, for example in Canada,
borrowers in the UK do not typically negotiate the terms of the product (Allen et al.
(2014b)).
At the expiry of the introductory deal consumers often transfer to a new mort-
gage product, either with their existing lender (remortgage internally) or a new
1In 2016 the median loan size for first-time buyers was around £135,000 with a median initial
term of around 30 years FCA (2018b).
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lender (remortgage externally). The FCA estimated that around three quarters of
customers switch to a new deal within six months of moving onto a reversion rate
(FCA (2018b)). A growing number of papers investigate refinancing behaviour and
possible drivers of inertia (for example Agarwal et al. (2013), Bajo and Barbi (2015)
and Andersen et al. (2018)).
The process of obtaining a mortgage is complex and consumers often rely on
mortgage intermediaries who guide them through the mortgage application and
provide advice. The number of intermediated sales has increased over the past
years from 48% in 2012 to 69% in 2016.2 In 2016 over 800,000 borrowers used a
mortgage intermediary. Intermediaries need to find a suitable deal that the consumer
is likely to be accepted for. This is a complex task because i) borrower characteristics
and circumstances vary widely and ii) lenders’ lending criteria may not be always
transparent. Brokers receive a commission from lenders for whom they originate a
mortgage. Borrowers may also pay a fee to the broker, but this is not common.
In the UK mortgage market borrower characteristics and circumstances vary
widely and different lenders may target specific types of borrowers. Mainstream
lenders typically focus on borrowers with standard circumstances and good credit
history, or only minor adverse credit. Specialist lenders, instead, typically focus
on borrowers with non-standard circumstances, such as complex income sources or
poorer credit history ranging from County Court Judgement to defaults or arrears.
Specialist lenders are also more likely to focus on the self-employed. We calculated
that while there are around 20% of self-employed borrowers in the whole market,
their share rises to 40% among specialist lenders. The higher price of a mortgage
offered by a specialist lender typically reflects the higher risk associated with the
borrower. In 2015 the aggregate market share of specialist lenders was small (around
1% of all mortgage sales).
The mortgage market is important for financial stability and consumer protection
considerations. Regardless of circumstances, borrowers need to meet affordability
criteria and prove income, unless they remortgage internally without change in loan
amount or mortgage term (FSA (2012)). Borrowers also need to pass interest rate
stress test, unless he/she takes out a mortgage with 5-year or longer introductory
period deal.3
The household debt is also an important driver of macroeconomic fluctuations.
The household debt cycle could predict severity of the slowdown Mian et al. (2017) or
credit supply driven by household demand could be a lead indicator of a recession
(eg. Mian and Sufi (2010)). Moreover, a recent paper by Garriga et al. (2019)
introduces mortgages into the New Keynesian model to analyse effects of monetary
policy.
2Between 2009 and 2014 the FCA introduced the Mortgage Market Review (MMR) that has
increased the take up of advice and intermediation. See FCA (2018b).
3https://www.fca.org.uk/firms/interest-rate-stress-test
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In this thesis, we try to understand the mortgage market and general credit
conditions, from macro-, micro- and policy perspectives.
First, we look at the mortgage market from a macro angle. The first question
that we look at is to identify the relative role of demand and supply conditions in
driving the erratic evolution of UK mortgage credit. Did the lending to individuals
halt because of banks’ inability to issue loans or because household reduced demand?
We aim at distinguishing demand from supply using a disequilibrium econometric
model to then compare and contrast credit cycles for the past 20 years. To the best
of our knowledge, this is the first study looking at credit conditions in the UK mort-
gage market using disequilibrium econometric model. We found that the periods of
recession coincide with credit rationing and the periods of economic growth coincide
with excess supply. Interestingly, prior the financial crisis there is some evidence of
equilibrium in the market, while the first year of the crisis is found to be determined
by depressed demand rather than credit rationing.
Second, we look at the mortgage market from a micro perspective. In particular,
we focus on the role of mortgage intermediaries and whether their incentives are
misaligned with consumers they serve in terms of finding the best deal. For exam-
ple, mortgage intermediaries need to spend time and resources to identify the right
product for the borrower in terms of price, suitability and likelihood of approval by
the lender. Lenders pay commissions (procuration fees) to intermediaries potentially
distorting incentives of the intermediaries to find the best deal. Moreover, borrowers
have little information or do not have tool to compare intermediaries. So we analyse
how the price of similar mortgage products for like-for-like consumers varies across
intermediary firms and what the drivers of the dispersion are. We find that the
difference in average price of mortgage products can be as high as £800 over the
incentivised rate period for the median loan amount. We find little evidence that
intermediaries selling highly priced mortgages also receive high procuration fees and
that the average price of the mortgages an intermediary sells is negatively correlated
with the number of lenders used. On average, intermediaries placing business with
a greater number of lenders sell cheaper products compared to intermediaries that
use fewer lenders.
Third, we evaluate impacts of the Financial Policy Committee (FPC) policy that
aims at reducing risks of financial instability in the economy by limiting excessive
household leverage in mortgages and unsustainable credit growth. This policy is
commonly known as ’LTI flow limit’. It recommends that "mortgage lenders do
not extend more than 15% of their total number of new residential mortgages at
Loan to Income ratios at or greater than 4.5". While the core objective of the FPC
recommendation is macro-prudential, we am interested in understanding whether it
has any impact on consumers in terms of the redistribution consequences and price.
The paper finds that after implementation of the recommendation the average loan
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size for high LTI mortgages increased by 4-7%. This suggests that lenders originated
high LTI loans for borrowers with higher incomes. As a result, we find robust
evidence of changes in composition of high LTI borrowers: 1) an increase in the
proportion of home movers; 2) a decrease in the proportion of first-time buyers;
3) an increase in the proportion of joint income applicants. After implementation,
although the overall proportion of high LTI mortgages to the total number of sales
in the market stays around 10%, lenders’ individual exposure to high LTI mortgages
changed. Some lenders, whose share of high LTI mortgages had been closer to the
15% limit, reduced their proportion of high LTI. In contrast, some lenders that
previously had a low share of high LTI mortgages increased their proportion of
them. After controlling for borrower, product, and lender characteristics, we find
that post-implementation the mortgage price for high LTI mortgages on average
decreased. The fall in the mortgage price was stronger for lenders that used to be
closer to the 15% constraint.
Fourth, we take a step back and look at the monetary and fiscal policies in
the context of New Keynesian models with real rigidities and an economy at the
zero lower bound. This chapter, though distinct from the rest of the thesis, has
two important links to the rest of the thesis. First, the environment of a zero
interest rate is associated with the recent financial crisis (perhaps, except Japan),
which was triggered by events in the US mortgage market. Second, similar to the
disequilibrium concepts discussed in the first chapter, real rigidities do not allow
markets to clear at the competitive prices, though the New Keynesian models assume
general equilibrium whereas the disequilibrium models do not. In this chapter,
we are particularly interested in identifying optimal fiscal and monetary policies
under strategic interaction among price- and wage-setting agents under zero lower
bound. We found that the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning
interest rates at the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of expected
inflation or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend crucially on the
assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to simple parametric
assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about the nature of the
labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour market segmentation
and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown to have particularly
significant consequences for the type of policy one might wish to implement in an
economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In those circumstances, it is
a good idea for governments to lean against the wind in two different ways. First,
an increase in government spending when output is low (and vice versa) stabilises
output (and prices) but this policy can be justified almost wholly with reference to
static public finance considerations. Second, an increase in taxes when output is
low (and vice versa) stabilises prices via their impact on marginal cost. The results
interact in interesting ways with the initial conditions in the economy. With higher
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inherited debt, fiscal sustainability considerations matter more for monetary and
tax policy and the explained differences across market structures grow larger.
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Part II
Credit Conditions in the UK
Mortgage Market: A Disequilibrium
Approach
1 Introduction
In this chapter of the thesis we look at the UK mortgage market through a macroeco-
nomic lens. One of the prolonged debates in macroeconomics is to identify whether
demand or supply drive the evolution of credit. Did lending to individuals halt
because of banks’ inability to issue loans (credit rationing) or because households
reduced demand? In this chapter, we aim to discern demand and supply in the UK
mortgage market for the past 20 years using an econometric disequilibrium model
to then compare and contrast credit conditions across business cycles.
While to the best of our knowledge this is the first study to understand credit
conditions in the UK mortgage market using disequilibrium econometric technique,
Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2006) research, for example, aims to answer a very sim-
ilar question but with a different methodology. Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2006)
create a credit conditions index (CCI) from the Survey of Mortgage Lenders to then
understand changes in credit supply from 1975 to 2001. The index is identified
from a ten-equation system with sign restrictions that takes into account various
economic and demographic variables affecting demand and supply of credit. The
study reports marked fluctuations of credit supply conditions over time. There was
an increase in the index in 1980s, peaking by the end of the decade (ie. loosening
of credit supply), then a fall in early 1990s (ie. tightening of credit supply), before
increasing again (ie. loosening of credit supply).
There is also a strand of literature to understand how changes in credit con-
ditions drive business cycles. For example, Aron et al. (2012) estimate housing
collateral (or ’wealth’ effect) on consumption for UK, US and Japan economies us-
ing a modified version of the Ando-Modigliani style consumption function. Authors
use the Fernandez-Corugedo et al. (2006) credit conditions index, which measures
exogenous shifts in credit supply, to capture effects of credit liberalisation on hous-
ing collateral. They conclude that the ’wealth’ effect differs across the countries
and varies over time because of the changes in the credit conditions. Loser credit
supply conditions reinforce positive housing wealth effect - consumers face a lower
down-payment constraint and are allowed to borrow against housing equity, as a
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result, they save less and consume more.4
1.1 Theoretical rationale behind disequilibrium
Disequilibrium models (or ‘quantity rationing models’) have been studied from both
theoretical and empirical perspective. The literature blossomed in 70s and 80s, but
with the prevalence of the idea of the general equilibrium, it had not received much
attention. However, the recent financial crisis highlighted the issue that markets
might not necessarily clear, ie. prices might be relatively rigid resulting in oversup-
ply/shortage of credit. The disequilibrium theory has been mainly concerned about
macroeconomic effects of disequilibrium and its micro-economic rationale including
why prices might be rigid and might not allow markets to clear. The empirical
literature on the other hand has been mainly looking at different estimation tech-
niques and application of these methodologies to different markets across different
countries.
The disequilibrium describes persisting excess supply or demand without any
tendency for price to correct the market imbalance. The comparison between un-
derpinnings of clearing and non-clearing market will closely follow Bénassy (2005)
and the rationale behind rigid prices not allowing a credit market to clear will be
discussed in accordance with Stiglitz and Weiss (1981).
To understand the difference between clearing markets (Walrasian theory) and
non-clearing markets (non-Walrasian theory), it is worth scrutinising the main as-
sumptions of both theories. The Walrasian theory assumes that all agents in the
market receive price signals and maximise their objective function to get the Wal-
rasian demand/supply, which depends on the price signals only. Exchange in the
market happens freely, i.e. suppliers can sell as much as they want, buyers can
receive as much as they want. There is also an auctioneer who changes the price us-
ing unspecified mechanism (‘tatonnement’ process) until demand is equal to supply.
Resulting price is the equilibrium price in the market and demand equals to supply.
The non-Walrasian theory abandons assumption of a centralised auctioneer, who
determines the equilibrium market price. While in the Walrasian theory an equi-
librium price is determined by an intersection of demand and supply, in the non-
clearing market, equilibrium prices are assumed to be set by one side of the market
or bargained between the two sides, such that none of the agents have incentives
to change their actions. Quantities exchanged in the market are either supply or
demand constrained. Markets do not clear and it is characterised by rationing.
An important element to the non-Walrasian theory is relationship between de-
mand, supply and quantity transacted. Agents form desired demand (d̃i) and desired
4Similarly, Muellbauer and Murphy (2008) argues that a housing collateral and down-payment
constraints (ie credit supply conditions) are key in explaining how fluctuations in house prices
affect consumption.
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supply (s̃i) from maximising their objective functions. However, the exchange that
agents wish to carry out does not necessarily match the resulting market transac-
tions. An accounting identity ensures that the amount sold (d̊i) and purchased (s̊i)




i=1 s̊i = S, but desired purchases do




i=1 s̃i = S̃.
If in addition such market is frictionless, i.e. there cannot be both rationed sellers
and buyers at the same time, and exchange happens voluntarily, i.e. no agent can be
forced to purchase more than he demands or sell more than he supplies, transacted
purchases or sales are determined by the ‘short-side rule’, or in aggregate, the ‘rule
of the minimum’. That is, quantities transacted are equal to minimum of desired
demand and desired supply:
D̊ = S̊ = min(D̃, S̃)
The ‘short-side rule’ plays a crucial role in identifying demand and supply sched-
ules in the disequilibrium econometric model. The ‘short-side rule’ of the disequi-
librium econometric model could split observations into three categories: 1) excess
demand, interpreted as desired demand being higher than desired supply; 2) ex-
cess supply, interpreted as desired supply being higher than desired demand; 3)
equilibrium, when desired demand equal to desired supply.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) provide micro-foundation to existence of excess de-
mand and excess supply in a credit market. Their model rationalises existence of
credit rationing– a situation, when some borrowers receive credit and others do not,
including these borrowers, who are willing to pay more than the prevailing interest
rate. In other words they provide micro-foundation to why interest rate does not
rise or fall to clear excess demand.
Their explanation focuses on banks’ objective to maximise expected return,
which is determined by the interest rate and the riskiness of the loan, and on
the interest rate ability to separate ‘risky’ and ‘safe’ applications. The necessary
condition for existence of excess demand is non-monotonicity of the bank expected
return. Non-monotonicity implies that the bank expected return does not always
increase with an increase in interest rate and there should exist an interest rate that
maximises the bank expected return.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) explain impact of adverse selection on expected bank
return. High interest rate discourages safe applicants and only risky applicants
remain. For example, if an applicant is willing to borrow at a very high interest
rate, it implies that he could not find a lender willing to supply a loan at lower price
or such applicant has low chances to repay the loan and therefore is not concerned
about paying a high interest rate. High interest rate might also encourage risky
behaviour (‘moral hazard’). Therefore, with an increase in interest rate the riskiness
of banks investment rises and expected return falls. There could be an interest rate
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maximising bank return, which is lower than the Walrasian interest rate, at which
demand equals to supply. At this rate there will be excess demand, but it will be
still an equilibrium because banks have no incentives to change it.
Stiglitz and Weiss (1981) also briefly discuss the micro-economic mechanism of
keeping interest rate from falling in a situation of excess supply. Assume banks can
identify credit worthy customers among its clients, from which they receive higher
expected return, and competing banks cannot. A competing bank might be willing
to reduce interest rate to attract profitable customers. However, the low interest rate
that it offers will be countered by an equally low interest rate from the customer’s
bank. The ‘risky’ customers on the other hand will now be offered a matching low
interest rate. Therefore, by lowering interest rate competing banks will attract a pool
of least profitable customers and their expected return will fall. Therefore, banks
with an excess supply of loanable funds will consider that a decrease in interest rate
lowers their expected return and will not adjust it to encourage more demand.
In the case of the mortgage market, for the same reasons when banks have
excess supply they might not be willing to lower interest rate. Low interest rate
makes mortgages more affordable and might attract borrowers with lower chances of
repayment. In case of excess demand, banks might be less willing to increase interest
rate because they are likely to attract risky and overconfident borrowers, who might
not realise that high interest rate puts a bigger burden on loan repayment.5
1.2 Econometric disequilibrium models and applications
In this section, we will describe various econometric disequilibrium models and their
applications. Broadly speaking econometric disequilibrium models can be distin-
guished by two features: 1) static vs dynamic and 2) models with unknown vs
known sample separation.
Applied literature on econometric disequilibrium models is scant. Applications
vary in term of countries, markets, estimation methodologies and whether a re-
searcher uses micro-level or macro-level data. Due to work of Stiglitz and Weiss
(1981) that provided a theoretical rationale on why interest rate does not have to
clear demand and supply of credit the disequilibrium models became relevant to ap-
ply for credit markets. Most of the applications use a canonical specification, which
is a static model with unknown separation, to find evidences of credit rationing or
to determine whether supply or demand factors drive evolution of credit.
5In addition to the interest rate, banks set loan-to-value ratio. The value of collateral is deter-
mined by a value of a house to purchase. While lower loan-to-value indicates safer investment, it
reduces profit per loan issued. Therefore, banks might not be willing to lower loan-to-value ratio
to reduce the excess demand for loans. Similarly, in case of shortage of demand/excess supply
either banks already offer 100% loan-to-value mortgages, or they might not be willing to increase
loan-to-value ratio as it attracts risky borrowers, or because there is a regulatory barrier to increase
loan-to-value higher.
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1.2.1 Static models with known and unknown sample separation
The canonical static econometric disequilibrium model with unknown sample sepa-
ration is Maddala et al. (1974) (MN) representation:
Dt = β1Pt +X1tβ2 + u1t
St = α1Pt +X2tα2 + u2t (MN)
Qt = min(Dt, St)
It consists of stochastic demand and supply schedules and a deterministic ‘min’
condition. The ‘min’ condition implies that the observed quantity is equal to supply
(Qt = St), when there is excess demand (Dt > St), and the observed quantity is
equal to demand (Qt = Dt), when there is excess supply (Dt < St). X1t and X2t are
weakly exogenous determinants of demand and supply schedule respectively. Both
vectors include Pt and can have common variables but have to differ at least in
one variable (the exclusion restriction). X1t, X2t, Pt and Qt are observed variables
and St and Dt are unobserved latent variables. The contemporaneous prices Pt are
assumed to be exogenous. The error terms u1t and u2t are generally assumed to be
normal and independent over time with mean zero and variances σ21 and σ22.6
In applied literature MN canonical representation competes with an alternative
specification proposed by Ginsburgh et al. (1980) (GTZ), which assumes that de-
mand and supply schedules are deterministic and ‘min’ condition is stochastic:
Dt = X1tβ1
St = X2tα1 (GTZ)
Qt = min(Dt, St) + ut
Pros and cons of the two specifications are discussed in details in Stenius (1986).
In summary, both representations compete in terms of intuition, statistical proper-
ties and computational intensity. The stochastic demand and supply schedules have
a simple and intuitive economic interpretation that there are supply and demand
shocks. The stochastic ‘min’ condition in combination with deterministic supply
and demand could also be interpreted as uncertainty whether ‘demand or supply
can be traded in the market’ (Stenius (1986)). GTZ specification is not identified
in case all observations belong to either demand or supply, whereas MN canonical
specification is. However, both specifications are prone to the unboundedness of
a likelihood function, though GTZ maximum likelihood is argued to be easier to
handle. Assumption of normality of the error terms is not testable in MN specifi-
cation, but it is in GTZ. In applications GTZ specification is claimed to simplify
6It is argued that estimates are consistent even if there is serial correlation (Gourieroux et al.
(1987).)
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estimation of dynamic disequilibrium models, where a lagged transacted quantity
Qt−1 is included as a determinant of demand and supply (Vouldis (2015)).
The econometric disequilibrium models with unknown sample separation offer
some degree of generalisation, but at a cost of a considerable loss of information and
potential statistical issues (Goldfeld and Quandt (1975) and Kiefer (1979) as cited
in Maddala (1986)).7 However, if a researcher wants to establish periods of excess
supply and excess demand endogenously, only the models with unknown sample
separation could be used, unless prices imperfectly signal about sample separation.
The static disequilibrium models with known sample separation asserts that
prices identify observations into demand and supply. Fair and Jaffee (1972) repre-
sentation (FJ) adds a price-adjustment equation the canonical MN specification:
Dt = X1tβ1 + u1t
St = X2tα1 + u2t
4Pt = γ(Dt − St), γ > 0 (FJ)
Qt = min(Dt, St)
where γ is a parameter that captures price sensitivity to excess demand or supply.
When there is excess demand (excess supply), price has a tendency to adjust upward
(downward). This price-adjustment formulation implies that disequilibrium exists
because prices do not adjust fully to the equilibrium levels. The price adjustment
equation is deterministic and therefore restrictive. The demand and the supply
schedules are identified because the model contains an explicit equation for Pt.
Laffont et al. (1977) took another view on the price-adjustment equation. In
contrast to Fair and Jaffee (1972), they assumed that prices rise and fall in response
to disequilibrium and prices adjust differently to excess demand and excess supply.
The Laffont et al. (1977) (LG) model is represented like:
Dt = X1tβ1 + u1t
St = X2tα1 + u2t
∆Pt+1 = γ1(Dt − St) if Dt > St and γ1 > 0 (LG)
∆Pt+1 = γ2(Dt − St) if Dt < St and γ2 > 0
Qt = min(Dt, St)
In this formulation Pt+1 is endogenous and Pt is exogenous. Further extensions
7The statistical issues is related to a potential unboundedness of likelihood function. This
problem, though does not occur very frequently in applications (Maddala (1986)), arises when
variance of one of the error terms u1t or u2t is close to zero. For example, the error u1t will have a
zero variance when the model identifies only one observation as belonging to demand and the rest
to supply and vice verse for the error u2t.
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of the models with known separation include a stochastic specification of the price-
adjustment equation including a vector of additional determinants (Fair and Kelejian
(1974))). The Fair and Kelejian (1974) (FK) specification is:
Dt = X1tβ1 + u1t
St = X2tα1 + u2t
∆Pt = γ1(Dt − St) +X3tγ2 + u3t (FK)
Qt = min(Dt, St)
The directional disequilibrium model, a variation of the models with known
sample separation, assume that 4Pt ≷ 0 classifies observations into supply (>) or
demand (<). However, demand and supply schedules are not identified if a con-
temporaneous price Pt is included among determinants. There are just not enough
equations to determine the joint density of Pt and Qt (Maddala (1986)).
1.2.2 Dynamic econometric disequilibrium models
Dynamic models have an advantage of capturing a dynamic structure of data and
are particularly helpful when errors are serially correlated. Estimation of dynamic
disequilibrium models received some attention from researchers. The main challenge
is to include unobserved latent variables Dt−1, Dt−2, ... and St−1, St−2, ... as
determinants. Laffont and Monfort (1979) propose to use the price adjustment
equation as in Laffont et al. (1977) to obtain a tractable likelihood function. The
Laffont and Monfort (1979) (LM) specification looks like:
Dt = X1tβ1 + β2Dt−1 + β3St−1 + u1t
St = X2tα1 + α2Dt−1 + α3St−1 + u2t (LM)
Qt = min(Dt, St)
4Pt = γ(Dt − St), γ > 0 or
4Pt+1 = γ(Dt − St), γ > 0
The price-adjustment equation identifies demand and supply observations over
the whole sample period, allowing to include lagged values of the latent variables in
the model. Laffont and Monfort (1979) argue that the likelihood function is well-
behaved and two-stage least squares provides consistent estimates, which can serve
as initial values for the maximisation iteration procedure.
Lee (1997) took a step forward and proposed a tractable recursive algorithm for
simulated likelihood to estimate the dynamic version of the MD specification (Lee
(1997) model denoted as L):
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Dt = X1tβ1 + β2Dt−1 + u1t
St = X2tα1 + α2St−1 + u2t (L)
Qt = min(Dt, St)
Without sample separation information or some specific structural specification,
the likelihood function usually involves multiple integrals of very high dimension.
That is, in case of T observations, there will be 2T possible paths of regimes (at each
period an observation belongs either to demand or supply) and each path will be T-
fold integrals. There should be a tractable simulation method to obtain maximum
likelihood function. Lee (1997) argues that in the dynamic models with one lag
latent-dependent variable, where demand depends on its one own lagged demand
and supply depends on its one own lagged supply, simulation of only certain paths
is required. For example, at t = 3, simulated demand d3 following a path d1, s2
and a path s1, s2 will be the same because d3 only depends on d2, which in the
two paths has not realized at the second period. Similarly for simulated supply s3
will be the same for a path d1, d2 and a path s1, d2, because supply observation has
not realized at the second period. Therefore, according to Lee (1997) the problem is
reduced from 2T simulations to T (T+1) and becomes more tractable. The simulated
likelihood function is smooth in parameters and estimates are accurate in moderate
sample sizes. Lee (1997) suggested that asymptotic properties of the estimators are
still to be established.
Bauwens and Lubrano (2007) adopted a different view on the dynamic structure
of the disequilibrium models. Instead of having own lagged latent-dependent variable
in the demand and supply specifications, they included an observed quantity of
previous transactions Qt−1:
Dt = X1tβ1 + β2Qt−1
St = X2tα1 + α2Qt−1 (BL)
Qt = min(Dt, St) + ut
1.2.3 Empirical applications
Laffont et al. (1977) paper is among the first one to analyse supply of and demand
for business loans. They looked at the Canadian market for a period from 1968 to
1973 and constructed a model of demand and supply of business loans to determine
possibility of credit rationing. The results of the study concluded that business loans
for the period under consideration is mainly demand driven.
Sealey (1979) argues that the disequilibrium models are not only useful in estab-
lishing existence and measuring a magnitude of excess demand or supply, but also
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in analysing implications of credit rationing for monetary policy. They fit the model
for quarterly data on US commercial loans from 1952 to 1977 and, in contrast with
Laffont et al. (1977), the results suggest that the market is mainly supply driven.
The resulting discrepancy between estimated demand and estimated supply is large.
Therefore, the authors argued that effects of credit rationing on effectiveness and
speed of monetary policy are not symmetric during expansionary and contractionary
regimes. Under periods of tight monetary policy there are strong evidences of excess
demand, that is, a further tightening of credit conditions will have a great impact
on business investments. On the other hand, during periods of loose monetary pol-
icy, the market experience large surpluses of credit with no strong implications for
demand.
Laffont et al. (1977) and Sealey (1979) researches set a benchmark for analysis
of credit conditions using the econometric disequilibrium models. Similar studies
also focus on finding evidences of credit rationing (eg. Bauwens and Lubrano (2007)
for Polish market of corporate loans, Oulidi and Allain (2009) for Moroccan credit
market, Chen and Wang (2008) for Taiwan’s bank loans market after the Asian
financial crisis, Čeh et al. (2011) for Croatia market for loans to households and
enterprises).
More recent studies of credit conditions focus on finding evidences of credit
rationing during the recent financial crisis. For example, Schmidt and Zwick (2012)
analysed German market for private sector loans. They identified five categories
of lenders that differ by their exposure to international shocks. Such separation
allowed the authors to look at effects of financial crisis on each of the categories
and attribute any differences to variation in exposure of these lenders to external
shocks. Schmidt and Zwick (2012), however, found no evidence of credit rationing
or credit crunch and attributed such results to adjustments from a demand side and
to a strong recovery of supply in banks that were affected the most.
Laffont et al. (1977) argues that separate analysis of loans to individuals and
firms is crucial for analysis of macroeconomic effects, as behaviour of both agents
is different. Vouldis (2015) attempts to fix the gap of the existing literature that
has looked at either loans for enterprises or aggregated loans to both household and
enterprises. Vouldis (2015) analysed separately short- and long-term business loans,
consumer credit and mortgages in Greece from 2003 to 2011. The author argues
that during good times, loans across all categories were supply driven. During the
crisis mortgages, consumer loans and long term business loans remained driven by
supply in spite of supply constraints. The short term loans, on the other hand, are
estimated to be driven by demand, i.e. demand was lower than supply. In addition
to that, Vouldis (2015) argues that mortgages and consumer loans have a very high
elasticity to lending capacity and GDP, which are the main determinants of supply
and demand respectively, suggesting that mortgages and consumer credit is very
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responsive to macroeconomic conditions.
Applications of the disequilibrium models on firm level or household level data
have gained momentum in the recent years. Atanasova and Wilson (2004) are among
the first applications of the canonical static disequilibrium models on micro-level
data. The objectives of the study are to find determinants of supply and demand
for bank loans to small and medium enterprises in the UK from 1989 to 1999.
Determinants include not only firms’ characteristics but also indicators of a busi-
ness cycle in order to establish evidences of credit channel of a monetary policy trans-
mission mechanism. The disequilibrium model also allows to endogenously classify
firms into credit rationed, which is a notable advantage over existing literature that
splits firms into the categories exogenously. The results suggest that among various
determinants, firms’ existing assets affect loans availability via collateral channel.
It also shows that firms tent to substitute bank loans with internal financing or
inter-firm credit. The authors also found evidence of the credit channel of monetary
policy. That is, there are evidence that availability of loans for the SMEs decreases
when monetary policy is tight.
A more recent application of the disequilibrium model to firm-level data is con-
ducted by Kremp and Sevestre (2013). The analysis is focused on identifying po-
tential credit rationing in the SMEs loans market in France from 2000 to 2010. The
results do not provide evidence of the claims that firms faced borrowing constraints
in the years of the financial crisis, the result which is in line with the conclusions of
the various surveys on access to finance. While Kremp and Sevestre (2013) applica-
tion is very similar to Atanasova and Wilson (2004), the main contribution of the
paper is a proposition of alternative likelihood function for data prone to a selection
bias. The selection bias arises because firms with no bank loans are either fully
rationed or just haven’t applied for the loan. Moreover, for the firms that are fully
rationed interest rate is not observed. Therefore, a data sample is restricted to only
these firms that are either not rationed or only partially rationed.
Burlon et al. (2016) use confidential data from Italian credit bureau together
with data sources on bank-level and firm-level balance sheets to construct a unique
dataset on bank-firm-contract level. It allows to have supply and demand schedule
to be determined by both banks’ and firms’ characteristics as well as characteristics
of a bilateral loan contract.
This chapter has the following structure. In the section 2, we describe method-
ology and give details about the data used in this study. In section 3, we present
results including robustness checks and discuss the evolution of credit conditions




The main aim of the research is to endogenously identify periods of excess de-
mand and excess supply in the mortgage market. Therefore, a model with unknown
sample separation is preferred. Due to complications involved with the dynamic
disequilibrium models with unknown sample separation, including non-tractability
of simulated likelihood function discussed above and non-trivial implementation of
algorithm (Lee (1997)), the static specification is preferred. The static model high-
lights the long-run relationship of supply and demand determinants. Due to non-
stationary properties of the data, demand and supply schedules should be checked
for co-integrating relationships with its determinants. If there is a co-integrating
relationship, the estimates of the static equation is super-consistent. That is, evi-
dence of long run relationships will dismiss concerns of spurious results (Engle and
Granger (1987)). However, due to switching nature of the disequilibrium model,
there is no straightforward test for co-integration. In the later section indicative
tests for co-integration will be discussed. It will be further assumed that there are
separate demand and supply shocks, therefore, the Maddala-Nelson (MN) speci-
fication is preferred over Ginsburgh-Tishler-Zang (GTZ). The MN model will be
estimated using classical maximum-likelihood approach.
The likelihood function for observations Qt in the canonical Maddala-Nelson
specification
Dt = X1tβ1 + u1t
St = X2tβ2 + u2t (MN)






where h(Qt) is the unconditional density of observation Qt.
Define a joint probability of Dt and St as g(Dt, St), which is derived from a joint
density of errors u1t and u2t. If observation t is on demand function, according to
the model Dt < St and Dt = Qt. Hence,
h(Qt|Qt = Dt) =







Similarly, if observation t is on supply function, according to the model Dt > St
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and St = Qt. Hence,
h(Qt|Qt = St) =







The unconditional density of observation Qt can be written as:
h(Qt) = h(Qt|Qt = Dt)Pr(Qt = Dt) + h(Qt|Qt = St)Pr(Qt = St)

































Denote φ1(.) as a probability density function of N(X1tβ1, σ1), Φ2(.) as a cumu-















































= φ1(Qt) ∗ (1− Φ2(Qt))
Denote φ2(.) as a probability density function of N(X
′
2tβ2, σ2), Φ1(.) as a cumu-
























































= φ2(Qt) ∗ (1− Φ1(Qt))
Therefore,










For each period probabilities of excess supply or excess demand conditional on
27
data can be calculated:8






φ1(Qt) ∗ (1− Φ2(Qt))
φ1(Qt) ∗ (1− Φ2(Qt)) + φ2(Qt) ∗ (1− Φ1(Qt))
Existing software packages do not have the disequilibrium model built in. There-
fore, we built the maximisation procedure on MATLAB using Quasi-Newton algo-
rithm.9
The asymptotic properties of the MLE estimators are the following:
ˆβmle
A∼ N(β, Î ( ˆβmle|Qt)−1)
That is, the maximum-likelihood estimator ˆβmle is asymptotically consistent esti-
mator and normally distributed, where Î( ˆβmle|Qt)−1 is the sample Fisher information
matrix.






where seβi,mle is the square room of the i − th diagonal element of the variance-
covariance matrix Î ( ˆβmle|Qt)−1
The choice of initial values for the optimisation algorithm is determined using
the two-step OLS procedure proposed by Hurlin and Kierzenkowski (2007), which is
found to yield estimates close to the true parameters in a simulation exercise.10 The
procedure consists of the following steps. The first step requires regressing observed
quantity on demand determinants Qt = X1tγ1 + µ1t and supply determinants Qt =
X2tγ2 + µ2t using OLS. This gives first approximation of demand D̂t = X1tγ̂1 and
supply Ŝt = X2tγ̂2. The second step requires splitting the sample into implied
demand and supply observations. If an indicator function 1(D̂t > Ŝt) equals to 1
it puts all variables into the supply category, denote them as Qst , Xs2t and Xs1t, and
if it equals to 0, the variables are allocated into the demand category denote them





1t and Qst = Xs2tβ2 + µd2t. Resulting coefficient β̂1 and β̂2 are used as
initial values for the iteration procedure.
8Kiefer (1980) argues that unconditional probabilities do not capture all sample information
and therefore conditional probabilities are preferred (as cited in Maddala (1986)).
9Maximisation of a likelihood function could be a challenging task. Therefore, Bayesian in-
ferences that do not rely on finding maximum of the function became popular in the empirical
literature. Bauwens and Lubrano (2007) estimated the Ginsburgh et al. (1980) specification us-
ing Bayesian approach. Vouldis (2015) applied Bayesian inferences to the Maddala et al. (1974)
canonical specification.
10The choice of the initial values is important for the maximisation procedure. Depending on




This section describes variables used in the model. To select variables used in the
model, we closely follow literature on applications of disequilibrium models discussed
in the previous sections.
Figure 1 depicts the value of total sterling approvals of secured lending to indi-
viduals from early 90s to up to 2013. The total value of secured lending includes
mortgages (comprising 80 % of the total value), remortgages and additional lending
from an existing mortgage contract for general purposes, including house improve-
ment, car purchases, debt consolidation etc.11
The data period is between 1987Q2 to 2013Q4 and it covers the recession in early
90-s and the recent financial crisis. The earlier data is not available. We also prefer
to stop before 2014 as that was the year when the major regulatory changes in the
mortgage market were implemented (eg. Mortgage Market Review and the FPC
recommendation on interest rate stress testing and the LTI flow limit (FSA (2012),
FCA (2014a))). The two recessions have its similarities and differences; both are
characterised by a sharp fall in secured lending, high unemployment and a sharp
fall in house prices. However, in the early 90s the interest rate was high, which
did not allow households to relieve a burden of interest repayment, inflation was
high and there was no crisis in banking. The great recession on the other hand, is
characterised by low interest rate, low inflation, and the government bailout of the
systemic banks.
Figure 1: Total value of approvals for secured lending.
Supply determinants are discussed in line with the portfolio management theory.
These factors could be broadly grouped into a price structure of loans, lending
11The data and definitions are obtained form the Bank of England http://www.bankofengland.
co.uk/statistics/Pages/iadb/notesiadb/ltoi.aspx
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capacity, rates of alternative assets, the cost of available lending resources, and
expectation indicators.
Across the literature lending capacity is approximated by available lending re-
sources. Laffont et al. (1977) used term deposits and demand deposits, Chen and
Wang (2008) and Sealey (1979)-total deposit, Oulidi and Allain (2009), Vouldis
(2015)-total deposits adjusted for required reserves, Schmidt and Zwick (2012) -
sum of bank equity and saving, demand and time deposits. We use the total bank
deposits to approximate lending capacity in the economy.
Rates of alternative investments include interest rates on various instruments
that bank can use to diversify its resources. Laffont et al. (1977) used interest rate
on government bonds as a proxy to an alternative long term investment. Sealey
(1979) used interest rate on treasury bills. Vouldis (2015) argues that a long-term
investment could be determined by an interest rate on a short-term investment to
capture banks propensity to substitute across different maturities. In line with the
literature, we use the interest rate on long term government bonds as a rate for an
alternative asset.
Cost of available resources is generally captured by interest rate paid on deposits.
Sealey (1979) approximated a cost per dollar of deposit as a maximum interest rate
on time deposit multiplied by a ratio of time deposits over demand deposits. Laffont
and Monfort (1979) initially considered to use time deposit rate as a determinant on
its own, but due to potential correlation with the price structure of loans, instead
used the difference between the loans interest rate and the time deposit rate. This
interest rate spread captures the profitability of loan investment and enters the sup-
ply equation with negative sign. That is, if loans yield a return lower than the price
of resources, issuance of loans should be decreased. Other authors including Schmidt
and Zwick (2012) and Oulidi and Allain (2009) also approximated profitability with
interest rate spread. Similarly to the existing research, the difference between the
time deposit rate and the mortgage rate is used here.
Expectations about future conditions have been successfully approximated by
indices of industrial production (Laffont et al. (1977), Sealey (1979)) and stock
market indices (Vouldis (2015) and Chen and Wang (2008)). The index of industrial
production is used here.
A price structure of secured lending is approximated by the mortgage rate. The
descriptions of the data, including the unit root test, and its sources are in the
Appendix A Table 18 and Table 19.
Most of the literature focused on applications of the disequilibrium models for
business loans. However, Vouldis (2015) and Kent (1980) provide some guidance
on the choice of determinants for a demand for mortgages. The main consideration
to keep in mind is that explanatory variables must not include these variables that
reflect eventual credit rationing (Laffont et al. (1977)). Vouldis (2015) assumes a
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very general formulation of the demand schedule for mortgages, which includes only
lending rate and nominal GDP. Kent (1980) provides some theoretical argumentation
to the determinants of mortgage demand. That is, the author assumes that for
every desired level of housing services there is desired demand for mortgages. He
further assumes that the net change of mortgage holdings ∆mh is determined by the
difference between desired level of mortgage holdings mh∗ and mortgage holdings as
of the previous period mh−1, that is ∆mh = β(mh∗ −mh−1). In turn the desired
level of mortgage holdings depends on desired level of housing services, which is
pinned down by the theory of consumption choice. Thus, the desired level of housing
services depends on permanent income, implicit price of the housing services and
price of rental housing as the closest substitute for owner-occupied housing. Due
to data limitations, the determinants of the demand curve are chosen to be the
mortgage rate and the index of consumer confidence for major purchases, which is
used to approximate the desired level of housing services directly and does not affect
banks decision to credit ration. The description of the data, including the unit root
test, and its sources are in the Appendix A Table 18 and Table 19.
3 Results
3.1 The model’s point estimates
The following disequilibrium model is fitted to the data.
log(demand of new loans)t =α0+α1mortgage ratet+α2consumer’s confidencet+u2t
log(supply of new loans)t= β0+β1mortgage ratet+β2long term government bond
ratet+
β3index of industrial productiont−1+β4log(total deposits)t+β5(time deposit ratet-
mortgage ratet)+u1t
log(value of loans approved)t=min(log(supply)t, log(demand)t)
Results are presented in the Table 1.12 The coefficients of the model have intuitive
and statistically significant signs. As expected, the desired demand for mortgages
decreases with the mortgage interest rate. The coefficient is negative and statistically
significant. The desired supply of mortgage increases with the mortgage interest
rate. The coefficient is positive and statistically significant.
12An alternative specification, which takes into account two trending variables, house prices
and income, is reported in the Appendix A Table 20. The point estimates are not economically
intuitive, but the probabilities of excess supply are robust across the main and the alternative
specifications (see Figure 19).
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The point estimates of semi-elasticities and elasticities are in line with the exist-
ing literature. The demand semi-elasticity is -0.0685 and the supply semi-elasticity
is 0.1569, meaning that a 1% decrease in the mortgage interest rate results in a fall
of the supply of loans by 15% and an increase in the loans demanded by 6.8%, ev-
erything else constant. That is, supply is more elastic than demand, which is in line
with Chen and Wang (2008). The loan supply could be more elastic because banks
have different alternative instruments to invest into. The slopes of the demand and
the supply schedule are important for a static comparison.
The elasticity of the lending capacity is 0.9830, close to 0.998 as in Chen and
Wang (2008) and 0.88 as Oulidi and Allain (2009). The lending capacity coefficient
implies that a 1% increase in total bank deposits results in about 1% increase in the
supply of secured loans to individuals ceteris paribus.
The measure of profitability captured by the spread between the mortgage rate
and the rate on deposits are similar to the estimates from the static specification
of Schmidt and Zwick (2012). The point estimate for the profitability measure is
-0.0771, which implies that a 1% increase of time deposits rate over the mortgage
interest rate leads to a reduction in loans by 7.7%.





mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation 0.1569*** (0.0202)
long term government bond rate,
adjusted for inflation
-0.1230*** (0.0213)
index of industrial production, lagged 0.0446*** (0.0038)
log(total bank deposits, adjusted for
inflation)
0.9830*** (0.1940)







mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation -0.0685*** (0.0141)




*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically
significant at 10%
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3.2 Periods of credit rationing
The disequilibrium methodology endogenously splits periods into excess supply and
excess demand, i.e. it identifies potential periods of credit/quantity rationing. The
probabilities of excess supply Πt = Pr(St > Dt|Qt), which are derived in the
methodology section, are presented in the Table 2. Due to stochastic nature of
the demand and the supply equation, we categorise observations as excess supply
only when Πt > 0.5. The graphical visualisation of the probabilities is presented in
the Figure 2 alongside with a graph depicting the estimated desired demand D̂t and
the estimated desired supply Ŝt obtained form the model and the actual quality of
newly loans approved Qt.13
The pattern of the probabilities identifies prolonged periods of excess demand,
i.e. probable periods of credit (quantity) rationing, and periods of excess supply.
From the start of available data, in particular, from 1990 Q3 to 1991 Q2, the market
reveals some evidences of excess supply, which is mainly driven by high availability
of credit.
From the time of the economic recession in the UK up to around 1997 Q3, there
are evidences of excess demand, which was mainly driven by the depressed supply of
loans. That period coincides with high write-off and provisions set up by the banks.
Thus, during that period the mortgage market was supply driven and that was a
period of potential credit (quantity) rationing.
Figure 2: Probabilities of excess supply, loans approved, implied demand
for and implied supply of loans.
From 1997 Q3 to 2002 Q1, there are clear evidences of excess supply and it is
caused by rapid expansion of the credit, which coincides with the Golden era in
the banking industry (Haldane (2009)). The growth of actual transacted credit was
restrained by the demand for loans.
From 2002 Q1 up to about 2007 Q4, the evidences are mixed. On one hand,
13The scaling of the variables remains in logarithms as in the model specification.
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Table 2: Probabilities of excess supply.
Year Prob. Year Prob. Year Prob. Year Prob. Year Prob.
1995:I 0.1131 2000:I 1.0000 2005:I 0.2608 2010:I 0.1352
1990:II 0.9642 1995:II 0.0537 2000:II 1.0000 2005:II 0.2738 2010:II 0.0950
1990:III 0.9998 1995:III 0.3401 2000:III 1.0000 2005:III 0.1763 2010:III 0.4149
1990:IV 0.9057 1995:IV 0.1725 2000:IV 1.0000 2005:IV 0.1752 2010:IV 0.1358
1991:I 0.9996 1996:I 0.0814 2001:I 1.0000 2006:I 0.0922 2011:I 0.0733
1991:II 0.2879 1996:II 0.0928 2001:II 0.9999 2006:II 0.2457 2011:II 0.0903
1991:III 0.3044 1996:III 0.2955 2001:III 0.9984 2006:III 0.1976 2011:III 0.2172
1991:IV 0.7817 1996:IV 0.4248 2001:IV 0.9900 2006:IV 0.1529 2011:IV 0.2058
1992:I 0.5500 1997:I 0.1349 2002:I 0.3422 2007:I 0.0487 2012:I 0.2723
1992:II 0.3460 1997:II 0.1590 2002:II 0.3457 2007:II 0.1233 2012:II 0.1685
1992:III 0.3122 1997:III 0.7231 2002:III 0.3223 2007:III 0.0420 2012:III 0.2248
1992:IV 0.0577 1997:IV 0.9642 2002:IV 0.3424 2007:IV 0.4245 2012:IV 0.1259
1993:I 0.4366 1998:I 0.9999 2003:I 0.3058 2008:I 0.7499 2013:I 0.3116
1993:II 0.4784 1998:II 0.9998 2003:II 0.4765 2008:II 0.8789 2013:II 0.4655
1993:III 0.0861 1998:III 1.0000 2003:III 0.9427 2008:III 0.9997 2013:III 0.9724
1993:IV 0.1349 1998:IV 1.0000 2003:IV 0.9946 2008:IV 1.0000
1994:I 0.1136 1999:I 1.0000 2004:I 0.4721 2009:I 0.9934
1994:II 0.0890 1999:II 0.9996 2004:II 0.7617 2009:II 0.3235
1994:III 0.0986 1999:III 0.9971 2004:III 0.1979 2009:III 0.3978
1994:IV 0.1069 1999:IV 1.0000 2004:IV 0.2829 2009:IV 0.5100
the estimated supply of credit is somewhat higher than the estimated demand and
the actual credit was following closely supply. On the other hand, the probabilities
indicate that that period was characterised by excess demand. Moreover, the esti-
mated probabilities move around 0.5 threshold line during that period, indicating
that early 2000s could be characterised as a period of equilibrium.
At around 2007 Q4 the demand for loans dropped, while the supply was still
high. For about a year from 2007 Q4 to 2008 Q4, the model reveals that there is an
excess supply of credit. Later with the crisis deepening in the financial system, the
supply dropped significantly reducing availability of credit to households, while the
household demand recovered. Up until the last observation in the data, 2013 Q3,
there are no evidences of improving conditions on the credit market and households
might have been experiencing credit/quantity rationing.
Some of the existing studies discern demand from supply using answers from bank
officers to surveys on lending conditions (for example, Del Giovane et al. (2011)).
The credit conditions survey (CCS) commissioned by the Bank of England gives an
indicator of the demand and the supply conditions for secured and unsecured lending
to individuals and corporate firms in the UK. Therefore, we would like to compare
the results of the disequilibrium model with the survey indicators. The Figure 3
presents two graphs. The first one depicts estimated demand from the disequilibrium
model and evolution of demand for mortgage and remortgages from answers of the
bank officers on the following two questions “How has demand for secured lending
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Figure 3: Credit condition survey vs the MN disequilibrium model.
for house purchase from households changed in the past three months?” and “How
has demand for secured lending for remortgaging from households changed in the
past three months?”. The second plot depicts estimated supply and evolution of
supply of secured credit from answers of the bank officers on the following question
“How has the availability of secured credit provided to households changed in the
past three months?”.14 While the overall dynamic of the results of the disequilibrium
model and the answers of the bank officers are in line, the CCS suggests that the
availability of credit had dropped first and then demand followed, whereas the results
of the disequilibrium model suggest that demand had fallen first and then supply
followed. The CCS also suggests that the recovery in the demand is mainly driven
by an increase in the demand for remortgages.
In addition, the disequilibrium model split between the demand and the supply
is compared against results of the multiple breakpoints test in a specification con-
taining both demand and supply determinants. The break points identified could
be interpreted as switches between demand and supply schedules. 15 Therefore, the
following specification is fitted to the data.
log(value of loans approved)t= γ0+γ1mortgage ratet+γ2long term government
bond ratet+
γ3index of industrial productiont−1+γ4log(total deposits)t+γ5(time deposit ratet-
mortgage ratet)+
γ6consumer’s confidence +εt
The multiple breakpoints test identified the following dates: 1996Q2, 2001Q2,
14The baseline 2007 Q1 and indexed to 100, the indices for the following quarters are calculated
as It−1 ∗ (1 + %t/100).
15The model is also checked for the coefficients stability using CUSUMQ test in line with Hwang
(1980) who used CUSUM test. CUSUMQ is preferred because it has a stronger power when there
are changes in the slopes of the coefficients or variances of the error term (Turner (2010)). The
CUSUMQ plot is presented in the Appendix A Figure 20.
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2005Q3, 2009Q4. The vertical lines in the Figure 2 represent the break point dates
identified by the multiple break-point test. Visually they seem to be coinciding with
the split between the demand and the supply as per the results of the disequilibrium
model.
3.3 Testing for stationarity
The static disequilibrium model has been applied to time series data, which often
exhibit non-stationary properties. In applications the most popular approach is to
check for a co-integrating relationship for both demand and supply schedules and
to estimate long run relationships under the static formulation (Ghosh and Ghosh
(1999)). In absence of a co-integrating relationship Hurlin and Kierzenkowski (2007)
argues that non-stationary data could results in spurious results and non-intuitive
sample separation.
It is difficult to conduct a formal quantitative test on existence of a co-integrating
relationship, because both the desired demand and the desired supply are latent
variable and the error terms in the two schedules u1t and u2t are not observed.
However, there are some informal tests, which will be discussed in this chapter.
Ghosh and Ghosh (1999) suggested to find one co-integration relationship be-
tween the estimated implied demand and the actual quantity transacted and the
estimated implied supply and the actual quantity transacted. Other studies, includ-
ing Oulidi and Allain (2009) and Čeh et al. (2011), followed that test. However,
a potential problem with that test is that the actual quantity transacted belong
to either the demand schedule or the supply schedule. Instead, the first infor-
mal test is suggested here analyses residuals êt = Qt − Q̂t, where Q̂t = Pr(St >
Dt|Qt) ∗ Q̂dt + (1−Pr(St > Dt|Qt)) ∗ Q̂st , Qt is the actual quantity transacted, Q̂dt is
the estimated implied quantity demanded, Q̂st is the estimated implied quantity sup-
plied and Pr(St > Dt|Qt) = Πt are the implied conditional probabilities as derived
above.
A time series plot of these residuals and a scatter plot of the residuals with its
own lag are depicted in the Figure 4. The Dickey-Fuller and Phillips-Perron tests
(no lags) of the residuals gives the MacKinnon approximate p-values as 0.0011 and
0.0028 respectively with Zdf (t)=-4.056 and Zpp(t)=-3.809, thus rejecting the null
hypothesis of unit-root.16 These results should be treated with caution, because the
Engle and Granger (1987) test for co-integration has non-standard critical values.
Co-integration relationship between Qtand Q̂t is also checked using Johansen co-
integration test with 2 lags optimally selected by AIC, HQIC, SBIC criteria. The
trace test detects one co-integrating vector (results are presented in Table 3).
16The p-value of the ADF(1) is 0.0274. The second lag is not statistically significant, therefore
ADF(1) is preferred.
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Figure 4: Residuals from the static disequilibrium model, Q- Q̂t, where
Q̂t = Pr(St > Dt|Qt) ∗ Q̂dt + (1− Pr(St > Dt|Qt)) ∗ Q̂st .
Table 3: Test for co-integration between Q and Q̂t = Pr(St > Dt|Qt) ∗ Q̂dt +
(1− Pr(St > Dt|Qt)) ∗ Q̂st .
Maximum Rank Eigenvalue Trace Statistics 5% Critical Value
0 . 16.9872 15.41
1 0.14305 2.7851* 3.76
2 0.02982
The second informal test of the long run relationship is based on literature testing
for co-integrating relationship in the regime switching models (for example, Gregory
and Hansen (1996)). The disequilibrium model estimates implied conditional prob-
abilities Pr(St > Dt|Qt) = Πt that can be used to separate quantity transacted
into the demand and the supply regimes using an arbitrary threshold of 50%. Since
both the demand and the supply schedules are stochastic, regimes cannot be exactly
determined. Therefore, the threshold of more than 50 % chance to be either on de-
mand or supply seem to be justifiable. Thus, when Πt = Pr(St > Dt|Qt) > 0.5,
there is excess supply and the quantity transacted is determined by the explanatory
variables of the demand schedule. When Πt = Pr(St > Dt|Qt) < 0.5, there is excess
demand and the quantity transacted is determined by the explanatory variables of
the supply schedule. According to Gregory and Hansen (1996), the standard ADF
test for co-integration is performed on errors from a regime-switching model. The
specification of such model stipulates that the quantity transacted switches between
supply and demand regimes. The switches are captured using a dummy variable D.
D =
1, Πt < 0.50, otherwise
The following model specification is estimated using OLS:
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log(value of loans approved)t= γ0 ∗D+γ1mortgage ratet ∗D+γ2consumer’s
confidencet−1 ∗D+β0 ∗ (1−D)+β1mortgage ratet ∗ (1−D)+β2long term
government bond ratet ∗ (1−D)+β3index of industrial
productiont−1 ∗ (1−D)+β4log(total deposits)t−1 ∗ (1−D)+β5(time deposit ratet-
mortgage ratet)∗(1−D)+εt
The results of the estimation are presented in Table 4. The standard errors
are robust to potential heteroskedasticity. The estimated coefficients of the regime-
switching model are similar to ones of the disequilibrium model. All signs are as
expected, the magnitudes are with small discrepancies. The results for the two
models are similar, because the split between demand and supply regimes is deter-
mined by the results of the disequilibrium model. The results are not exactly the
same, because the stochastic nature of demand and supply schedule does not allow
to determine regimes exactly but only with some probability.




mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation*D -0.0462*** (0.0064)




mortgage rate, adjusted for
inflation*(1-D)
0.1434*** (0.0190)
long term government bond rate,
adjusted for inflation*(1-D)
-0.1159*** (0.0206)
index of industrial production,
lagged*(1-D)
0.0426*** (0.0038)
log(total bank deposits, adjusted for
inflation)*(1-D)
0.8953*** (0.1708)
∆(time deposits-mortgage rate), adjusted
for inflation*(1-D)
-0.0738** (0.0305)
*** statistically significant at 1%, ** statistically significant at 5%, * statistically
significant at 10%
The informal test on co-integration is performed on the residuals from this
regime-switching model. A time series plot of the residuals are depicted in Fig-
ure 5. The plot of the residuals show some similarities to the stationary process.
The DF and the ADF(1) tests, results of which are summarised in Table 5, give the
t-statistics of -5.4435 and -4.4958 respectively. Gregory and Hansen (1996) tabulated
the critical values for the ADF test for models with breaks in up to 5 coefficients
including one constant. The ADF critical value for 95% level two-sided test for 5
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coefficients is -6.64. Since there are 7 independent variables and two dummies, nei-
ther ADF(1) nor DF t-statistics reject a null hypothesis of the unit root. However,
these tests have lower power and are unlikely to reject the null of the unit root, even
if in both tests the coefficient γ is about 0.5, which is far from 0.
Figure 5: Residuals from the regime-switching model.





DF: 4ε̂t = c+ γ ∗ ε̂t−1 + ut
ADF(1): 4ε̂t = c+ γ ∗ ˆεt−1 + η ∗ 4 ˆεt−1
While the tests discussed above do not provide a robust conclusions on station-
arity, we consider there is enough evidence to suggest that there is co-integrating
relationships for the supply and demand schedule. However, it is worth stressing
that these results serve as an indication rather than a formal test of the validity of
the static model on non-stationary data.
4 Conclusion
In this chapter we use disequilibrium econometric model to discern demand and
supply in the UK mortgage market. We discussed why theoretically there could be
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a non-clearing price in the mortgage market and different econometric models and
their applications. We then used the canonical econometric disequilibrium model to
identify periods of credit rationing. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
study looking at credit conditions in the UK mortgage market using disequilibrium
econometric approach. We found that the periods of recession coincide with the
periods of credit rationing (or depressed supply) and the Golden era in banking
coincides with the period of supply expansion. Interestingly, the period prior the
financial crisis (from 2002 Q1 to 2007 Q4) exhibit some evidence of equilibrium in
the market and in the first year of the crisis (from 2007 Q4 to 2008 Q4) credit
conditions were driven by depressed demand. We also conducted econometric tests








The process of obtaining a mortgage is complex and consumers often rely on mort-
gage intermediaries who guide them through the mortgage application and provide
advice.
There are around 4000 active mortgage intermediaries in the market and they
differ in a number of ways (FCA (2018a)). From a regulatory point of view, in-
termediaries may be Directly Authorised (DAs) by the FCA or may be Appointed
Representative (ARs) of a Principal that is directly authorised. DAs are responsible
for compliance monitoring and other functions, while ARs rely on the oversight of
the Principal.
Intermediaries differ by the type of borrowers they tend to serve or by other type
of specialisations. For example, there are intermediaries specialising in high-income
or near prime borrowers, in mortgages on newly built properties or operating within
specific regional areas or operating solely online (eg Habito).17
Intermediary firms also vary in size, measured by volume or value of business.
While larger intermediaries may have hundreds of employees, there are also many
sole practitioner advisory firms. The sector is not particularly concentrated.
Some intermediaries use panels of lenders (ie a list of firms with which one firm
expects to do business), the sizes of which vary. Intermediaries receive a commission
from lenders (called ‘procuration fees’) for whom they originate a mortgage. In the
UK the structure of procuration fees is agreed between the intermediary firm and the
lender (FCA (2018b)). Lenders typically set procuration fees as a percentage of the
loan amount and some also set a minimum and/or a maximum amount. Different
lenders pay different procuration fees and some lenders pay different fees to different
intermediaries. Lenders may base their pricing structure on how important the
intermediary is to their distribution strategy or the quality of the intermediary’s
applications. Quality may take into account the ratio of applications that arrive to
completion or a fraud measure.
17There has been very little innovation in the mortgage advice space and only a few online brokers
are present in the market. According to FCA (2018a) ’there is little appetite among established
intermediaries and lenders to develop online advice services. Commercial incentives for doing this
appear limited. The responses also indicated a perception that the sector does not see a role for
online mortgage advice.’
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Procuration fees paid by lenders that cater for borrowers with non-standard cir-
cumstances are typically higher than those for mortgages for standard borrowers.
Anecdotal evidence from intermediaries and lenders suggests that applications from
borrowers with less straightforward circumstances, such as the self-employed or con-
tractors with complex income sources, may require intermediaries to collect more
information to satisfy lending criteria.
Contracts between lenders and intermediaries do not allow variations in procu-
ration fees depending on LTV or the volume of business an intermediary generates.
Additionally, mortgage intermediaries in the UK do not typically receive trail com-
missions (ie commissions paid over the lifetime of the product).
Procuration fees of a number of lenders increased around the end of 2014 and the
beginning of 2015. Some firms stated that this happened as a result of the Mortgage
Market Review and lenders focusing more on intermediated sales (FSA (2012)).
Borrowers may also pay a fee to the intermediaries, but this is not common.
Borrowers execute transaction with one intermediary firm only, but they do not
need to use the same intermediary to get a new mortgage deal.
Intermediaries search deals on behalf of borrowers. They need to find a suitable
deal that the consumer is likely to be accepted for. This is a complex task because
i) borrower characteristics and circumstances vary widely and ii) lenders’ lending
criteria may not be always transparent. Due to frictions in the market, intermedi-
aries may be motivated to act in their own best interest, which may be in conflict
with those of borrowers and result in borrowers paying more for a mortgage.
Mortgage intermediaries need to spend time and resources to identify the right
product for the borrower in terms of price, suitability and likelihood of approval by
a lender. Intermediaries are unlikely to have access to the lenders decision-making
criteria on credit risk or affordability. For example, the FCA found evidence that
lender criteria and affordability models are opaque (FCA (2018b)). While lending
criteria are publicly available, the finer detail may be less clear and the cost of
searching across lenders to be certain they will accept the consumer is high. In
addition to this, intermediaries may not be able to see, for example, the credit score
of consumers before sending a mortgage application. As a result, intermediaries
may decide to reduce search costs and recommend a product from a lender with less
strict criteria or that they are familiar with. This may result in some consumers
paying a higher price for their mortgage.
A potential misalignment of intermediaries incentives to find the best deal for
consumers could be exacerbated because borrowers have little information or do not
have tools to shop for intermediaries. The FCA found that there is little informa-
tion available to help consumers assess and compare intermediaries (FCA (2018b)).
If borrowers are not able to search for and compare intermediaries, some borrow-
ers may pay a higher price than others for their mortgage product depending on
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the intermediary used. Moreover, procuration fees may distort incentives of the
intermediaries to find the best deal to consumers.
1.2 Research questions
The first question we address is how the price of similar mortgage products for like-
for-like consumers varies across intermediary firms. Price dispersion in credit mar-
kets is well documented and it can often be attributed to credit risks and the ability
of lenders to price borrowers accordingly (for example Edelberg (2006), Adams et al.
(2009), Einav et al. (2013) and Allen et al. (2014a)). However, to the best of our
knowledge this is the first paper that investigates whether the choice of intermediary
has an impact on the price consumers pay for their mortgage.
When looking at the price borrowers pay, we recognise that mortgage cost can
differ because of borrower individual characteristics. For example, if one interme-
diary sells mortgages to borrowers who are on average riskier, then the price these
borrowers pay will on average be higher because of the higher risk. To take this
into account, we build a model for mortgage pricing to compare similar products for
like-for-like consumers. It captures factors that may have an effect on the mortgage
price, such as loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI), credit risk and property
postcode.
We find that the choice of intermediary led to economically significant differences
in the price of the mortgage. Looking at the cost of 2-year fixed rate mortgages
sold by different intermediaries to like-for-like consumers, we find a 27 basis points
difference in the average borrowing cost. This amounts to about an £800 difference
calculated on the median loan size over the introductory period.
We focus on a specific mortgage type (ie. two-year fix with capital and interest
repayments) because this reduces the likelihood that there is unobservable variation
in the make-up of the borrower pool. Also, two-year fixed products represent around
60% of the products sold between January 2014 and June 2016. We replicate the
analysis for 5-year fixed rate products (which account for over 20% of the mortgages
sold) and we still find significant price differences across intermediaries.
Despite controlling for an extensive range of characteristics of products, proper-
ties and borrowers, there may be characteristics that we cannot observe that may
affect the price paid and therefore our results. For example, the price variation may
be driven by unobservable factors that lead some intermediaries to choose more ex-
pensive lenders or some borrowers may prefer or need a certain lender for reasons
that are unobservable to us. To address this point, we run two robustness checks.
Firstly, we calculate the conditional price of mortgages sold to borrowers with
standard characteristics (ie, excluding self-employed and borrowers with poorer
credit history). Price dispersion is slightly smaller but still statistically and eco-
nomically significant. We find a 20 basis point difference in the average borrowing
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cost.
Secondly, we calculate the price variation across intermediaries of products of
the same lender sold to like-for-like consumers. We find that the price variation
is around 18bps. For the median loan amount and the median interest rate, the
difference amounts to £600. This suggests that the price of the same mortgage
product provided by the same lender for like-for-like consumers varies materially
across different intermediaries.
The second question we investigate are potential reasons why the cost of borrow-
ing varies across intermediaries. A large body of literature investigates the drivers
of poor broker advice on investment products (see Inderst and Ottaviani (2012b)
and Inderst and Ottaviani (2012a) for a theoretical framework).
A strand of the literature investigates how poor advice is a result of recommend-
ing the same product to all consumers, as advisors may have incentives to reduce
search costs and not to shop around extensively for the best product. For exam-
ple, Foerster et al. (2017) use data from the Canadian retail investment market and
find that advisers sell clients similar portfolios, independently from their clients’ risk
preference and stage in the life cycle. They also find that the adviser’s own portfolio
is a good predictor of what portfolio her clients hold.
Sometimes financial advisers might provide advice based on rule of thumbs pop-
ularised in financial advisers handbooks. For example, Agarwal et al. (2013) derived
a closed-form solution for optimal refinancing strategy and rules of thumb used by
financial advisers could only provide rough approximation to the optimal solution
and result in sub-optimal advice. We contribute to this literature by considering
whether intermediaries that use fewer, familiar lenders on average sell more expen-
sive products to consumers.
We find significant differences in the number of lenders that intermediaries use
during the period of time we looked at. Even when intermediaries use a similar
number of lenders, we observe a range of strategies. For example, some interme-
diaries concentrate most of their business with a few lenders while others place it
more evenly with many. Some intermediaries use panels of lenders (ie a list of firms
with which one firm expects to do business), the sizes of which vary. Irrespective of
whether they operate panels, the number of lenders that intermediaries place their
business with varies: some intermediaries source products from a few lenders while
others source products from many.
Table 6 shows the number of lenders each intermediary uses. In 2015, around
16% of intermediaries used only one lender and around 33% used between two and
five lenders. This is partly due to either intermediaries that are small or the fact
that mortgages are not a main business line. If we restrict the analysis to those that
sold at least 50 mortgages in 2015, the proportion of intermediaries using five or
fewer lenders falls to 4%.
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Such differences in the number of lenders used are reflected in how intermediaries
spread business across lenders. To assess this, based on the Herfindahl-Hirschman
Index (HHI), we build a measure that takes into account the amount of business
placed with each lender. HHI is typically used by competition and regulatory author-
ities to measure market concentration.18 We use HHI to measure how intermediaries
source mortgage business from different lenders. 1/HHI is proportional to the num-
ber of lenders used – a higher HHI typically indicates that an intermediary uses
fewer lenders.
HHI takes values between zero and one. Low values indicate that an intermediary
sources mortgages from many lenders, while high values indicate that it places most
of the business with few lenders. The HHI-based measure is equal to one when all
the products sold by an intermediary are sourced from one lender.
Figure 6 shows how the HHI-based measure varies across intermediaries. Figure
6 also shows that the market for providing mortgage intermediation is very frag-
mented. Around 62% of intermediaries sold just 10% of all intermediated mortgages
in 2015. Smaller intermediaries, with low numbers of sales, typically use a smaller
number of lenders on average.
We also calculate the proportion of business an intermediary sources from each
lender. A high proportion suggests that an intermediary is familiar with a lender.
Figure 7 shows the proportion of sales that each intermediary placed with familiar
lenders. We order intermediaries so that on the left of Figure 7 we have those inter-
mediaries that source a large proportion of their mortgages from the most familiar
lender and to the right those sourcing a small proportion of mortgages from the
most familiar lender.
The line made up of green circles shows the proportion of business placed with the
most familiar lender for each intermediary. As one can expect, the line is downward
sloping and mimics the HHI-based measure in Figure 6. Figure 7 shows, for example,
that around 50% of the intermediaries source at least 40% of the mortgages they
sell from one lender.
We also calculate the proportion of business that each intermediary places with
both the two most familiar lenders and the three most familiar lenders. The former




i , where si is the market share of entity i.
While competition and regulatory authorities use HHI to measure market concentration, we use
HHI to assess how intermediaries place business across lenders. In our context, si is the amount
of business placed with lender i by a given intermediary.
Table 6: Number of lenders used by each intermediary in 2015.
Number of lenders used
1 2-5 6-10 11-15 >15 Total
% of intermediary firms 16% 33% 33% 13% 5% 100%
% of intermediary firms (>=50 sales) 2% 2% 32% 42% 21% 100%
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After controlling for borrower, product and property characteristics, we find that
intermediary firms that place business with a larger number of lenders sell on average
cheaper products, while those that use fewer lenders sell on average more expensive
products. We also find that products sourced from familiar lenders are on average
more expensive compared to products sourced from less familiar lenders.
These findings can be interpreted in several ways. For example, intermediaries
might be tempted to use a smaller number of lenders to reduce search costs. As a
result, they might be unable to pick a cheaper deal because they are using a limited
range of products. Alternatively, intermediaries might use fewer, familiar lenders to
minimise the risk of rejection, as they have a better understanding of the lending
criteria of particular lenders. They might therefore trade-off the risk of rejection
with higher product prices.
The last question we investigate in this chapter is whether high procuration fees
lenders pay to intermediaries are associated with intermediaries selling more expen-
sive products to consumers. If the differences between these procuration fees are
large, intermediaries face a conflict of interest. They may be tempted to maximise
the income from procuration fees, rather than recommend a cheaper or more suit-
able product. This may result in some consumers paying a higher price for their
mortgage. Thus we consider whether intermediaries that receive higher procuration
fees on average sell more expensive products to consumers.
A strand of the literature investigates whether commissions lead to poor advice
by creating incentives for advisers to recommend products that are not in the best
interest of consumers. Indeed, Mullainathan et al. (2012) using audit methodology
to test the quality of advice and find that advisers push for actively managed funds
that have higher fees, even if the client starts with a well-diversified, low-fee portfolio.
Anagol et al. (2017) conducted field studies in India to assess quality of advice for
insurance products. The study finds that financial advisers recommend unsuitable,
strictly dominated products, which provide high commissions to the agent. Other
studies, like Christoffersen et al. (2013) or Barber et al. (2005) also study impacts
of commissions on recommendations.
Robles-Garcia (2019) is the only paper we are aware of that also studies the
relationships between commissions and mortgage recommendations in the UK. It
finds a strong correlation between procuration fees and lender’s market share with
a broker. As the commission to a broker increases, lenders’ market share with that
broker increases as well. It further argues that intermediaries allow challenger banks
(usually small and new lenders with lower brand recognition that offer on average
higher procuration fees) to increase their market share and to improve competition.
It finds that borrowers that use an intermediary are 7% more likely to choose a
product of a challenger bank.
The role of commissions in also an important topic for regulatory authorities. For
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example, in 2009 the FSA looked at the mortgage market and did not find evidence
that the remuneration model and potential commission bias in the mortgage market
caused poor outcomes (FSA (2009)). In 2017 ASIC conducted a review of mortgage
intermediary remuneration and found that upfront commission may represent a way
to increase loan flow (ASIC (2017)).
We find little dispersion of procuration fees. The difference between the 10th
and the 90th percentile is around 0.08%. Calculated on the median loan amount
of around £147,000, this results in a gross difference of less than £120. However,
specialist lenders that offer products for borrowers with non-standard circumstances
and characteristics typically pay higher procuration fees.
We recognise that, offered a range of significantly different fees, intermediaries
may choose the products and lenders that pay the most. However, we find little
evidence that intermediaries selling highly priced mortgages actually also receive
high procuration fees. In the few cases where this does happen, we do not consider
that higher procuration fees adversely affect consumers because other factors may
play a significant role. These factors include, for example, unobservable borrower
characteristics (such as the length of trading history for self-employed) that may
lead intermediaries to recommend a specialist lender.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the data
we use and the methodology to assess our three questions and Section 3 describes
the results. Section 4 concludes.
This research was conducted alongside the FCA mortgage market study and the
findings contributed to the mortgage market study interim report.19
2 Research design
2.1 Data
We use an extensive dataset which includes a number of borrower, property and
product characteristics. Product Sales Data 001 (PSD001), which provides transaction-
level data on all first-charge residential mortgages completed in the UK, is matched
to the MoneyFacts dataset (that includes additional product characteristics), a
credit reference dataset (that includes additional borrower characteristics such as
credit score), the Financial Services Register (that includes additional information
on mortgage intermediaries) and the HM Land Registry (that includes additional
property characteristics). We provide details of each dataset below.
The main source of data is PSD001, which is a regulatory dataset the FCA
19The UK Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) began a review of the mortgage market in 2015.
The FCA published a Call for Input inviting views from market participants on areas in which
competition issues may exist and merit further investigation (FCA (2015)). The FCA issued a
feedback statement and it launched a market study to investigate competition in the mortgage
market (FCA (2016a), FCA (2016b))
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collects quarterly. PSD001 is a transaction-level dataset that covers all regulated
first-charge mortgage transactions in the UK since April 2005. It includes informa-
tion collected from each lender at point of origination on product characteristics (eg
loan amount, property value, mortgage term, interest rate type, initial interest rates
and procuration fees), borrower characteristics (eg age, income, employment status)
and on the intermediary that sold the product, if relevant.
Data from 2015 onwards is more comprehensive because of changes to report-
ing fields made between January and June 2015. The dataset before July 2015 is
supplemented with a data request to the largest lenders in the market, whose total
sales made up over 90% of the market. The data request covers the period January
2014 to June 2015. The additional data request included missing information on
interest rate, lender fees, procuration fees and the date when the incentivised rate
period ended. PSD001 is matched to the mortgage MoneyFacts dataset. The Mon-
eyFacts dataset provides additional information on mortgages. The dataset at our
disposal covers mortgage products available in the market from 11 October 2011 to
30 November 2016.
We are particularly interested in the product characteristics, such as lender fees
and initial period of fixed rate for fixed interest rate mortgages, where the PSD001
returns have missing values, and the reversion rate, as that is not recorded in the
PSD001 returns. PSD001 is also matched to credit reference data which include
credit score and a number of other variables on borrower credit history (eg past
County Court Judgement or other marks in the credit history, such as arrears),
on borrower indebtedness and on borrower usage of other financial products (eg
whether the borrower holds a Personal Current Account (PCA) with the mortgage
lender) at the time the mortgage was taken out. In some cases, this information
can affect the price of the mortgage, for example because lenders sometimes offer
preferential price to their PCA customers. The credit reference dataset covers the
borrowers that completed a mortgage transaction between July 2012 and June 2016.
To supplement our information on intermediaries, PSD001 is matched to the
Financial Services Register information on intermediaries’ authorisation status (eg
whether the intermediary is an Appointed Representative or a Directly Authorised
firm) and, if applicable, the name of their directly authorised Principal. Finally,
PSD001 is further matched to the HM Land Registry to include additional property
characteristics, such as whether the mortgaged property is a new build or an older
property.
2.2 APRC-based price measure
We compare mortgage products using an APRC-based price measure that takes into
account both the initial interest rate and the fees each consumer paid to the lender
to set up their mortgage. As a starting point, we use the definition of the Annual
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Percentage Rate of Charge (APRC) as described in the Mortgage Credit Directive
(MCD), introduced and transposed into the FCA Handbook in March 2016. See the
Appendix B for more details on how we calculate the price of a mortgage.
We adjust the APRC by not including the fees paid by consumers to the inter-
mediary. This is because we are interested in assessing the price of products sold by
the intermediary rather than the total cost of borrowing for the consumers. Also,
given a consumer can pay a lender’s fees either up-front or over the life of the loan
(ie ‘roll-up’ the fee), we assume fees are rolled-up.20 Finally, we calculate the price
of the mortgage using two different time periods: over the initial incentivised rate
period and over the mortgage term.
In the baseline analysis, we base our cost measure on the initial interest rate
charged over the initial incentivised rate period (eg, two years). This is equivalent
to assuming consumers only take into account the initial interest rate and switch to
a new deal as soon as or shortly after the mortgage reverts to the reversion rate.
In other words, we assume that consumers expect they will have repaid the loan
with the original lender in full at the point of remortgaging to another lender. We
follow this approach because we want to assess the price of a mortgage, regardless
of consumers’ switching decisions. In support of our approach, we also find that
the large majority (around 80%) of consumers on fixed and variable mortgages with
two-year and five-year incentivised rate period expiring in 2015 either switched to a
new product with their existing lender, or redeemed their mortgage (FCA (2018b)).
In the Appendix B we also calculate the cost measure over the mortgage term,
including the reversion rate (typically the lender’s Standard Variable Rate (SVR))
in the calculations. Note that our analysis focuses on the price paid by the borrowers
and does not assess whether the product sold by the intermediary is suitable or not.
2.3 Sample construction
In this section we provide details on how we construct the sample we use for the anal-
ysis. As our work focuses on intermediaries, we limit the analysis to intermediated
mortgages sales, which in 2016 accounted for around 67% of the market.
We exclude equity release mortgages, bridging loans, business loans and mort-
gages for high net worth individuals. We also exclude offset mortgages, shared
ownership mortgages, low start mortgages, mortgages on self-build, shared appreci-
ation mortgages and guarantor mortgages. These types of mortgages account for a
small proportion of the market.
We limit the analysis to First Time Buyers, Home Movers and Remortgagors
(where there is a change of lender). We exclude Right-to-Buy and other types of
20According to the ESRO consumer research many consumers opt to roll up their




borrowers, which account for less than 1% of the market. We further restrict the
analysis to mortgages with capital and interest repayment methods, which account
for over 96% of all transactions.
We also restrict the analysis to mortgages with an incentivised rate period of two
years. Additionally, we conduct robustness checks on mortgages with a fixed interest
rate over an initial period of five years. Mortgages where the interest rate is fixed
for two or five years make up the majority of the market – accounting for around
81% of all mortgages sold in 2016. We do not include variable rate products as they
represent a small proportion of the market (see Table 7). Moreover, procuration fees
for each intermediary-lender pair do not vary by repayment method or by borrower
or interest rate type.
Focusing on a specific mortgage type (ie two-year fix with capital and interest re-
payments) reduces the likelihood that there is unobservable variation in the make-up
of the borrower pool. The restriction to two-year fixed deals also has the additional
advantage that the initial rate becomes a natural cost measure to consider, given
that the vast majority of borrowers re-finance at the end of the incentive period.
Table 7: Number of transactions by type.
Total intermediated sales (Jan 2014 to Jun 2016) 1,430,503
Mortgages by borrower types 100%
First Time Buyer 33%
External Switchers 32%
Home Movers 34%
Other borrower types (eg, Right to Buy) 1%
Mortgages by repayment method 100%
Capital and interest 96%
Interest only 3%
Mix of ’capital and interest’ and ’interest only’ 1%




Other fixed rate 6%
Other interest types (eg, variable, tracker) 6%
Finally, given that the credit reference dataset only covers transactions until
June 2016, we restrict the analysis to mortgages completed between January 2014
and June 2016. We refer to the sample resulting from the above cuts as the full
sample.
To run robustness checks, we build a second sample which is a subset of the
full sample and excludes mortgages completed by the self-employed and borrowers
with poorer credit history. We refer to the second sample as the mainstream sample.
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From the mainstream sample we exclude the self-employed because we do not observe
a number of important factors about these borrowers (eg the length of the trading
history). These factors may affect the likelihood of getting a mortgage and/or the
price. For example, specialist lenders are typically willing to lend to borrowers
with shorter trading history, so these factors may force some self-employed to use a
specialist lender and thus pay a higher price for their mortgage.
We also exclude borrowers with County Court Judgments (CCJ), mortgage ar-
rears, Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA), bankruptcy and borrowers with
credit score in the lowest 20th percentile.
To ensure the results are consistent, we limit the analysis to those intermedi-
aries and those intermediary-lender ‘pairs’ that sold at least, respectively, 50 and
30 mortgages over the period. Table 8 shows the different cuts and the number
of observations available for the analysis.21 We conduct robustness checks on the
thresholds used.






pairs with more than
30 sales at a given level of
procuration fees (Model 4)
Number Number % Number %
Full sample
Observations 782,810 742,018 95% 507,024 65%
Lenders 63 62 98% 31 49%
Intermediaries 4,268 1,068 25% 437 10%
Mainstream sample
Observations 500,545 461,962 92% 308,769 62%
Lenders 62 61 98% 28 45%
Intermediaries 4,013 707 18% 235 6%
The descriptive statistics for the full sample, after dropping the intermediaries
with less than 50 sales, are presented in Table 9. Our full sample includes 742,018
mortgages, sold between January 2014 and June 2016 by more than 60 lenders. The
sample includes 288,159 first time buyers, 250,711 external switchers and 203,148
home movers. The median loan amount is around £147,000 and the median income
is £46,000.
Unsurprisingly, first time buyers have on average smaller loans and lower income
while home movers have larger loans and higher incomes. The median LTV is around
80% and the median LTI is 3.4. As one may expect, first time buyers have higher
median LTV and LTI than other borrower types. The median age of borrowers in
the sample is 34.22 The median level of procuration fees paid is around 0.4% of the
21This sample includes two-year fixed mortgage products with Capital and Interest repayment
sold to First Time Buyers, Home Movers and Remortgagors, after removing non-standard mortgage
products and outliers. Overall, the cleaned full and the mainstream samples represent respectively
55% and 35% of all intermediated sales
22If the mortgage is on a jointly basis, the table shows the average age of the borrowers
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loan amount. The difference between the 10th and the 90th percentile (respectively
0.33% and 0.41%) is around 0.08%. Based on the median loan amount of £147,000,
choosing a product with a high procuration fee instead of a low procuration fee
product could result in less than £120 extra in remuneration before tax per sale.
This is a measure of the potential gain when selling a high procuration fee product.
Table 9: Descriptive statistics, full sample .
Number of observations
742,018
Number of observations broken down by Borrower type First Time Buyers Home Movers External Switchers
288,159 250,711 203,148
Income basis Joint Single
426,326 314,761
Employment status Full time Self-employed
665,333 76,685
Building type New build Older property
85,851 634,575
Variables 1st quartile median 3rd quartile mean
Price (%) 2.29 2.78 3.71 3.07
Loan value (£) 104,550 147,250 212,329 174,204
Total gross income (£) 32,988 45,795 65,000 54,559
Loan-to-value 68% 80% 87% 75%
Loan-to-income 2.65 3.37 4.04 3.32
Mortgage term (months) 264 300 360 316
Age (years) 29 34 41 35
Procuration fees (% of the loan amount) 0.35% 0.40% 0.40% 0.38%
2.4 Methodology
In this section we present the methodology to investigate the following questions.
First, whether the average price of similar mortgage products for like-for-like bor-
rowers varies materially across intermediaries. Second, whether intermediaries that
receive higher procuration fees on average sell more expensive products to consumers.
Finally, whether intermediaries that use fewer, familiar lenders on average sell more
expensive products to consumers.
We start by building a model for mortgage pricing that captures factors that
may affect the price of the mortgage. To take into account that mortgage costs may
vary because of borrower, product and property characteristics, the model controls
for a number of factors such as LTV, LTI, loan size, age, credit risk, whether the
lender is the PCA provider and property postcode.23
The following baseline specification is fitted to the data:24
Pricelibt = θXi + φYp + γZd + ft + fa + elibt (1)
where Pricelibt is the price of the mortgage provided by lender l, sold to a bor-
rower i by intermediary b at time t. Xi are borrower characteristics such as age
23See the Appendix B for a comprehensive list of the controls used
24See Best et al. (2015) and Eckley et al. (2017) for alternative pricing models for the UK
mortgage market. Our model is richer and controls, for example, for credit score and for whether
the borrower has a personal current account with the lender.
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brackets, LTI and LTV bands, credit score (specific for mortgages), levels of monthly
payments for unsecured debt, whether the application is filed by a self-employed or
a employed borrower, on single or joint basis, and whether the borrower is a first
time buyer, a home mover or a remortgagor. Yp are product characteristics such as
mortgage term, loan value and whether the mortgage is taken with the borrower’s
provider of a personal current account. Zd are property characteristic of whether it
is newly built or not.
These variables are important as they control for observable characteristics that
could explain difference in the riskiness of the underlying mortgages and prices. It
means that the model compares prices for borrowers that are like-for-like across these
dimensions. If we don’t control for these characteristics, their effects would mislead-
ingly end up in the intermediary fixed effects, that we will use later to compare
performance of intermediaries.
ft are year-month dummies. Controlling for a time dimension is important to
allow comparison of like-for-like borrowers overtime. These dummies take into ac-
count all macroeconomic factors that were changing overtime, for example, a steady
fall in mortgage interest rates or a general economic activity.
fa are dummies for regional areas (using outward postcode).25 The regional
areas fixed effects will control for the local demand volatility and long-run supply
constraints in housing markets, which in turn jointly explain price volatility in these
markets (Hilber and Vermeulen (2016)). Location specific price volatility affects
location specific default risk and because intermediaries will have a local presence,
unless area fixed effects are controlled for, these effects would misleadingly end up
in the intermediary fixed effects. Again, we want to compare differences in the
performance of intermediaries, and not observed differences in the riskiness of the
underlying mortgages.
We use outward postcode as it is the most granular classification to control for
geographical areas characteristics that does not cause the multicollinearity problem.
θ, φ, γ are the regression coefficients.
We consider four additional specifications, which take into account a combination
of time-invariant intermediary specific, lender specific, as well as intermediary-lender
pair specific characteristics, which are captured by corresponding fixed effects (see
Table 10).
The intermediary fixed effects fb capture common variation in the price of the
products sold by the same intermediary. These fixed effects will reflect differences in
intermediaries business models (for example, firms that use a limited set of lenders
vs firms that use a wider range of lenders, or small vs large firms) and how these
features result in variation of prices that consumers pay.
The lender fixed effects fl capture common variation in the price of the products
25The outward code is the part of postcode before the space in the middle and it is between two-
and four-character long
54
of the same lender.
The intermediary-lender pair fixed effects flb capture intermediary-lender specific
characteristics, that is, any common variation of the price of the products sold by
a given intermediary-lender pair. This includes common variation due to, eg com-
mercial agreements between the intermediary and the lender, such as procuration
fees.
In the next section we discuss how we use these models to assess the three
questions. In the Annex we discuss how much variation is captured by borrower,
product and property characteristics. We also compare their explanatory power to
the explanatory power of lender and intermediary attributes.
Table 10: Fixed effects used.
Fixed effects Specification
Model 1 Intermediary fixed effects Pricelibt = θXi + φYp + γZd + ft + fa + fb + elibt
Model 2 Lender fixed effects Pricelibt = θXi + φYp + γZd + ft + fa + fl + elibt
Model 3 Lender and intermediary fixed effects Pricelibt = θXi + φYp + γZd + ft + fa + fb + fl + elibt
Model 4 Intermediary-lender pair fixed effects Pricelibt = θXi + φYp + γZd + ft + fa + fbl + elibt
To ensure consistency of the fixed effects, in the baseline and in Model 1, 2 and 3
the analysis is restricted to the mortgages sold by intermediary firms that sold more
than 50 mortgages. In the model with the intermediary-lender pair specific fixed
effects (Model 4), we only analyse the intermediary-lender pairs with more than 30
transactions at a given level of procuration fees. We implement robustness checks
on the threshold to ensure results are robust to different cut-off thresholds. The
models are estimated using OLS, with standard errors clustered by intermediary to
account for correlation in the behaviour of mortgagors using the same intermediary.
We assess how average mortgage price varies by intermediary for like-for-like
consumers by calculating the intermediary fixed effects from Model 1. This model
controls for borrower, product and property characteristics to take into account fac-
tors that may affect mortgage cost. For example, if an intermediary sells mortgages
to borrowers who are on average riskier, then the price these borrowers pay for their
mortgages will on average be higher because of the higher risk. Therefore, the co-
efficients of intermediary fixed effects from Model 1 indicate the average mortgage
price per intermediary of similar products provided by different lenders and sold to
like-for-like consumers.
We use two robustness checks. Firstly, we estimate Model 1 on the mainstream
sample, which excludes self-employed and borrowers with poorer credit history. Sec-
ondly, we calculate the intermediary fixed effects from Model 3. In addition to the
control variables in Model 1, Model 3 includes lender-specific characteristics. There-
fore the coefficients of intermediary fixed effects indicate the average mortgage price
per intermediary of similar products provided by a given lender and sold to like-for-
like consumers. Model 3 mitigates possible effects from unobserved factors that lead
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either intermediaries to specialise in certain lenders or some borrowers to prefer a
certain lender.
We then investigate the two remaining hypotheses by considering procuration
fees and number of lenders each intermediary uses. We assess these hypotheses
by using the intermediary-lender pair fixed effects from Model 4. We are particu-
larly interested in how characteristics of the relationship between intermediaries and
lenders (eg contractual level of procuration fees agreed between them or the number
lenders used by an intermediary) explain the price dispersion of mortgages across
intermediary-lender pairs.26
The following model is fitted to the data:
f̂bl = a+ θproc.feesbl + φNb + ebl (2)
where the f̂bl is the estimate of the intermediary-lender pair fixed effects for a
given level of procuration fee between the pair, proc.feesbl is the procuration fees
paid by lender l to intermediary b and Nb are characteristics of the intermediary (eg,
the number of lenders used in a year, HHI-based measure or size of the intermedi-
ary).27 θ and φ are the regression coefficients. The standard errors are adjusted to
be robust to heteroscedasticity.28 As a robustness check we estimate this model on
both the full and mainstream sample.
3 Results
In this chapter we present the assessment of the three questions we investigate. See
the Annex for a description of the pricing model we developed and a discussion of how
mortgage price varies for different consumer, product and property characteristics.
3.1 The average price for like-for-like borrowers varies mate-
rially across intermediaries
The estimates of the coefficients of the intermediary fixed effects from the model
with intermediary fixed effects only (Model 1) are plotted in Figure 8.29
Conditional on borrower, product and property characteristics, we find that the
price of a mortgage varies materially across intermediaries. Intermediaries on the
right hand side of Figure 8 sell on average more expensive products and those on
26For similar methodological approach see, for example, Foerster et al. (2017)
27Over the relevant period some lenders have changed the level of the procuration fees. Therefore,
we observe multiple levels of procuration fees for the same intermediary-lender pair. In the analysis
we treat intermediary-lender pairs with different levels of procuration fees as separate fixed effects.
28The heteroscedasticity robust standard errors controls for unknown structure of heteroscedas-
ticity in error terms. If there is no heteroscedasticity, the robust standard errors will become
conventional OLS standard errors.
29Figure 8 also shows the confidence interval for each individual fixed effect.
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the left hand side sell cheaper products.
Figure 8: Estimates of intermediary fixed effects (full sample).
Comparing the cost of two-year fixed rate mortgages for like-for-like consumers,
the difference in the average price between the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile
intermediary is around 27 basis points.30 This represents a 10% price increase over
the median mortgage price (which is 2.78% in our sample).
Table 11 shows the monetary amount corresponding to 27 basis points for differ-
ent loan values. 27 basis points correspond to extra £778 for the median loan value
over the two-year incentivised rate period (assuming the mortgage is held until the
end of the incentivised rate period and consumers refinance after that).31 The extra
payment is around £553 for the 25th percentile loan value and around £1,122 for
the 75th percentile loan value.
These findings suggest that the intermediary a consumer uses has a significant
impact on the cost of the mortgage.3233
The price variation across intermediaries cannot be explained by characteristics
of the borrower, product and property included in the regression in equation (1), such
as LTV, LTI, credit risk, age, employment status or loan size. The Appendix B gives
a comprehensive list of the characteristics included in the regression. However, there
30The price difference between the 25th percentile and the 75th percentile intermediary is around
12bps. This corresponds to around £346 more for the median loan value. Differences are statisti-
cally and economically significant.
31We calculate the additional cost on the median size of the mortgage of around £147,000. £800
is the difference in the total interest paid over the two years period between two products with a
27 basis points difference in the price (ie, 2.78% vs. 3.05%).
32We consider whether intermediaries selling cheaper product also charge higher fees to bor-
rowers, as they may compensate for the time and resource they use to find cheaper products.
However, we do not find evidence that intermediaries selling cheaper products charge higher fees
to borrowers.
33We obtain similar results by cutting intermediaries with less than 100 sales.
57
Table 11: 27 bps correspond to different monetary amounts for different
loan sizes.
Distribution
of the loan value
(quartiles and average)
Loan values
27 bps correspond to
the following monetary amounts





may be characteristics that we cannot observe that may affect the price paid and
therefore our results. For example, the price variation may be driven by unobservable
factors that lead some intermediaries to choose more expensive lenders or some
borrowers may prefer or need a certain lender for reasons that are unobservable to
us.
To address this point, we run two robustness checks. Firstly, we calculate the in-
termediary fixed effects of the Model 1 using the mainstream sample, which excludes
self-employed and borrowers with poorer credit history. The variation of intermedi-
ary fixed effects in the mainstream sample is smaller, which is to be expected given
the more homogenous nature of borrowers in the mainstream sample. However, it is
still statistically and economically significant. The difference between the 10th and
the 90th percentile intermediary is around 20bps (see Figure 21 in the Appendix B).
Secondly, we calculate the price variation across intermediaries of products of
a given lender sold to like-for-like consumers. In other words, we calculate the
coefficient of the intermediary fixed effects from the model with lender fixed effects
(Model 3). We find that the price variation between the 10th and the 90th percentile
intermediary is around 18bps. For the median loan amount and the median interest
rate, the difference amounts to £600. This suggests that the price of the same
mortgage product provided by the same lender for like-for-like consumers varies
materially across different intermediaries.
The evidence of price variation across intermediaries becomes even more impor-
tant given the evidence of consumers’ limited shopping around for intermediaries.
The FCA Financial Lives Survey 2017 found that many consumers use only one
source of information (from the options given by the survey) to help with their deci-
sion making. The most common reasons given as influencing the choice of those who
have taken out, or switched, a residential mortgage in the last three years, arranged
through an intermediary, include recommendations from a friend or relative (29%)
or having used the intermediary before and being happy with the service (26%).34
There is very little information or tools available to help consumers identify and
34FCA (2018b)
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compare the quality of intermediaries, making choosing an intermediary difficult.35
We find that intermediaries that on average sell more expensive products do so
persistently over the time period we consider. To assess this, we divide the full
sample into two 15-month sub-samples. The first sub-sample includes transactions
completed between January 2014 and March 2015. The second includes transactions
completed between April 2015 and June 2016. We recalculate the intermediary
fixed effects from Model 1 and compare the ranking of intermediaries in the two
sub-samples.
To ensure consistency of coefficients of the fixed effects, the analysis is restricted
to intermediaries that appear in both samples and that sold at least 50 mortgages
during in each 15-month period. Figure 9 shows that more than 40% of the interme-
diaries that were in the top quartile between January 2014 and March 2015 (ie that
on average sold the cheapest products) are also in the top quartile between April
2015 and June 2016. Similarly, more than 40% of the intermediaries in the bot-
tom quartile between January 2014 and March 2015 are also in the bottom quartile
between April 2015 and June 2016.
The Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient of the fixed effects estimates between
the two periods is 0.33 and it is statistically different from zero. This suggests that
intermediaries that sold cheaper or more expensive products in one period are likely
to continue to do so in the subsequent period. The result holds when using the
mainstream sample. This result suggests that the differences in price across different
intermediaries are less likely to be the result of chance.
The variation in the intermediary fixed effect coefficients, which show what im-
pact intermediaries have on the cost of the mortgage for consumers, could be ex-
plained by a variety of factors. For example, it could in part reflect the different
business models of intermediaries (face-to-face intermediaries vs online brokers), the
difference in sizes (small vs large firms), the number of lenders brokers use (a re-
stricted set or a wide range of lenders), how familiar brokers with lenders and what
level of procuration fees brokers receive. In the next section we investigate potential
underlying economic mechanisms that could drive this price dispersion: procuration
fees and number of lenders each intermediary uses.
35FCA (2018b)
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Figure 9: Persistence of intermediary fixed effects (full sample).
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Table 12: Drivers of price variability.




Procuration fees, % of loan amount 4.7752∗∗∗ 0.7612
(0.8319) (1.0032)
N. of lenders used by intermediary (between 4 and 8) −0.0778∗∗∗ −0.0736∗∗∗
(0.0261) (0.0252)
N. of lenders used by intermediary (between 9 and 12) −0.2022∗∗∗ −0.1417∗∗∗
(0.0407) (0.0458)
N. of lenders used by intermediary (between 13 and 16) −0.2612∗∗ −0.219∗∗
(0.0607) (0.0917)
N. of lenders used by intermediary (between 17 and 20) −0.1844∗∗∗ −0.1804∗∗∗
(0.0668) (0.0599)
N. of lenders used by intermediary (more than 20) −0.1597∗ −0.1338∗
(0.0587) (0.0701)
Tot number of sales of the intermediary, log -0.0008 0.0137
(0.0101) (0.0103)
R-squared 20.42% 2.38%
Number of observations 1752 1106
Standard errors are clustered at intermediary level and reported below the estimates. ∗ ∗ ∗
significant at 1%, ∗∗ significant at 5%, ∗ significant at 10%
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3.2 Intermediaries using fewer, familiar lenders sell on aver-
age more expensive products
In the previous section, we showed that different intermediary firms use different
numbers of lenders. Some intermediary firms place their business with only a few
lenders, while others may use many more. In this section we consider the results of
the regression in equation (2) and focus on coefficients that show how the number
of lenders each intermediary uses correlated with the prices consumer pay. Results
are reported in Table 12.36
Results indicate that the average price of the products intermediaries sold over
the time period is negatively correlated with the number of lenders used. That
is, intermediaries that use a greater number of lenders, also sell on average cheaper
products, while those that use fewer lenders sell on average more expensive products.
The number of lenders intermediaries use is captured by dummies to allow for non-
linearity. We also control for the size of an intermediary firm, as, on average small
intermediaries place business with a lower number of lenders (see Table 6). The
regression results indicate that the price difference could be as high as 27 basis
points, which correspond to around £800 on the median loan amount over the two-
year incentivised rate period. Importantly, this result holds when controlling for the
size of the intermediary.
Moreover, as a proxy for familiarity we calculate the proportion of business an
intermediary sources from each lender. A high proportion suggests that an interme-
diary is familiar with a lender. We find that products sourced from familiar lenders
are on average more expensive compared to products sourced from less familiar
lenders. Table 13 show that results do not depend on the size of the lender or on
the size of the intermediary.37
There may be several interpretations of this finding. Intermediaries need to
spend time and resource to identify the right product for the borrower in terms of
price, suitability and likelihood of lender approval. For example, advisers may have
to research lending criteria and assess whether borrower circumstances match them.
Intermediaries may be tempted to reduce search cost by using fewer, familiar lenders.
In fact, whilst incentives to match borrowers to a lender that will accept them might
be strong, incentives to find the cheapest suitable deal seem weaker. As a result,
intermediaries using many lenders may be able to pick a cheaper deal from a wider
product offering. Intermediaries have incentives to minimise the risk of rejection. By
36We also run the analysis on the sample resulting from removing intermediary-lender pairs with
i) less than 40 sales and ii) less than 10 sales. Results remain robust.




Where V olumebl is the volume of mortgages sold by intermediary b sourced by lender l and V olumeb
is the total volume of mortgages sold by intermediary b.
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doing so, intermediary firms may trade-off price with reducing the risk of rejection.
The use of familiar lenders may lower the risk that an application is rejected and
ensure that the borrower successfully takes out a mortgage. Unfortunately, we do not
have data on the number of rejected applications. We also have limited information
on intermediaries and cannot control for other characteristics. For example, if we
expect intermediaries with online outreach to work with more lenders because they
incur lower search costs, we should control for this characteristic of a business model
to disentangle it from the number of lenders used.
The result is robust to different specifications and different measures of lender
concentration per intermediary. In particular, we find similar results when replacing
the number of firms used with the HHI-based measure. The results of the regression
in Table 13 suggest that higher values of the HHI-based measure (which indicate
that an intermediary concentrates the majority of the business with few lenders) are
correlated with higher average prices.
One could argue that results are driven by borrowers with non-standard circum-
stances, as the potential for unobservable borrower characteristics that affect the
price of the mortgage is much higher for non-mainstream borrowers. For example,
borrowers with poorer credit history may use specialist lenders whose products may
increase the average price per intermediary. To check this, we run the same analysis
on the mainstream sample. Table 13 shows that results are robust. Even using the
mainstream sample, intermediaries selling more expensive products use on average
a smaller number of lenders.38
Interestingly, such tendency of mortgage intermediaries to use a restricted num-
ber of lenders has been observed also by the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC). In 2017 ASIC found that the number of lenders actually pro-
viding mortgages may be significantly smaller than the number of lenders on an
intermediary’s panel. ASIC did not conclude on whether this practice results in
higher prices for borrowers (ASIC (2017)).
We find that the difference between the coefficients of the dummies is not signif-
icant when the number of lenders used is large. This suggests that compared to an
intermediary that is already using a large number of lenders, intermediaries using
additional lenders do not sell on average cheaper products. In other words, correla-
tion between number of lenders used and mortgage price tails off when number of
38As an additional robustness check we also include lender fixed effects in equation (2) to control
for unobservable characteristics of lenders. The negative correlation between number of lenders and
price is weaker but still statistically significant for higher number of lenders bands (ie, intermediaries
selling using more than 17 lenders sell on average cheaper products compared to intermediaries
using fewer lenders). Note that the interpretation using equation (2) with lender fixed effects is
different, as in this case the coefficient represents the correlation between the number of lenders used
by an intermediary and the price of the products of a given lender. Given that some intermediaries
place all their business with one lender, lender fixed effects capture part of the effect of the number
of lenders used and therefore the correlation is not statistically significant for lower number of
lenders bands (ie, less than 17 lenders used).
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lenders is large. See Table 26 for details on the methodology. We obtain the same
result in the specification including the HHI-based measure.
3.3 Little evidence that intermediaries selling highly priced
mortgages also receive high procuration fees
In this section we consider the results of the regression in equation (2) on procuration
fees. The result on the mainstream sample suggests that there is no statistically sig-
nificant evidence that intermediaries receiving higher procuration fees sell on average
more expensive products.
We consider that the positive correlation between procuration fees and price in
the regression on the full sample may be spurious. The difference in the results
between the mainstream and the full sample is driven by products for borrowers
with non-standard circumstances or poorer credit history. These borrowers are more
likely to be served by specialist lenders.
Specialist lenders typically offer significantly higher initial interest rates and pay
higher procuration fees compared to mainstream lenders. Positive correlation on
the full sample may be spurious if we do not capture factors that lead consumers
to specialist lenders. For example, we lack of data on self-employed borrowers may
explain why some of them are served by specialist lenders (eg we do not have data on
their trading history). Given that the effect of unobservable borrower characteristics
on the price of the mortgage is much higher for the non-mainstream borrowers, we
consider that conclusions based only on non-mainstream borrowers would be likely
to be misleading.
Overall, given that it is unlikely that unobservable factors have a significant
impact on the results of the mainstream sample, we conclude from this that there is
little evidence that intermediaries receiving higher procuration fees sell on average
more expensive products. 39
4 Conclusion
As part of the FCA Mortgage Market Study we use a transactional-level dataset
that includes detailed information on borrower, product and property characteristics
to investigate whether: i) the price of mortgage products varies materially across
intermediaries; ii) intermediaries that receive higher procuration fees on average sell
more expensive products to consumers; iii) intermediaries that use fewer, familiar
lenders on average sell more expensive products. We find that the average price of
39Moreover, we do not find significant differences between intermediaries that equalise procura-
tion fees for their employees, which reduces incentives to recommend a lender based on procuration
fees income), and intermediaries that do not equalise procuration fees. In fact, intermediaries that
equalise procuration fees have similar fixed effects associated with specialist lenders as intermedi-
aries that do not equalise procuration fees.
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mortgage products sold varies across intermediaries. The difference can be as high
as £800 over the incentivised rate period for the median loan amount.
The relationship between borrower and mortgage intermediary is a well-known
example of misaligned incentives: intermediaries may be motivated to act in their
own best interest, which may be in conflict with those of borrowers. We investigate
whether we have evidence compatible with potential conflict of interests.
While we recognise that, in theory, there is potential for procuration fee bias
where intermediaries see large differences in procuration fees across lenders, we find
little evidence that intermediaries selling highly priced mortgages also receive high
procuration fees. We find that the average price of the mortgages an intermediary
sells is negatively correlated with the number of lenders used. On average, inter-
mediaries placing business with a greater number of lenders sell cheaper products
compared to intermediaries that use fewer lenders.
These results imply that intermediaries take advantage of information asymme-
tries by spending less effort finding the best deal for consumers (for example, to
minimise search costs), but the cost of their mortgage recommendations does not
appear to be associated with levels of procuration fees. These results do not mean
that brokers do not respond to procuration fee-induced incentives. According to
Robles-Garcia (2019), as procuration fees to a broker increase, the lender’s market
share with that broker increases as well. In combination with our results, it means
that brokers tend to respond to commission-induced incentives, but that does not
result in a worse outcome for consumers in terms of price. In the data we observe a
variety of pricing strategies and there is not clear relationship between procuration
fees and prices. Some lenders appear to pay higher procuration fees and charge con-
sumers higher price. Others instead pay higher procuration fees and charge lower
prices, potentially in an attempt to gain market shares. Finally, we also observe
some lenders paying lower procuration fees and higher prices. For example, Robles-
Garcia (2019) finds that challenger banks usually pay higher commission but on
average sell cheaper products, ie driving the correlation coefficient θ down.
Our analysis is based on an extensive dataset which includes a number of bor-
rower, property and product characteristics and it should not suffer from any mea-
surement errors. Nevertheless, while we have tried to capture as many of the char-
acteristics of borrowers, products and properties as possible, there may be charac-
teristics that we cannot observe that may affect outcomes and therefore our analysis
results.
Results may be affected by borrowers’ unobservable characteristics. For example,
we do not have information on the wealth of consumers or the length of the trading
histories of self-employed borrowers. Moreover, in the UK there is no single credit
score universally applied to lending decisions, like a FICO score in the USA. As a
result, we might not be able to perfectly control for risk of default even though we
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used credit scores generated specifically for mortgages. Nevertheless, we think we
mitigate these potential issues by replicating the analysis on the mainstream sample.
Moreover, we do not know customers preferences, such as changes in employment,
plans to start a family or move area, which may have influenced intermediaries’
recommendations. For example, borrowers may trade-off price for speed of service,
and be willing to pay a higher price to get the mortgage offer as quickly as possible.
However, a need for speed cannot explain why consumers use specialist lenders, as
these firms tend to take longer to process a mortgage application.
Other unobservable lender characteristics include the quality of customer service,
such as brand popularity. We control for whether the mortgage is provided by the
PCA provider, as this allows us to take into account the convenience of having
several financial products provided by the same firm. However, it is possible that
borrowers have a strong preference for a particular lender. We mitigate the risks
above by controlling for unobservable attributes of lenders as a robustness check.
Results may also be driven by unobservable characteristics of the property, such
as whether the mortgaged property is next to a property licensed for commercial
use. We mitigate this risk by using data from the HM Land Registry and PSD001
to control for some characteristics of the property and whether it is a new build or
an older property. We also control for the outward postcode. We do not expect
unobservable characteristics of the property to significantly affect results.
Moreover, we do not observe many other characteristics of intermediaries. For
example, a type of business model they operate: online, face-to-face or a combina-
tion of both. However, we would only be concerned about characteristics that are
correlated with our variable of interest: level of procuration fees, number of lenders
intermediaries use or intermediaries’ familiarity with lenders.
Additionally, it should be noted that the results are correlations and should not
be interpreted as causation. The coefficient of the procuration fees θ in equation (2)
indicates the correlation between procuration fees and price. Procuration fees repre-
sent a cost for lenders, which they may pass through to consumers by charging them
higher prices. Therefore the coefficient θ may capture potentially two things; the
pass-through rate and the role played by intermediaries in recommending products
with high procuration fees. If pass-through is positive, correlation between procura-
tion fees on intermediaries’ recommendations might be strengthen. Even then, we
do not expect that the interpretation of the results and conclusions are affected.
Finally, the analysis is based on the products sold, rather than products available
to intermediaries when they make a recommendation. This may affect results, as
intermediaries may only recommend, for example, products with high procuration
fees or with low interest rates. To overcome this problem, we would need to construct
the choice set of each intermediary. However we do not have information on the
composition of the panel of each intermediary and the procuration fees paid by each
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Impacts of the LTI flow limit in the
UK mortgage market
1 Introduction
The June 2014 Financial Stability Report noted that the recovery in the UK housing
market over that year was linked to a rise in the share of mortgages extended at high
loan to income (LTI) ratios (BOE (2014)). Increased household indebtedness may
be associated with a higher probability of household defaults, which cause economic
instability and the risk of financial crisis. It may also be associated with a sharp fall
in consumer spending after a negative shock, leading to subdued economic activity
and macroeconomic volatility. In June 2014 the Financial Policy Committee (FPC)
recommended that the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) and the Prudential Reg-
ulation Authority (PRA) ‘ensure that mortgage lenders do not extend more than
15% of their total number of new residential mortgages at Loan to Income ratios at
or greater than 4.5’ (BOE (2014)). This recommendation is commonly referred to
as the ‘LTI flow limit’. The core objective of the LTI flow limit is macro-prudential.
It aims to reduce risks of financial instability in the economy by limiting the risk
of excessive household leverage and curbing unsustainable credit growth. This in
turn should ensure the integrity and good functioning of the UK mortgage market.
The LTI flow limit took effect in October 2014 and applies to lenders that extend
residential mortgage lending greater than £100 million per year.
According to the November 2016 Financial Stability Report (FSR), since im-
plementation of the recommendation, the allocation of credit across LTI ratios has
changed. Lenders increased new mortgages extended at LTI ratios just below 4.5
and restricted lending at LTI ratios above 4.5 (high LTI ratios). This has resulted
in ‘bunching’ below the 4.5 cut-off (BOE (2016)). Using a unique transaction-level
mortgage dataset and the difference-in-difference methodology, our objective, in this
paper, is to document the changes in consumer outcomes and lenders’ market dy-
namics in response to the recommendation. Our findings will be of interest to a
wide community of policy makers and academics to help understand the impact of
LTI ratio policies.
The paper focuses on the following question:
• Is there evidence that high LTI mortgages are originated for bigger loans and
as a result are there any borrower composition changes?
• Are there changes in mortgage price for like-for-like high LTI borrowers?
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• Are there are changes in lenders’ exposure to high LTI mortgages post- imple-
mentation and does the lender proximity to the 15% constraint drive changes
in mortgage price?
The LTI recommendation imposes a 15% limit on the total number of new mort-
gage sales rather than on their total value. This restriction on supply could result
in lenders choosing to optimise their credit allocation of high LTI mortgages. Post-
implementation, lenders may have incentives to extend high LTI mortgages on bigger
loans, because the lender may wish to: 1) maintain interest income; and/or 2) main-
tain the level of the total value of new mortgages. We could expect to see an average
increase in the loan size for high LTI mortgages post implementation. This would
indicate that lenders may prefer to cater for borrowers with higher income. For
example, if borrower A has an income of £10k and a borrower B has income of
£20k. For an LTI ratio of 4.5 a lender offers a loan of £45k to borrower A and
a loan of £90k to borrower B. To assess whether lenders cater for borrowers with
bigger loans, we examine whether there is a change in the average loan size of high
LTI mortgages compared to lower LTI mortgages, post implementation of the LTI
flow limit.
We also consider whether the composition of borrowers at high LTI ratios has
changed post implementation; this may indicate that some types of borrowers were
more affected by the policy than others. For example, the FCA Guidance Con-
sultation on the LTI recommendation outlined that young first-time buyers and
applicants on sole income may be more affected by the introduction of the LTI flow
limit (FCA (2014a)).
The price of high LTI mortgages may have been affected post-implementation
and there could be many mechanisms. For example, the 15% constraint may have
represented a negative supply shock, restricting the number of high LTI mortgages
available in the market and driving prices up. Alternatively, the recommendation
may have restricted competition among lenders thereby increasing the price for high
LTI mortgages. For example, some lenders might have been closer to the limit and
therefore had limited capacity to compete in the market for high LTI mortgages. The
constraint may have also affected lenders’ pricing strategies, for example, because
lenders might have changed their risk attitude towards high LTI mortgages. We
document whether there is any evidence of a change in mortgage price for like-for-
like high LTI borrowers after the LTI flow limit was implemented.
Before the recommendation, lenders’ exposures to high LTI mortgages, measured
as the percentage of high LTI sales to their share of all mortgage sales, varied
considerably. Some lenders were close to the 15% limit, but other lenders had very
low proportions of high LTI mortgage sales. We examine how lenders appear to
have changed their exposure to high LTI loans post-implementation and whether
changes in mortgage price depends on lender proximity to the 15% constraint.
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This paper contributes to the literature on macro-prudential tools, including
maximum limits on loan-to-value (LTV), loan-to-income (LTI) and debt-to-income
(DTI) ratios. Policy ratio limits (for example, maximum LTV of 85% in Sweden
and 90% in Norway) are designed to protect consumers from excessive household
leverage and to curb house price appreciation; this highlights their financial sta-
bility objective. Theoretical literature has evaluated the impact of these policies
and the consensus is that they restrict credit, reduce household leverage and im-
prove loan performance (e.g. Allen and Carletti (2010)). There are few empirical
assessments of housing macro-prudential policies. Our paper is closely related to
DeFusco et al. (2017) analysis of the impacts of the U.S. mortgage market policy re-
stricting excessive household leverage (DTI). Their paper evaluated the Dodd-Frank
‘Ability-to-Repay’ rule and its effect on the price and availability of credit in the US
mortgage market.
By looking at the changes in mortgage performance our paper also contributes to
the literatures on broader consumer protection (Campbell et al. (2011), Posner and
Weyl (2013); Jambulapati and Stavins (2014), and Agarwal et al. (2015)). It also
contributes to the literature on ex-post evaluation by looking at the changes in the
UK mortgage market post-implementation of the FPC recommendation (Agarwal
et al. (2014) and Agarwal et al. (2017)).
We use a unique transaction-level dataset covering mortgage transactions from
July 2012 to June 2016 to test these research questions. These are our key findings.
The average loan size for high LTI mortgages increased by 4-7% post implementation
of the LTI flow limit. For a given LTI ratio, an increase in the average loan size
suggests that lenders migrated towards borrowers with higher incomes. Our results
show that this change occurred at the 4.5 cut-off, which could be attributed to the
FPC recommendation. There were also changes in the composition of the high LTI
borrowers. Our results indicate that these changes are also associated with the FPC
4.5 cut-off. Specifically, above the 4.5 cut-off there is:
• an increase in the proportion of home movers;
• a decrease in the proportion of first-time buyers;
• an increase in the proportion of joint income applicants;
These changes in the borrowers composition are consistent with the increase in
average loan size for high LTI mortgages. Home movers and joint income applicants
are more likely to have higher incomes. The average loan size for home movers, joint
income applicants, first-time buyers, and single income applicants, is around £190k,
£180k, £150k, and £140k, respectively.
After controlling for borrower, product, and lender characteristics, we find that
post- implementation the mortgage price for high LTI mortgages on average de-
creased. The price is measured as either the initial interest rate or the Annual
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Percentage Rate (APR) based metric, which considers the initial interest rate and
the lender fees.
Before the recommendation lenders differed in their exposure to high LTI mort-
gages, measured as the proportion of their number of high LTI mortgage sales to
their number of all mortgage sales. After implementation, although the overall pro-
portion of high LTI mortgages to the total number of sales in the market stays
around 10%, lenders’ individual exposure to high LTI mortgages changed. Some
lenders, whose share of high LTI mortgages had been closer to the 15% limit, re-
duced their proportion of high LTI. In contrast, some lenders that previously had a
low share of high LTI mortgages increased their proportion of them. We find that
lenders proximity to the 15% constraint is correlated with how strong there is a fall
in mortgage price for high LTI mortgages.
2 Policy background
In July 2014 the FPC recommended that the FCA and the PRA ‘ensure that mort-
gage lenders do not extend more than 15% of their total number of new residential
mortgages at Loan to Income ratios at or greater than 4.5’ (BOE (2014)). The
recommendation took effect on 1 October 2014. The FCA Guidance Consultation
outlines details of the policy, but here we highlight the main aspects relevant for our
research purpose (FCA (2014a)).
Not all mortgage products are in scope of the recommendation. Some categories
of mortgages are excluded from the total number of mortgages completed or the
percentage of mortgages completed with an LTI ratio of 4.5 or higher. Both internal
and external remortgages, as well as ported products, with no increase in principal
are excluded from the LTI flow limit, because they do not constitute an increase
in indebtedness. Remortgages with an increase in principal are included. Non-
regulated mortgages at the time of the publication of the recommendation, that
is, second charge mortgages and buy-to-let mortgages, are exempt from the rule.
Lifetime mortgages and equity release products are excluded, because they do not
conform to this measure.
Not all mortgage lenders are in scope of the recommendation. A size threshold
condition means that only large lenders qualify for the policy. The recommendation
stipulates that lenders who completed more than 300 regulated mortgage contracts
(excluding remortgaging with no increase in principal, lifetime mortgages, and other
mortgages excluded) worth more than £100 million in 4 consecutive quarters preced-
ing 1 October 2014 (ie from Q4 2013 to Q3 2014) are subject to the recommendation
on the date the policy came into effect (ie lenders in scope on the date the policy
came into effect (Condition A)).
Lenders could move in and out scope after the recommendation applies. Post-
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implementation of the recommendation, mortgage lenders are monitored on whether
they continue to meet the size threshold of selling per annum more than 300 reg-
ulated contracts worth more than £100 million. Mortgage lenders that were not
subject to the recommendation at the outset of the recommendation could move in
scope if they sold over 2 consecutive rolling periods of 4 quarters more than 300
regulated contracts worth £100 million per year. They would become subject to
the recommendation 2 quarters after satisfying the size threshold. Similarly, if a
lender stopped selling more than £100 million worth of mortgages or sold less than
300 regulated contracts per annum over 2 consecutive rolling periods of 4 quarters,
it would exit the recommendation (Condition B). For a diagrammatic explanation
of Condition A and Condition B and a worked example refer to the FCA Guidance
Consultation (FCA (2014a)).
Our analysis of the Product Sales Data (PSD) regulatory returns shows that 36
mortgage lenders became subject to the recommendation from 1 October 2014 and
remained in scope for the period we analyse (ie until June 2016). These 36 mortgage
lenders represented 98% of high LTI mortgage lending over our data period. 10
lenders dipped in and out of the recommendation as per the Condition B. 148
mortgage lenders have never been in scope of the recommendation. Those lenders
outside the scope of the recommendation account for less than 1% of all mortgage
sales.
Regardless of when a mortgage offer may have been made, all mortgages at an
LTI at or above 4.5 completed after 1 October 2014 were counted towards the 15%
limit. The 15% limit applies to the number of mortgages completed (volumes) not
to the value of mortgages completed (pound sterling basis). The limit applies at the
regulated entity level, but lenders are allowed to allocate all or part of its high LTI
allowance to any other regulated entity within the same group as stated in the FCA
Finalised Guidance (FCA (2014b)).
The PRA does not stipulate any explicit regulatory cost associated with exceed-
ing 15% threshold, but the FCA Guidance Consultation (FCA (2014a)) states that
‘if a firm exceeds 15% or more of its total number of new residential mortgages at
LTI ratios at or greater than 4.5, we may, on our own initiative, require the firm to
stop entering into high LTI mortgage contracts’.
3 Data and summary statistics
The main data source for our research is Product Sales Data (PSD001). All lenders
selling regulated first-charge mortgage contracts in the UK must complete this tem-
plate on a quarterly basis. The dataset includes information collected at point of
origination on product characteristics like: loan amount, value of the property, mort-
gage term, variable vs. fixed rate, initial interest rates and borrower characteristics
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including age, income, employment status. We complement PSD001 data with in-
formation from additional data sources. Missing interest rates are replaced with
interest rates from the Product Sales Data (PSD007), which contains information
on mortgage performance for all existing mortgage balances since 2015. Additional
borrower characteristics like mortgage performance, credit scores, information on
property type are obtained from the Credit Reference Agency data. The Credit
Reference Agency data covers mortgage products available in the market from July
2012 to June 2016. Finally, where possible, the data is matched to the Money-
Facts mortgage product dataset. This includes product characteristics, borrowers’
eligibility criteria, and products’ effective date. The MoneyFacts dataset at our dis-
posal covers mortgage products in the market available from 11 October 2011 to 30
November 2016.
The period of the combined dataset is from July 2012 to June 2016. Non-
standard and non-regulated mortgage products are excluded from our research sam-
ple. Examples of non-standard and non-regulated mortgages are buy-to-let, life-
time mortgages, business loans and bridging loans. Mortgage products that are not
subject to the recommendation are also excluded from the analysis; these are re-
mortgages without an increase in principal. Excluded mortgages account for 15% of
the total number of originated mortgages.
This research focuses on those mortgage lenders that have always been in scope
of the recommendation. They account for about 95% of all mortgage sales and 98%
of all high LTI mortgage sales over the period analysed. This 98% proportion has
not changed overtime suggesting that high LTI mortgage lending has not shifted
(or ‘leaked’) from lenders in scope of the recommendation to those outside scope.
Within this sample of mortgage lenders, around 10% of all mortgage sales were at
or above the 4.5 LTI ratio cut-off.
Table 14 presents descriptive statistics on borrowers’ main characteristics before
and after implementation of the recommendation, grouped by LTI bucket.40 The
difference in composition of borrowers across different LTI buckets could be driven
by various factors including regional discrepancies in income and house prices, bank
internal risk policies, and regulatory environment.
The summary statistics indicate that borrowers with LTI ratios at and above 5
are very different in comparison to borrowers with lower LTI ratios and we separate
these borrowers into different buckets. There are anecdotal and data evidence that
some lenders have internal LTI limits. Some lenders do not lend above LTI ratios of
around 4.7-4.8 and so for borrowers with LTI ratios between 4.5 and 5, we separate
them into 2 buckets, [4.5-4.7) LTI bucket and [4.7-5) LTI bucket.41
40The table focuses on selected borrower characteristics. We looked at other borrower and
product characteristics and these summary statistics are available on request.
41 For example, https://www.moneymarketing.co.uk/borrowers-face-mass-confusion-as-mmr-and-/
lti-cap-conflict/. Data tabulation also shows that some lenders have not originated mortgages
above a certain LTI thresholds.
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Borrowers in the LTI >=5 bucket are more likely to be home movers and higher
income borrowers. Interestingly, the proportion of joint income borrowers is notice-
ably lower in this LTI bucket, suggesting that a lot of high LTI loans could be high
income individuals. Mortgages in the >=5 LTI bucket have on average lower LTVs
(in the mid-to-high 60p.p. compared to lower 70p.p. for all other LTI buckets) and
pay lower interest rates. These individuals also take much larger loans and have
higher mortgage payment to income ratio. Their credit scores are higher, which
suggests that on average banks offer extremely high LTI mortgages to consumers
that have lower credit risk. We find that the relationship between LTV and LTI
is nonlinear- mortgages with higher LTI ratio are associated with lower LTV ratios
(Figure 22 in Appendix C).
On average, borrower in the LTI buckets between 4.5 and 5 are similar to the
borrowers in the LTI buckets just below 4.5. However, before the recommendation
these borrowers have slightly lower average income and larger average loans. These
borrowers pay on average lower initial interest rate than borrowers just below 4.5 cut-
off, though their average loan to value ratio and credit scores are not very different.
High LTI mortgages are not necessarily riskier. For example, on average they have
the same or lower LTV, and credit score.
There are some clear trends when we compare borrower characteristics before
and after implementation of the recommendation. Most notably, for all LTI buckets
at or above 4.5, the proportion of mortgages to home movers rises but the propor-
tion of mortgages to first-time buyers falls. This phenomenon does not occur for
mortgages in LTI buckets below 4.5. Post-implementation the proportion of joint
income applicants rises across all LTI buckets, except for a small 1% decrease for
bucket LTI=>5. Table 14 also highlights that over our sample period for all LTI
buckets the average mortgage term increases by around 7-13 months, the loan value
increases and the average initial interest rate falls.
Some of these findings could be symptomatic of more general trends in housing
markets and not related to the implementation of the LTI recommendation. We
collect evidence that suggests whether this is the case in the following sections of
the paper. In particular, to formally test the changes in the outcome variable after
implementation of the policy we use the difference-in-difference (DD) methodology.
This compares loans in the affected buckets (LTI ratio at and above 4.5) and loans
in the unaffected buckets (LTI ratio below 4.5) before and after the implementation
of the recommendation. We will give more details to the difference-in-difference





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































4 Research design and results
4.1 Redistribution consequences
The 15% limit on the number of high LTI mortgages could have triggered changes in
credit allocation across LTI buckets. According to November 2016 Financial Stabil-
ity Report, there is evidence of these changes happening since the implementation
of the recommendation (BOE (2016)). On the one hand, the number of high LTI
mortgages decreased, ie lenders might have started rejecting high LTI borrowers.
On the other hand, the number of high LTI mortgages just below the 4.5 cut-off
increased, ie lenders might have started shifting borrowers from just above to just
below the FPC cut-off. If lenders rejected high LTI borrowers or shifted them be-
low cut-off non-randomly, we are likely to observe distributional changes for high
LTI mortgages. Moreover, the recommendation imposes the 15% limit on the total
number of sales rather than the total value of sales. Post-implementation, lenders
may have incentives to lend high LTI mortgages for bigger loans, catering for bor-
rowers with higher incomes. This strategy could reduce the impact of the 15% limit,
because lenders could start substituting smaller loans with bigger loans to maintain
interest income and/or the total value of new mortgages.
Figure 10 shows the average loan size before and after implementation of the
recommendation for the LTI buckets [4,4.3), [4.3,4.5), [4.5,4.7), [4.7,5). Before the
recommendation, the affected (ie LTI buckets [4.5-4.7) and [4.7-5)) and unaffected
(ie [4-4.3) and [4.3-4.5)) buckets were moving in parallel. After implementation,
there is a noticeable increase in the unconditional average loan size for the LTI
buckets above the 4.5 cut-off in comparison to the trend of the average loan size for
the LTI buckets below the 4.5 cut-off.
This increase in average loan size for high LTI mortgages implies that these
mortgages were originated for bigger loans. For a given LTI ratio a bigger loan
would be originated for a borrower with a bigger income. As the 4.5 LTI cut-off
applies universally to all types of borrowers, some groups of borrowers with smaller
incomes are more likely to be affected the most. For a given LTI ratio, a loan size for
joint income applicants is more likely to be bigger. Sole income applicants may be
more likely to be affected by the recommendation. Given the upward sloping income
profiles over age, younger borrowers may be more likely to have smaller incomes and
more likely to be affected by the recommendation. The first- time buyers (FTB)
may be more likely to be affected by the recommendation than home movers (HM)
or re-mortgagors with an increase in principle (RMTG). Before implementation of
the recommendation the average income for home movers is £55,000 the average
income for joint income applicants is £61,000.
We use an econometric approach to determine whether high LTI mortgages are
originated for bigger loans, and if so, whether there are corresponding changes in
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LTI >= 4.0 & LTI < 4.3 LTI >= 4.3 & LTI < 4.5 LTI >= 4.5 & LTI < 4.7 LTI >= 4.7 & LTI < 5
Note: the average loan size before and after the implementation of the
recommendation on winsorised sample of loan values has the same pattern.
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borrowers’ composition. We are also interested in whether ex-ante risk character-
istics, such as payment-to-income ratio, credit score, and LTV, have changed since
the implementation of the LTI flow limit. To do so we compare loans in the affected
buckets (LTI ratio at and above 4.5) and loans in the unaffected buckets (LTI ratio
below 4.5) before and after the implementation of the recommendation.
We choose mortgages with LTI ratios [4.5, 4.7) as the treatment group and
mortgages with LTI ratios [3.5, 3.7) as the control group. As has been discussed
above, some lenders do not extend mortgages with LTI ratios above 4.7-4.8. The
statistics in Table 14 suggest that borrowers with LTI ratios above 5 are likely to
be a very different group of borrowers. Therefore, we consider LTI bucket [4.5, 4.7)
as a treatment group. These LTI buckets will be our baseline case.
The recommendation has changed credit allocation around the 4.5 threshold
(BOE (2016)). In Figure 11, we show distribution of LTIs in the pre-implementation
and post-implementation periods. There are evidence of ’bunching’ below 4.5 thresh-
old (ie lenders credit ration on intensive margin and originate smaller mortgages to
move them below the 4.5 cut-off) and ’missing mass’ above 4.5 threshold (ie lenders
credit ration on extensive margin and stop originate large mortgages above the 4.5
cut-off). However, as we go further away from the threshold, the difference in the
two distribution becomes smaller. To avoid contamination of the estimates from
reallocation of credit around the threshold, we do not use LTI buckets close to the
4.5 cut-off as a baseline control group. For the baseline case our control group is
mortgages with LTI ratio [3.5, 3.7). We carry out robustness checks using various
buckets, including just below the 4.5 threshold, because they are more likely to be
more similar to the one just below the 4.5 cut-off.
The baseline case represents mortgages originated in a 6-month window that
ends 6 months before the announcement of the policy (ie originated between July
2013 to December 2013), and mortgages originated in a 6-month window that starts
6 months after implementation of the policy (ie between April 2015 to September
2015). Both periods are sufficiently far from the implementation date. We also carry
out robustness checks using different intervals. The following model is fitted to the
data:
yit = α+β0∗1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i+β1∗Postt+β2∗1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i∗Postt+eit (M1)
where yit comprises of characteristics that may have changed after the recom-
mendation was implemented. In this section, for example, these characteristics are
loan value, gross income, borrower types, age, and ex-ante riskiness characteristics
like credit score, payment-to-income ratio and LTV. 1[LTIi = d] is a dummy vari-
able for LTI buckets, which takes value 1 for the treatment LTI bucket d = [4.5,4.7)
and 0 for the control LTI bucket d = [3.5,3.7). Postt is a dummy variable that
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Note: For presentation purposes, the LTI distribution is shown between values of
2.5 and 6. Pre-implementation period is a 6-month window that ends 6 months
before the announcement of the policy (ie from July 2013 to December 2013) and
post-implementation period is a 6-month window that starts 6 months after
implementation of the policy (ie from April 2015 to September 2015).
takes value 0 if a mortgage is originated between July 2013 to December 2013 or 1
if a mortgage is originated between April 2015 to September 2015. The parameters
are estimated by the ordinary least squares (OLS) method. It is possible that yit
is correlated over time, which means that error terms eit are likely to be serially
correlated. In this case, standard errors may lead to serious over-estimation of t-
statistics and significance. Bertrand et al. (2004) demonstrated importance of using
cluster-robust standard errors in the difference-in-difference settings. To account for
serial correlation and any area-specific random shocks, we cluster standard errors at
a postcode area level in this and all following models. This approach is in line with
DeFusco et al. (2017). We chose property area level because it strikes a good bal-
ance in the bias-variance trade-off that arises: in many estimation problems, larger
and fewer clusters have less bias but more variability (Cameron and Miller (2015)).
There are around 120 area levels and these areas are quite large.
The β2 coefficient is the parameter of interest. It measures the difference be-
tween the average change in the variables of interest in the treatment group and
the average change in the variables of interest in the control group before and after
the implementation of the recommendation. The estimates of β2 coefficients for the
baseline case are reported in Table 15 Col A.
As robustness checks, the β2 coefficient is estimated against different time periods
before and after the recommendation, using the same control and treatment groups.
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Table 15 Col B shows the estimated β2 coefficients for a 6-month period that ends
just before the announcement of the recommendation (ie from January to June
2014). Here the post-implementation period is the same as in the baseline case.
Table 15 Col C shows the estimated β2 coefficients for a different pre-implementation
period, which is a 12-month period that ends just before implementation of the
recommendation (ie from October 2013 to September 2014), and for a different
post-implementation period, which starts immediately after implementation of the
recommendation (ie from October 2014 to September 2015).
The house price inflation in an environment of stagnating wages could shift bor-
rowers’ demand for high LTI mortgages and change borrowers’ composition. To
avoid this compounding effect from the house price inflation, Table 15 Col D shows
the estimated β2 coefficients for a sample of English regions that experienced low
house price inflation and low ratio of median house price to gross annual earnings.
These regions are North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Mid-
lands, and West Midlands. 42 The Model 1 is estimated for the baseline sample.
The results in Col A, Col B and Col C in Table 15 suggest that unconditional
average loan size has increased by around 4-7% for the treatment LTI bucket [4.5,4.7)
relative to the control LTI bucket [3.5,3.7) after the implementation took effect.
Prior to the recommendation, an average loan size for LTI bucket [4.5-4.7) was
around £190,000. An increase by 4-7% implies that the average loan size post
implementation for high LTI mortgages, in this case in the LTI bucket [4.5, 4.7),
increase by £7,600-£13,300. As expected, the unconditional gross income has also
increased similarly to the unconditional loan size by around 4-7%. For an average
gross income of £40,000 it is an increase of £1,600-£2,800 per year.
The estimates of β2 coefficient for different borrower characteristics suggest that
there have been changes after the implementation of the recommendation for the
treatment LTI bucket in comparison to the control bucket. The proportion of home
movers increased by about 4-7%, the proportion of joint income applicants increased
by about 6-10%, and the proportion of first-time buyers decreased by about 2-5%.
Like the robustness checks for the unconditional changes in the average loan size,
the β2 coefficient is estimated against different time periods before and after the
recommendation and for English regions that experienced low house price inflation
and low ratio of median house price to gross annual earnings. Table 15 Col B,
Col C, Col D suggest that the results on joint income applicants, home movers,
and first-time buyers are robust. Other characteristics are either not robust or the
changes are not economically meaningful. For example, credit risk characteristics
like credit score, payment to income and LTV in the treatment group in comparison






Table 15: Changes in average loan value, total gross income and bor-
rower composition .












low house price inflation
Loan value, log 0.0697 *** 0.0552 *** 0.0424 *** 0.0330 ***
(0.009) (0.0089) (0.007) (0.013)
Gross income, log 0.0702 *** 0.0557 *** 0.0427 *** 0.0337 **
(0.009) (0.0089) (0.007) (0.01236)
Proportion of home movers 0.0692 *** 0.0590 *** 0.0381 *** 0.0528 ***
(0.008) (0.0090) (0.0066) (0.0156)
Proportion of first time buyers -0.0508 *** -0.0415 *** -0.0212 *** -0.0538 ***
(0.0077) (0.009) (0.006) (0.0140)
Proportion of re-mortgagors -0.0148 *** -0.0160 *** -0.0155 *** 0.0002
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.0097)
Proportion of other borrowers -0.0035 ** -0.0014 -0.0014 0.0009
(0.002) (0.0015) (0.0010) (0.0026)
Age 0.2559 ** 0.0679 0.0564 0.6157 **
(0.1328) (0.1500) (0.098) (0.2377)
Proportion of joint income applicants 0.0724 *** 0.0967 *** 0.0678 *** 0.0565 ***
(0.008) (0.0080) (0.0057) (0.0113)
Payment to income ratio -0.0095 *** -0.0096 *** -0.0073 *** -0.0061
(0.0007) (0.0007) (0.0004) (0.0014)
LTV -0.0158 *** -0.0068 *** -0.0044 *** -0.0178 ***
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0017) (0.0038)
Credit score 3.4698 *** 1.3334 0.7205 2.8002
(1.1135) (1.118) (0.7496) (2.321)
Note: Standard errors are clustered at property postcode area level, in parentheses, *p<0.1;
**p<0.05; ***p<0.01. Col A is the baseline case, where mortgages are originated in a 6-month
window that ends 6 months before the announcement of the policy (ie from July 2013 to
December 2013), and mortgages originated in a 6-month window that starts 6 months after
implementation of the policy (ie from April 2015 to September 2015). Col B is a robustness
check, where the pre-implementation time period is a 6-month period that ends just before the
announcement of the recommendation (ie from January 2014 to June 2014) and the
post-implementation period is the same as in the baseline case. Col C is a robustness check,
where the pre-implementation time period is a 12-month period that ends just before
implementation of the recommendation (ie from October 2013 to October 2014), and the
post-implementation time period starts immediately after implementation of the recommendation
(ie from October 2014 to September 2015). Col D is a robustness check on a sample of regions
that experienced low house price inflation. The model is estimated for the baseline sample.
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to the control group, though in some cases statistically significant, have changed
only marginally after the recommendation took effect.
The results of Table 15 shows that there are changes in the composition of home
movers and first-time buyers, as well as joint income applicants. However, to provide
evidence that changes in the borrowers’ composition are related to the LTI 4.5 cut-
off rather than other changes in the market, we should expect that changes will
show at the 4.5 cut-off point. If instead there are other market-wide impacts on
borrower composition, then we should expect any changes to vary smoothly for all
LTI buckets. In line with DeFusco et al. (2017), we fit the following flexible DD
specification:




βd1 ∗ 1[LTIi = d] +βd2 ∗ 1[LTIi = d]Postt
]
+ eit (M2)
In this specification a dummy for LTI bucket [3, 3.3) is omitted so that the
coefficients βd1 estimate the d-specific LTI bucket change in the variable of interest
relative to the loans in the omitted LTI bucket after the implementation of the policy.
The model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at postcode area
level.
The results of this model are summarised in Figure 13, which plots βd1 coefficient
estimates (the coefficient for the interaction term between LTI bucket and the Post
dummy) from the flexible DD specification and its 95% confidence interval. The
coefficient of the baseline LTI bucket [3, 3.3) is normalised to 0. All coefficients
can be interpreted as the change in the variable of interest for a given LTI bucket
following the implementation of the FPC recommendation relative to the LTI bucket
[3, 3.3).
The Figure 13A makes clear that an economically significant increase in the
proportion of home movers occurs for mortgages above the FPC 4.5 LTI cut-off.
Figure 13B shows that there is an economically significant decrease in the propor-
tion of first-time buyers and Figure 13D shows an economically significant increase
in the proportion of joint income applicants for mortgages above the FPC cut-off of
4.5. Figure 13C shows no change in the proportion of people remortgaging above
the FPC 4.5 LTI cut-off. This is in line with the findings of the simple DD ap-
proach of Model 1. These results are also robust to different time window, from
the pre-implementation period of January 2014 to June 2014 and from the post-
implementation period of October 2014 to September 2015. Figure 13 shows that
after implementation of the FPC recommendation, the changes in proportions of
home movers, first-time buyers and joint income applicants are associated with the
FPC 4.5 cut-off.
These changes in borrowers’ composition are consistent with the increase in av-
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erage loan size for high LTI mortgages. However, the results might not be entirely
driven by the fact that these categories of borrowers (ie FTB, and single income ap-
plicants) have lower income. It could be that, even conditional on the same income
and other characteristics, some groups are being offered fewer mortgages, possibly
because they are perceived as riskier. To disentangle these two stories, we would
need to compare borrowers that differ only in the variables of interest. This condi-
tional analysis is outside the scope of this paper. Instead we check whether income
alone could explain the compositional changes, by including it as a regressor in the
baseline specification (ie Model 1). Once we include the income variable, our results
show that the coefficient βd2 for the variables of interest became smaller in absolute
levels but remain statistically significant.
Furthermore, we can provide evidence that the changes in the borrowers’ com-
position are related to the time when the FPC recommendation was introduced. In
Figure 12 we plotted unconditional averages over time for the baseline control and
treatment groups for selected outcomes. This shows that the changes in the market
are related to the recommendation. This is also a crucial test of the validity of the
difference-in-difference design. That is, in the absence of treatment, the difference
between the treatment and control group is constant over time. Figure 12 shows
that the trend assumption holds for loan value, proportions of home movers, first-
time buyers and joint income applicants. The test on parallel trends controls for an
overall time trend and will take into account any UK specific changes in house price.
However, to further check sensitivity of the above results to house prices, we
run the parallel trends test test on loan value and the flexible DD specification on
borrowers’ composition using a sample of regions with the low house price inflation
(results are reported in Figure 23 and Figure 24 in Appendix C). The previous
findings are robust, ie the average loan size increases after the implementation of
the recommendation and there are changes in the borrowers’ composition beyond
the 4.5 cut-off.
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D. proportion of joint income applicants
Note: baseline specification where the LTI bucket d=[4.5, 4.7) is a treatment group
and the LTI bucket d=[3.5, 3.7) is a control group.
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D. changes in % of joint income applicants per LTI bucket
Note: All coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the variable of interest for a given LTI
bucket following the implementation of the FPC recommendation relative to the LTI bucket [3,
3.3). An economically significant change in the proportion of home movers, first-time buyers and
joint income applicants happens at the FPC 4.5 cut-off. This shows that changes in the
composition of borrowers are related to the LTI 4.5 cut-off rather than other changes in the
market. According to the flexible DD results on loan value and gross income (in logs) an increase
for the treatment groups happens at 4.5 cut-off.
4.1.1 Discussion
The increase in unconditional average loan size for high LTI mortgages is consistent
with our observed changes in borrower composition. There are different mechanisms
of how these changes may have happened, and we discuss a few in this section. We
showed that there are changes in the proportions of different types of borrowers for
high LTI mortgages. However, we want to know whether it also resulted in changes
in absolute levels, ie changes in number of a certain type of borrowers for high LTI
mortgages. Figure 25 in Appendix C shows that the number of mortgages sold with
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LTI bucket [3.5, 3.7) (control group) and the number of mortgages with LTI bucket
[4.5, 4.7) (treatment group) move in parallel before and after the intervention. The
increase in the proportion of home movers and joint income applicants between the
treatment and the control groups could be interpreted as an increase in the number
of such borrowers. The decrease in the proportion of first-time buyers could be
interpreted as a decrease in number of such borrowers. There is some evidence that
high LTI mortgages are extended more to home movers and joint income applicants
and less to first-time buyers, which is partially driven by income differences between
these groups.
One mechanism that reduces the number of borrower type for high LTI mort-
gages is lenders’ direct credit rationing, either on extensive or intensive margins.
The November 2016 Financial Stability Report (BOE (2016)) sets out evidence of
redistribution of mortgages across LTI ratios, which suggests that there could be ra-
tioning of credit. Intensive credit rationing means that borrowers get smaller loans
than they applied for. Extensive credit rationing means that borrowers are rejected
for a loan. Rationing could make borrowers buy a smaller house, postpone their
purchase until they accumulate a larger deposit, or re-apply with a different lender.
Unfortunately, we do not have rejection or application data to analyse lenders credit
rationing behaviour.
A second mechanism is that intermediaries may steer certain type of borrow-
ers towards high LTI mortgages after implementation of the recommendation. We
compared the redistribution results between intermediated and direct sales and they
seem similar across the 2 categories. A third mechanism is that lenders may change
the menu choice, offering high LTI mortgage to certain type of borrowers. Some
lenders have explicit LTI limits. For example, according to Mortgage Strategy
(2017), for Barclays’ applicants with incomes of less than £55,000 will get income
multiples of up to 4.49 x income’. In many cases there is a lack of transparency
around LTI limits for mortgage products and it is difficult to pin down changes in
menu choice from available data (FCA (2018b)).
The changes in average loan size and composition of borrowers for high LTI
mortgages raise interesting questions. For example, whether these changes are driven
solely by the 15% limit being set on the volume rather than value of sales, and
whether the redistribution consequences could be mitigated if the 15% limit was
instead set on the value of sales.
4.2 Price and market dynamics
In addition to the distributional effects, the 15% constraint may have changed mar-
ket dynamics and prices for high LTI mortgages. For example, the 15% constraint
may have represented a negative supply shock, restricting the number of high LTI
mortgages available to borrowers, and so may have increased prices. And, if the
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recommendation restricted competition among lenders, this could also lead to in-
creased prices. On the other hand, the 15% constraint might not have been binding
at all, and so mortgage prices might have been unaffected. The recommendation may
have also changed lenders’ pricing strategies. In this section, we document whether
there are any changes in the mortgage price for like-for-like high LTI borrowers and
changes in the market dynamics.
Figure 14 shows the average initial interest rate before and after implementation
of the recommendation for the LTI buckets [4,4.3), [4.3,4.5), [4.5,4.7), [4.7,5). After
implementation of the recommendation, there is a decrease in the unconditional
average interest rate for the LTI buckets above the 4.5 cut-off in comparison to the
trend of the average interest rate for the LTI buckets below the 4.5 cut-off. The figure
also confirms that affected and unaffected buckets were moving in parallel before the
announcement of the recommendation in July 2014, after which the trends diverge.































































































LTI >= 4.0 & LTI < 4.3 LTI >= 4.3 & LTI < 4.5 LTI >= 4.5 & LTI < 4.7 LTI >= 4.7 & LTI < 5
To assess how mortgage prices changed for like-for-like high LTI borrowers we can
use a DD methodology that compares loans above 4.5 LTI and below 4.5 LTI before
and after the implementation of the recommendation. Our baseline specification is
a simple DD regression estimated at transaction level over the entire sample period.
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The following baseline regression model is estimated:
ritpk = β0 + β1 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i + β2 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i ∗ Postt+
Xiγ + γk + ρp + δt + ρp ∗ δt + eitpk(M3)
where ritpk is the initial interest rate on loan i originated in month t. 1[LTIi = d]
is a dummy variable for LTI buckets, which takes the value of 1 for the LTI bucket
d = [4.5,4.7) and 0 for the LTI bucket d = [3.5,3.7). Postt is the dummy variable
takes the value of 1 if a mortgage is originated after October 2014 or 0 if before.
eitpk are error terms.
The specification controls for borrower and product characteristics (Xi) – these
are LTV bands, borrower age, credit score, whether a mortgage is issued based on
single or joint income application, employment status of the main borrower, mort-
gage terms, and loan value. It also controls for time trends (δt is origination fixed
effects) to account for any time varying changes in the market, for time invariant
geographical factors (γk), and for factors that are specific to a lender (ρp). The
model also includes an interaction term between credit score and LTV bands. The
model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at postcode area level.
We are interested in the coefficients β2, which estimates a change in an interest
rate specific to the LTI bucket relative to the control group of mortgages. To see
if the price of mortgages with LTIs above 4.5 changed, we used different control
groups as a robustness check. These groups are mortgages with LTI between [4.3,
4.5), [4, 4.3), [3.7, 4). The model is run on 2-year fixed mortgages, the most popular
product in the market.
The DD methodology relies on the assumption of parallel trends for the control
and the treatment groups before any intervention. Figure 15 plots unconditional
average initial interest rate over time for the baseline control and treatment groups,
which are mortgages with LTI between [3.5, 3.7) and between [4.5, 4.7) respectively.
It shows that there is a parallel trend between the 2 groups before the recommen-
dation.
The coefficients of the interaction term 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]∗Postt for 2-year fixed
interest rate mortgages is negative and statistically significant (Table 16). These
results are robust across different control groups. The specification considers fixed
effects of lenders, regions and LTV bands, as well as credit and LTV interactions fixed
effects. This suggests that after the recommendation was implemented, the interest
rate for mortgages with LTI ratio between 4.5 and 4.7 was lower than the interest
rate of mortgages in the control group. These results are statistically significant,
and the magnitude of the coefficients suggests that the impact on the initial interest
rate is around 6-8bps.
The price of the fixed rate mortgages is not only determined by the initial interest
rate but also by the lender fees each consumer pays to set up their mortgage. We
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Note: baseline specification where the LTI bucket d=[4.5, 4.7) is a treatment group and the LTI
bucket d=[3.5, 3.7) is control group.
run the Model 3 on an APR based measure that calculates the mortgage cost on
initial interest rate and lender fees (see Chapter II for details on how this measure is
constructed). The results are presented in Table 27 in the Appendix C. It shows that
the APR based measure in the treatment buckets decreased relative to the control
buckets after implementation of the recommendation by around 4-7 bps. Results
are robust to different control buckets of the LTI.
We also provide supporting evidence that the changes in the initial interest rate
for 2-year fixed mortgages are related to the LTI limit recommendation, rather than






βd1∗1[LTIi = d]+βd2∗1[LTIi = d]Postt
]
+Xiγ+γk+ρp+δt+ρpδt+eitpk (M4)
In this specification a dummy for LTI bucket [3, 3.3) is omitted so that the
coefficients βd1 estimate the d-specific LTI bucket change in the interest rates relative
to the loans in the omitted LTI bucket after the recommendation is implemented.
The results of Model 4 for the 2-year fixed rate mortgages are summarised in Figure
16, which plots βd1 coefficients estimates (the coefficient for the interaction term
between LTI bucket and the Post dummy) from the flexible DD specification and
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its 95% confidence interval. The coefficient of the baseline LTI bucket [3, 3.3) is
normalised to 0 so that all coefficients can be interpreted as the change in interest
rates for a given LTI bucket after the FPC recommendation is implemented relative
to the baseline. Figure 16 shows that a significant interest rate shift occurs for
mortgages above the FPC LTI limit of 4.5.
Contrary to expectations that the 15% supply restriction should drive prices
up, the analysis shows robust evidence that post-implementation the average price
for high LTI mortgages dropped, keeping everything else constant (based on the
2-year fixed mortgages). In the next sub-section, we analyse whether this reduc-
tion in price is associated with lenders’ exposure to high LTI mortgages before the
recommendation and in sub-section 4.2.2 we discuss alternative drivers.














LTI [4.5;4.7) * Post -0.0754 *** -0.0799 *** -0.0661 *** -0.0569 ***
(0.0081) (0.0072) (0.0070) (0.0082)
Year-month Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LTV Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LTV*credit score Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Year-month Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65
Number of observations 108,329 142,512 130,754 96,390
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, standard errors are clustered at property area level. These results
are robust to winsorisation.
4.2.1 Lenders’ proximity to the 15% constraint
Before the recommendation lenders differed in their proportion of high LTI mort-
gages.43 Figure 17, Panel A shows that mortgage lenders in scope of the recom-
mendation were either far away from the 15% limit imposed by the FPC policy or
very close to it. The figure captures the average exposure of lenders to high LTI
mortgages before the recommendation and does not capture whether the 15% limit
was binding at the time of announcement or implementation. The share of high LTI
43To obtain lenders’ exposure to high LTI mortgages, for each lender we calculate: a) the share
of high LTI mortgages in total sales for each quarter in the period before the LTI recommendation
was implemented; and b) average these quarterly values. These values represent lenders’ average
exposure to high LTI mortgages before the recommendation. The baseline calculations are based
on the period from July 2012 to October 2014. Any seasonal variation should be averaged over
this period. For robustness, we also calculated the measure over two time periods before the LTI
recommendation was implemented (from April 2013 to March 2014; and from January 2013 to July
2014). The pairwise spearman rank correlation between these three measures is high, between 80%
and 95%. This means that a lender’s exposure to high LTI mortgages relative to other lenders
does not vary between the three time periods.
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Figure 16: Flexible DD estimates of the FPC recommendation on inter-
est rates, 2-years fixed mortgages.
Note: all coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the variable of interest for a given LTI
bucket following the implementation of the FPC recommendation relative to the LTI bucket [3,
3.3). An economically significant change in the initial interest rate happens at the FPC 4.5 cut-off.
This shows that changes in the initial interest rate are related to the LTI 4.5 cut-off rather than
other changes in the market.
mortgages in total sales is averaged over quarters in the period from July 2012 to
October 2014.
The 15% constraint may have affected lenders differently, or not at all. For exam-
ple, mortgage lenders that were closer to the 15% limit before the recommendation
could have become more cautious about their exposure to high LTI mortgages once
the policy was announced, and subsequently scale back this lending. In contrast,
lenders that were further away from the 15% may have interpreted the implemen-
tation of a 15% high LTI lending limit as a signal of an acceptable level of risk and
increased their exposure to high LTI mortgages. Alternatively, the 15% may not
have been binding for some lenders.
Figure 17, Panel B shows how lenders’ exposure to high LTI mortgages varies
after implementation of the recommendation. The period before implementation
is from January 2013 to October 2014. Some lenders that were closer to the 15%
constraint (measured by volume of sales) reduced the proportion of high LTI loans in
their new sales afterwards. Other lenders that were further from the limit increased
the proportion of high LTI mortgages in their new sales afterwards.
Here we would like to see whether the fall in mortgage price depended on how
constrained lenders were to the 15% policy. We modify Model 4 to allow the DD
coefficient to vary by lenders’ exposure to high LTI loans. In Model 5, we capture
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the differential impact of the policy on interest rates for those mortgages affected
by the LTI limit.
ritpk = β0 + β1 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i + β2 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i ∗ Postt+
β4 ∗ Postt ∗ exposurep + β3 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i ∗ exposurep+
β5 ∗ 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)]i ∗ Postt ∗ exposurep+
Xiγ + γk + ρp + δt + ρpδt + eitpk
(M5)
β5 is a triple difference coefficient of the interaction term 1[LTIi = [4.5, 4.7)] ∗
Postt ∗ exposurep. It measures whether the difference in the initial interest rate
(ritpk), before and after the recommendation (Postt), between the treatment and
control groups, depended on lenders’ exposure to high LTI mortgages prior the
recommendation (exposurep).
The β5 coefficients for the 2-year fixed interest rate mortgages is negative and
statistically significant (Table 17). These results are robust across different control
groups, except the baseline case. There is some evidence that after the implemen-
tation of the recommendation, the decrease in interest rates for mortgages with LTI
ratio between 4.5 and 4.7 relative to the control group is bigger for lenders that were
closer to the 15% constraint and constrained by the policy.
Table 17: DD specification, 2-year fixed mortgage initial interest rate .
Initial interest rate control [3.5, 3.7) control [3.7, 4) control [4-4.3) control [4.3-4.5)
LTI [4.5;4.7) * Post -0.0691 *** -0.0491 *** -0.0131 0.0036
(0.0206) (0.0174) (0.0165) (0.0215)
LTI [4.5;4.7) * Post*exposure -0.1672 -0.4371 *** -0.6259 *** -0.6871 ***
(0.1990) 0.1691 (0.1592) (0.2022)
LTV FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
LTV*credit score FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year-month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender*year-month FEs Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65
Number of observations 108,329 142,512 130,754 96,390
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, standard errors are clustered at property area level.
These results are robust to winsorisation.
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Figure 17: Average % of high LTI mortgage sales in total number of sales





























































































































Lenders' exposure to high LTI before the recommendation (%)
Changes in lenders' exposure 




Note: The period before implementation is from July 2012 to October 2014, the
period after the implementation is from October 2014 to June 2016. % of high LTI
mortgages in total number of sales (or in total value of sales) are calculated over
each quarter by each lender, these values are then averaged over the quarters before
and after the implementation.
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4.2.2 Discussion
In this section we analysed changes in mortgage prices for high LTI mortgages after
the recommendation was implemented. The 15% constraint represents a restriction
of supply, and such a negative shock should have driven up prices. However, the
analysis finds the opposite effect, ie robust evidence that post-implementation prices
for high LTI mortgages decreased. In this section, we discuss potential reasons for
this.
We looked at the market dynamics and found that post-implementation of the
recommendation some lenders whose share of high LTI mortgages had been closer
to the 15% limit, reduced their proportion of high LTI mortgages and some lenders
that had a low share of high LTI mortgages subsequently increased their propor-
tion of high LTI mortgages. We also found a meaningful relationship between a
lender’s proximity to the 15% constraint prior to the recommendation and the fall
in the mortgage price. Lenders that were closer to the 15% constraint had a larger
reduction in the initial interest rate.
The decrease in the price for mortgages could also be explained by other drivers,
including changes in competition, lenders’ pricing strategies, and unobservable risk
characteristics.
We looked at the evolution of market concentration, a proxy for competition, by
identifying mortgages of different LTI buckets as a market segment, and calculating
the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) for each segment. The Figure 18 shows
the calculated HHI, which suggests that the concentration measure for mortgages
with LTI bucket [4.3-4.5) and [4.7-5) fell by more compared to mortgages with LTI
buckets [4-4.3). The concentration for mortgages with LTI bucket [4.5-4.7) increased.
Unfortunately, these patterns cannot be reconciled with the fall in price for high LTI
mortgages. If market concentration was related to the reduction in price, we would
have seen a reduction in the HHI measure for the segment of mortgages with LTI
above 4.5 relative to the segment of mortgage with LTI below 4.5. However, it may
also be the case that the threat of increased competition in the high LTI segment,
even if there was not a significant decrease in concentration, was the reason for the
interest rate changes. This hypothesis needs further investigation.
The fall in the price could not be explained by any observable risk character-
istics or changes in borrower composition. The regression models 4 and 5 control
for difference in product, borrower, provider and regional characteristics and poten-
tial non-linearities, like LTV and credit score buckets, including their interaction
effects. If we control for provider and regional characteristics only, omitting prod-
uct and borrower characteristics, the fall in the initial interest rate is around 16bps
compared to 6-8bps in the full Models 4 and 5. It means that borrower and prod-
uct characteristics already account for about 10bps reduction in initial interest rate
post-implementation of the recommendation.
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Table 15 already showed that ex-ante credit risk characteristics like credit score,
payment to income and LTV in the treatment group in comparison to the control
group changed only marginally (towards lower risk) after the recommendation took
effect. However, the fall in prices could reflect changes in unobservable borrowers’
characteristics. Lenders could have become very selective and offered high LTI loans
to less risky consumers on dimensions we cannot observe. This hypothesis matches
the lack of transparency in eligibility criteria, which allows lender to choose at their
discretion what type of borrowers are approved for high LTI mortgages.
Another potential explanation is that lenders changed their pricing strategies for
high LTI mortgages. Accordingly, our analysis indicates a fall in mortgage price.































































































LTI >= 4.0 & LTI < 4.3 LTI >= 4.3 & LTI < 4.5 LTI >= 4.5 & LTI < 4.7 LTI >= 4.7 & LTI < 5
96
5 Conclusion
This paper provides evidence of changes in the market for high LTI mortgages
post-implementation of the FPC recommendation. We used DD and flexible DD
research methodologies and a unique mortgage transaction-level dataset to document
changes in the mortgage market after the introduction of the recommendation with
a particular focus on consumers. The paper finds that after implementation of
the recommendation the average loan size for high LTI mortgages increased by 4-
7%. This suggests that lenders originated high LTI loans for borrowers with higher
incomes. As a result, we find robust evidence of changes in composition of high
LTI borrowers: 1) an increase in the proportion of home movers; 2) a decrease
in the proportion of first-time buyers; 3) an increase in the proportion of joint
income applicants. After implementation, although the overall proportion of high
LTI mortgages to the total number of sales in the market stays around 10%, lenders’
individual exposure to high LTI mortgages changed. Some lenders, whose share of
high LTI mortgages had been closer to the 15% limit, reduced their proportion
of high LTI. In contrast, some lenders that previously had a low share of high
LTI mortgages increased their proportion of them. After controlling for borrower,
product, and lender characteristics, we find that post-implementation the mortgage
price for high LTI mortgages on average decreased. The fall in the mortgage price
was stronger for lenders that used to be closer to the 15% constraint.
Here we also highlight some research limitations, which might weaken the strength
of our findings. We also discuss our approach to overcome these limitations.
The main challenge was that other policy interventions were happening at a
similar time as the FPC recommendation on LTI, making it difficult to isolate indi-
vidual policy impacts. The Mortgage Market Review (MMR) rules came into effect
in April 2014, 6 months before implementation of the FPC recommendation. The
biggest change was that borrowers looking to take out a mortgage now had to un-
dergo an affordability assessment. In addition to the MMR rules, in June 2014 the
FPC recommended that mortgage lenders should apply an interest rate stress, when
assessing borrowers’ affordability (BOE (2014)). The affordability assessment may
have a much larger effect for borrowers with LTIs of 4.5 and above than for borrow-
ers with lower LTIs. Borrowers’ affordability should be tested using reversion rate
+ 300bps. For a borrower with a 25-year term and a reversion rate of 4%, an LTI of
4.5 would imply a stressed Debt Service Ratio (DSR) of 35-45%. If a borrower has a
stressed DSR above 35-40%, it is more likely they will fail the affordability test. Our
treatment and control groups might have been affected differently by these changes
and it is challenging to rule out that the findings in the paper are just because of the
FPC recommendation on LTI. However, the flexible DD methodology showed that
changes in borrower composition and initial interest rate happened exactly at the
4.5 FPC cut-off. It is also important to note that the changes in payment-to-income
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ratio, which could serve as a proxy for affordability, before and after the recom-
mendation was implemented, for high LTI mortgages changed only by 1% (Table
15).
There could also be an issue of potential endogeneity if, for example, the rec-
ommendation were a response to trends already happening with loans at LTI above
4.5. Besley and Case (2000) discussed an example of policy endogeneity. However,
one can argue that the FPC recommendation on LTI was exogenous, because it was
designed as an ‘insurance’ policy and was not ‘expected to have a material impact
on mortgage lending and housing transactions’ (BOE (2014)). Nevertheless, this
paper also addressed any potential issue of endogeneity by showing that changes
in loan value, borrowers’ composition and price happen exactly at the 4.5 cut-off
(the flexible DD results in Figure 13) and at the time the recommendation was
implemented (the test on the parallel trend assumption in Figure 12). This is in
line with the findings of DeFusco et al. (2017), and this paper closely follows their
methodology. Similar to the flexible DD approach, and to avoid any contamination
of the estimation due to a shift of borrowers from just below 4.5 to just above 4.5,
this paper uses buckets further away from the 4.5 cut-off as a control group. We
carry out further robustness checks using buckets just below 4.5 cut-off.
The government also launched the help-to-buy (HTB) scheme in October 2013
and restricted it to new mortgages with LTIs below 4.5 from October 2014. The
HTB scheme was designed to help first-time buyers to buy a home or home movers
with limited equity to move houses. Under the HTB scheme, buyers only needed
to provide 5% of a home’s value as a deposit. This scheme could have affected
our control group of borrowers with LTI ratios below 4.5. That is, borrowers that
previously could not afford a mortgage were more likely to enter the HTB scheme
and (until October 2014) be borrowers with high LTI and LTV ratio. We checked
if the scheme was affecting our findings by choosing a control group of borrowers
with LTIs well below 4.5 and crossed checked the results to borrowers with LTIs
just below 4.5 (flexible DD approach), and as discussed above the results are robust.
Another approach was to re-run the main findings on the data excluding mortgages
provided under government initiatives. However, this data field is only available
after 2015.
The fast growth in house prices relative to incomes could also have affected
distribution of borrowers across LTI buckets. We offset this impact by performing
robustness checks on regions with low house price inflation, and by controlling for
regional characteristics in our regression analyses.
98
Part V
Real Rigidities and Optimal
Stabilization at the Zero Lower
Bound in New Keynesian Economies
1 Introduction
Keeping the nominal interest rate at zero even after the natural rate has recovered to
positive values, enacting an increase in government spending or, more controversially,
introducing tax increases have all been discussed as viable stabilisation policy
strategies in New Keynesian economies subject to deep recessions. This paper
studies the extent to which the desirability of such strategies is affected by the nature
of interaction among firms and households in the product and labour markets. It
highlights that both the optimal length of time spent at the zero bound, the strength
of policy responses, and the magnitude of observed macroeconomic outcomes under
optimal policy (such as inflation rates) are significantly affected by the degree of
strategic complementarity in price- and wage-setting. We show that the structure
of the labour market (in particular, whether or not labour markets are segmented)
has a profound effect on both optimal policy and macroeconomic outcomes.
The importance of strategic complementarity between price- or wage-setters has
received considerable attention in the context of the ability of New Keynesian models
to replicate observed persistence in the real economy following monetary policy
shocks.44 However, the literature on stabilization policy at the zero lower bound
has so far largely ignored the implications of strategic interaction in price and wage
setting for policy under the specific circumstances presented to policy makers by
the presence of this nonlinearity.45 Exploring the interaction between strategic
complementarity and optimal policy at the zero lower bound is important, as
seemingly innocuous assumptions about market structure or structural parameters
often taken in the literature have non-trivial implications for the way we should
think about ‘good’ policy and what is desirable to achieve in terms of outcomes in
the economy.
44See Edge (2002), Woodford (2011) or Ascari (2003), for example.
45Most recently, Eggertsson and Singh (2019) discuss sector specificity of labour markets in a
paper on zero-lower-bound issues. They concentrate on the analytical usefulness of this assumption,
and do not explore the implications for policy or economic dynamics.
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In this paper, we study a New Keynesian setup in which prices and/or wages
are sticky, and the labour market can be either non-segmented (or economy-wide)
or segmented (sector-specific). Government spending is valued and the income tax
policy is determined endogenously. This economy is subject to a large fundamental
shock as a result of which optimally set nominal interest rates hit the zero lower
bound.46 While Correia et al. (2013) have shown that a sufficiently rich set of
policy instruments can completely circumvent the liquidity trap problem, and may
even enable policy makers to implement the first best outcome, in this paper we
study a world in which solutions that are costless in welfare terms are ruled out. In
addition to setting the tax on wage income and government spending, the authorities
can use forward commitment concerning interest rates to stabilize the economy in
a liquidity trap.47 Eggertsson and Woodford (2004) and Nakata (2011) have also
studied a simultaneous determination of optimal monetary and fiscal policy in a
deep recession but did not consider in greater depth the role of wage stickiness and,
in particular, strategic complementarities. Christiano et al. (2011) and Christiano
(2010), whilst including wage stickiness, only examined the functioning of ad hoc
(tax) policies and concentrated on the implied real economy effects.
We find that the optimal response in the inflation rate to a given large shock
varies by as much as one order of magnitude depending on whether we assume
sector-specific labour markets or an economy-wide labour market. We also highlight
the importance of key parametric assumptions for policy and outcomes at the
zero lower bound. In particular, we show that depending on the nature of
nominal wage adjustment in the economy, a linear production technology may
justify relatively high expected inflation or—at the other extreme—strict price-level
targeting strategies. The differences are smaller with a concave production function.
Intuitively, in the presence of nominal price and/or wage rigidities (à la Calvo),
features that force price- or wage-optimizers to consider more carefully the potential
adverse implications of demand reallocations for their profits act to supress relative
price adjustment following shocks. It matters, in particular, if real wage changes are
46The policy prescriptions obtained in our framework are standard given that the source of the
downturn in our model is also standard—a shock to the rate of time preference of agents. Schmitt-
Grohé and Uribe (2004) and Mertens and Ravn (2014) have questioned the usefulness of such
conventional policy advice if the cause of the severe downturn in the economy is that expectations
are not well-anchored. We believe this discussion is beyond the scope of the intended contribution
of this paper.
47Such a set of policy tools better reflects the policy decisions implemented by central banks
and governments around the developed world in the wake of the most recent severe recession.
See, for example, EC (2009) or CEA (2009). Only the United Kingdom have on a one-off basis
implemented a policy concerning the general VAT rate that is vaguely in line with Correia et al.
(2013).
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seen as an economy-wide phenomenon or something that affects particular industries
only. In the latter case, sectoral price determination needs to take into account
the consequences of price-change-induced demand re-allocation for sectoral wages
(and profits). An implication of this is more caution in price re-optimization, less
inflation volatility and more volatility in real variables. The latter is manifested
in both larger response magnitudes and longer duration of adjustment following
shocks. Such considerations are, understandably, exacerbated by factors such as
the intersectoral substitutability of different types of products and labour, and the
nature of the production technology. This is something we demonstrate in the paper
too.
The optimal policy response in the presence of conditions for dampened
adjustment is to act more forcefully. In terms of monetary policy action, the
commitment to keep interest rates at zero lasts longer after the zero bound ceases
to bind once real rigidities are taken into account. Krugman et al. (1998) famously
argued that monetary policy is not ineffective in a liquidity trap as long as it is able
to affect inflation expectations. Expectations of higher inflation lower the current
real interest rate and act to stimulate demand even if the short-term nominal interest
rate is stuck at zero. It has been shown in the context of standard New Keynesian
models that the monetary policy consistent with such evolution of prices involves a
commitment to keep the nominal interest rate at zero for some time after the zero
bound ceases to bind. Eggertsson and Woodford (2004), Jung et al. (2005) and
Adam and Billi (2006) have shown this formally, whilst arguing for very modest
rates of expected inflation. Our paper demonstrates that the optimal duration of
the commitment to keep interest rates at zero as well as the implied inflation rates
vary considerably depending on the assumed degree of strategic complementarity in
price and wage setting decisions. Contrary to what one might expect, longer forward
commitment does not translate into larger inflation responses. It merely mitigates
their absence. The point of a stronger monetary policy response is primarily to
engineer a larger boom in the real economy in the future which reduces desired
savings and stimulates demand in the short run. This is consistent with a thought
experiment in Werning (2011) who examined the case of a simple economy in a
liquidity trap with artificially fixed prices. We show that such a simple exercise
is a close approximation of optimal dynamics in a sticky-price sticky-wage New
Keynesian economy with a linear production technology.
When real rigidities are stronger, other tools in the conventional stabilization
toolbox are applied more forcefully too: the desired short-term government spending
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expansion is larger and the government must commit itself to greater cuts in the
future. A policy strategy of ‘leaning against the wind’ in which government spending
is first raised and then cut whilst the nominal interest rate is at the zero bound has
been proposed by Gertler (2003) due to its impact on the natural rate of interest.
Nakata (2011) and Werning (2011) have shown this to be a feature of optimal policy
in a liquidity trap. Werning (2011) argues that the mentioned strategy is almost
entirely ‘opportunistic’ and the motivation for it has little to do with stabilization.48
We provide evidence supporting this view too. Since we study optimal policy from
a timeless perspective, in line with Schmidt (2013), we do not find large gains in
terms of the stability of nominal or real variables as a result of the deployment of
government spending.
The idea that an income tax hike is desirable at the zero bound due to its effect
on (expected) inflation and the real interest rate has been discussed in Eggertsson
(2011) and Nakata (2011). In Correia et al. (2013), tax policy is best thought of as
a price stabilization tool given its impact on the marginal cost in the economy. In
our model, we also observe gains in price stability once tax policy is activated in
addition to the other tools in the policy maker’s toolbox. Overall, the budgetary
impact of stabilization measures is close to zero in the short term.
We also examine the state-dependency of our results as in Burgert and Schmidt
(2014). We find that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the differences
across economies with different labour market structures. In particular, the optimal
inflation response is even larger in the economy with economy-wide labour markets
relative to the alternatives considered when initial debt is high. Tax policy deployed
more forcefully bears the brunt of the initial adjustment in debt. This can be an
increase or a cut depending on where the economy starts relative to its steady state.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.1 introduces different
versions of a baseline model that form the basis for our analysis of the design of
optimal monetary and fiscal policies in a liquidity trap. This model is parameterized
and solved using the nonlinear method explained in great detail in Nakata (2011).
The results of the numerical exercise are presented and related to the existing
literature in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
48In a public finance context, ‘opportunistic’ policy makers will seek to increase the provision of




This section describes a model of an economy with sticky nominal wages and prices
akin to Benigno and Woodford (2005) which builds on Erceg et al. (2000). The
government authorities in our economy set the interest rate, government spending
and the distortive labor income tax rate to stabilize the economy. Shocks to the
discount factor are the only source of disturbance in the model, and we examine the
economy’s adjustment under perfect foresight along a deterministic path following a
single large innovation to the discount factor. If this innovation was small, it could
be fully offset by a cut in the nominal interest rate, and other policy instruments
would not play a role in stabilizing the economy.
Whilst the model is closer to the widely used medium-scale setups than the
more common simple stylized frameworks in terms of its complexity, it should still
be thought of only as a relatively tractable environment for the study of policy
interactions. The quantitative results from this model are especially subject to this
caveat. The main lessons concerning policy coordination should, however, apply
more generally, as the circumstances we examine are implicit in all larger-scale
models.
2.1.1 The discount factor shock
An exogenous shock to the discount factor of agents, representing a change in their
preferences in terms of consumption and savings, is used to capture the idea of a
severe demand-led contraction in the economy.
As in Nakata (2011), we assume that the discount factor at time t+ s is defined
as βδs, i.e. δs shows the relative difference between discount factors at time t + s
and t + s + 1. The following assumptions about the discount factor shock hold in
the model
δ0 = 1,
δ1 = 1 + εδ,1,
δs = 1 + ρδ (δs−1 − 1) for s > 2.
The discount factor shock is realized before optimization decisions are made. It
holds that εδ,1 > 0 and the shock persists, but decays with the time at the rate
0 < ρδ < 1.
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2.2 Households and the labour market
There is a continuum of monopolistically competitive households located on the unit
interval [0, 1]. Those of type j choose private consumption of a final good Ct(j) and



























6 (1− τn,t+s)Wt (j)Nt+s(j) +Bt+s−1(j)− TLSt+s +Dt+s (3)
The variable Pt is a price of a final good, Rt stands for the gross nominal return
on the bond, while τn,t is the labor income tax rate. TLSt refers to the lump sum
taxes (transfers) that may be paid by (to) the households. The profits generated
by monopolistically competitive firms are transferred to households in the form of






where Πt = Pt/Pt−1 is price inflation. The Euler equation is not indexed by the
households, as we assume completeness of insurance market against idiosyncratic
shocks and that the initial holdings of assets are the same across households.49
Therefore, Ct(j) = Ct and Bt(j) = Bt for all j and t.50
Households of type j supply a differentiated labor service Nt (j) at a wage rate
Wt(j). There is a perfectly-competitive employment agency that aggregates the











in which ε is the elasticity of substitutions between differentiated labour. The
perfectly-competitive employment agency sells aggregated labour to producers of




Wt(j)Nt (j), taking the wage rateWt(j) and the aggregate
price index Wt as given. In optimum, the employment agency’s demand for type-j
49An implication of the former is that the exact distribution of shares across firms does not
matter. Hence, we do not specify dividends D in detail.
50Notice here that if δ is small enough, it can be fully offset by a change in R, leaving the rest
of the economy unaffected.
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labour is given by















To introduce wage stickiness, the model assumes a system of staggered wage
contract for the households: households of a certain type are able to change their
wages with probability 1−ξw at any given period of time. Whenever the households
are allowed to re-optimize their wage, they choose optimalW ∗t to maximize expected
discounted sum of utilities, taking into account that they may not be allowed change
the wage rate, subject to the demand for labor equation and the budget constraint.
For simplicity, we do not consider wage indexation. The households thus choose the












































We have defined Πwt = Wt/Wt−1 and wt = Wt/Pt. Given our wage setting
mechanism, the evolution of the aggregate wage index follows
1 = (1− ξw) (w∗t )





There is a continuum of intermediate differentiated goods indexed i. Firms operating
in sector i use a linear production technology to produce output
Yt(i) = Nt (i)
1/α . (10)
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with α > 1. The price of an intermediate good i is Pt(i). The representative final
goods producer that operates in a perfectly competitive environment sells Yt which










in which θ is the elasticity of substitutions between the differentiated intermediate
products. The representative final goods producing firm sells its product to the
consumers at a price Pt. It chooses the quantity of each differentiated good to
maximize its profit PtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt(i)Yt(i)di. As a result, demand for intermediate
good i is given by















Price adjustment is assumed to be staggered too. It is assumed that in any given
period, the intermediate goods producing firms operating in a given sector are able
to re-optimize their price with a probability 1− ξp. Whenever the firms are able to
re-optimize their price, they choose the optimal P ∗t to maximize expected discounted
sum of profits subject to the demand for their product defined in equation (11). The





































The dynamic of the aggregate price index follows





Monetary and fiscal authorities coordinate their action to maximize social welfare.
The monetary branch of the central government sets the nominal interest rate Rt,
and is constrained by the zero lower bound
Rt > 1 for all t. (17)
The fiscal authority sets the tax rate τn,t and decides about government spending







− τn,twtNt +Gt − TLSt (18)
with bt = Bt/Pt.
2.2.3 Further equilibrium conditions
Given the intermediate goods producing firms’ production function (10), the




Nt (i) di, it can be shown that
stY
α













stands for price dispersion. The resource constraint is given by
Ct +Gt = Yt. (21)
An important equilibrium condition is the identity describing the evolution of







Chugh (2006) highlights the importance of this identity in generating endogenous
persistence in a sticky-price, sticky-wage economy.
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2.2.4 Alternative versions of the model
We consider two versions of this model in which wages will be flexible but the steady
state is the same as in the economy set out above. These versions are distinct in
one crucial aspect: labour market segmentation. This has a key implication for the
price determination in the economy and ultimately for the degree of sluggishness in
the response of the real economy to shocks and policy action.
No labour market segmentation
When intermediate goods producing firms hire labour from the economy-wide
market, their pricing decision still affects the demand for the differentiated goods
produced by these firms but they consider the economy-wide real wage rate as being
unaffected by their decision. This significantly increases the sensitivity of prices
to shocks and accelerates real adjustment following disturbances and policy action.
This version of the model is the same as the one presented in the sections above
with ξw set to zero and relative wages set to one at all times. In the presence of
perfect insurance against idiosyncratic risk, we also need not consider differentiated
types of labour and write Nt and Wt instead of their sector-specific values in the
households’ problem.
Segmented labour markets
In this version of the model, which is close to the setup of Woodford and
Eggertsson (2003) and Adam and Billi (2006), the intermediate goods producing
firms internalize the consequence of their pricing decision for demand for the specific
type of good, and the subsequent implications for the sectoral wage rate through
the demand for sector-specific labour. The firms’ problem gets modified in a
















and the definition of the real wage rate coming from the household problem.51
































2.2.5 The policy problems
We shall consider the alternative versions of the model with different elements of
the policy maker’s toolbox switched on and off. In all cases, the objective will be

































= (1− ξw) (w∗t )




is a measure of wage dispersion. This is equal to one for all t when wages are
flexible. Moreover, in the case of the flexible-wage economy with sector-specific














51The introduction of sector-specificity raises questions about wage formation. In order to avoid
the need to consider monopsony in the labour market, we are implicitly assuming that there are
many firms and many households in each sector in the economy, i.e. a ‘double continuum’ of firms
and households, as explained in Woodford (2011) (Chapter 3). Hence, we have used the plural







We shall be looking for policies that are optimal from a timeless perspective
(Woodford (2011)). In other words, we will be solving for time-invariant policy
rules assuming that preferences in the initial period are augmented so that the
policy maker does not take advantage of the fact that there had been no expectations
formed about the initial outcomes. The equilibrium conditions and the first-order
conditions for each version of the model are listed in the Appendix D.
2.3 Parameterization and solution
We parameterize the model with values commonly used in the literature.52 We refer
to the model under this parameterization as our ‘baseline’ case. The discount factor
β is assumed to be 0.99. The discount factor shock εδ,1 is set to 0.02 to make sure the
economy hits the zero bound. The persistence of the innovation ρδ is 0.9. Thus, to
determine when the natural rate of interest exceeds zero, one needs to check at what
quarter the product of βδt falls below 1. For the parameters of the shock process,
the discount factor and the persistence, the natural rate of interest is above zero
from t>7.53 We assume preferences are logarithmic in government spending, set
χC to 1/6 and the inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply to 1.54 The preference
parameters χN,0 and χG,0 are set to 1 and 0.2 respectively. This parameterization
implies that steady-state government spending is close to 20 percent of steady-state
output and the steady-state public debt is at 50 percent of annualized GDP. The
elasticity of susbstitution for goods θ is set to 11. We follow Chugh (2006) in setting
the elasticity of substitution in the labour market ε to 21. The measure of price
stickiness ξp is 0.75 implying an average four-quarter duration or price contracts.
The same value is used to parameterize the duration of wage contracts when wages
are sticky.55 The production function is assumed to be linear in labour in the baseline
case (as in Nakata (2011) or Fernández-Villaverde et al. (2015)).
When conducting sensitivity tests, the steady-state of our model is going to
change. We maintain comparability by ensuring that in all cases the steady-state
debt-to-GDP ratio remains at 50 percent of GDP.
52The parameter values are summarized in Table 28 in the appendix.
53Werning (2011) shows this need not be equivalent to the point in time when the zero bound
stops binding, as the optimal interest rate reaction function may involve other terms that are non-
zero at the zero bound in addition to the natural rate. We only have a numerical solution for the
interest rate, and so cannot be more precise here.
54The value for χC was also used in Jung et al. (2005), Nakata (2011), and is close to the estimate
of Rotemberg and Woodford (1997).
55In the flexible-wage case, we set this parameter to zero but retain imperfect competition in
the labour market so that the flexible-wage and sticky-wage economies are easier to compare.
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Given that we consider an event in which the economy departs far from its
steady state, and an inequality constraint becomes binding, we solve the model in
its non-linear form. We use the procedure described in detail in Nakata (2011),
which embeds the modified Newton method of Juillard et al. (1998) into a shooting
algorithm. As shown in Nakata (2011) there are significant accuracy gains from
using a nonlinear solution relative to piecewise linear methods. Fernández-Villaverde
et al. (2015) also argue in favour of explicitly considering nonlinearities. Our
approach here is thus different from the approach of Kollmann (2008) that relies
on approximations and studies simple implementable rules.56
3 Results
There are two ways of dissecting our results. We shall look at comparisons across
different labour market arrangements. At the same time, we can understand a lot
about the intuition behind the various policy interventions and the transmission
of policy decisions by inspecting the same economy under different policies and
parameterizations. In this section, we draw conclusions from both of these
approaches. First, we look at the baseline model. Later, we demonstrate the
robustness of our intuition by conducting sensitivity tests.
3.1 The model under baseline parameterization
Our first set of results is shown in Figure 26 in which impulse response functions to
a discount factor shock for three types of economic settings are compared (a model
with flexible wages and an economy-wide labour market, a model with flexible wages
and segmented labour markets labelled ‘SLM’, and a model with sticky wages). Here,
we assume that monetary policy is the only available tool to stabilize the economy
and that the fiscal solvency constraint is satisfied through lump-sum taxes.
The model’s simulation suggests that the optimal inflation volatility at the zero
lower bound is significantly affected by the nature of the labour markets in the
economy. When labour market sector specificity is introduced into the model with
flexible wages, the optimal inflation response to a given shock drops by as much as
one order of magnitude. In the model with sticky wages, inflation volatility drops
even further. For all practical purposes, the dynamic of the optimal sticky-wage
economy is the same as the dynamic of an economy without price or nominal wage
inflation. The figure also shows that in all three models, it is optimal to keep
56For the sake of balance, we mention that Eggertsson and Singh (2019) tend to downplay the
importance of the differences arising from approximation accuracy in a model similar to ours.
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the nominal interest rate at zero even after the zero bound ceases to bind. This
result is in line with the earlier literature. However, our key contribution is to show
that it is optimal to keep the interest rate at zero for even longer when labour
markets are segmented or nominal wage rigidities are present. This policy—as we
demnonstrate—is associated with smaller rather than larger expected inflation in
the economy.
The intuition for this result is best understood in the context of the literature
that investigates the ability of New Keynesian models to generate realistic degrees
of output persistence (Edge (2002), Ascari (2003), Woodford (2011)). Changing
the nature of the labour markets affects the way price-setting firms and/or wage-
setting households respond to a demand contraction or expansion in important
ways. In a flexible-wage economy, a shock with negative implications for demand
implies lower demand for labour and hence a downward pressure on real wages
(and, by implication, on marginal cost). In an economy with flexible wages and
economy-wide labour markets, optimizing firms would reflect the effect on wages
to a large extent in their pricing decision. They would consider the fact that
they may not be able to change the price soon as demand recovers (and in fact
overshoots) which will limit the extent to which prices drop. The firms also consider
that lowering prices induces substitution of demand from goods for which prices
remain unchanged. They can, however, recruit additional labour at the prevailing
economy-wide real wage rate, which is a cost unrelated to the industry they operate
in. With labour market segmentation, the firms need to consider that price-change-
induced intersectoral re-allocation of demand needs to be met by hiring additional
labour from a specific market with a specific wage rate. This will be affected by the
need to meet the extra demand. This additional wage effect—which would eat into
firms’ profits—introduces an element of caution in price setting. As a consequence,
there is a dampened price response in the first place, and a more persistence in
the adjustment of the real economy. This mechanism explains the much more
subdued inflation dynamic under segmented labour markets as depicted in Figure
26. With sticky nominal wages, marginal cost adjusts sluggishly by construction.
In addition, optimizing households consider the broader implications of their wage
decisions. Cutting (raising) wages too much, whilst other households keep wages
constant, might re-allocate demand towards (from) their speciality, and the welfare
cost of labour supply increases on the margin. This reinforces wage stability already
introduced via staggered wage-setting. Overall, wages and, as a consequence, prices
react little to shocks.
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The downside of such price stability is that it imples a higher path for real
interest rates. In the absence of significant expected inflation, the future real boom
would be more subdued ceteris paribus and discounted more heavily. Relatively low
wealth implies lower consumption in the short run.
The monetary policy maker mitigates subdued price inflation by keeping the
interest rate at zero for longer. This induces a greater real economy boom. It is
in this sense that we argue, following Werning (2011), that monetary policy in the
liquidity trap is geared towards generating an expected real economy boom rather
than inflation per se.
Overall, we still observe a significantly larger drop in output and consumption
under segmented labour markets and nominal wage rigidity than with economy-
wide labour markets. However, an optimizing policy maker will be comfortable with
achieving more price stability at the expense of larger consumption (and output)
volatility. This is because strategic complementarity affects not only the degree
to which marginal cost pressures translate into price movements (the slope of the
Phillips curve) but also the relative costliness of inflation and output variability from
a welfare perspective. With more strategic complementarity, a flatter Phillips curve
implies that there is larger misallocation of resources arising from a given rate of
inflation.
Introducing government spending as a policy tool does not change the overall
picture markedly, which can be inferred from Figure 27. This is consistent with
Schmidt (2013). In fact, as argued in Werning (2011), government spending policy
may have little to do with stabilization in the economy and instead be driven by
public finance considerations. In an economy with depressed private demand, the
marginal disutility of labour is low. An ‘opportunistic’ policy maker deciding on
the optimal amount of public spending within the period following the Samuelson
rule will observe a small marginal rate of transformation between the public and
private goods (a drop in the relative price of public good), and will seek to increase
provision of valued G. The reverse holds in boom time.
To get a feel of the relative contribution of such considerations for government
spending policy, we do the following comparison. We take the output dynamic from
the optimal economy without fiscal variables in use as given, and ask ourselves the
question: What would an optimizing policy maker driven purely by public finance
considerations do if he/she saw output dynamic from the economy stabilized only by
monetary policy? Our objective is thus to find GPF = arg maxG(C,C +G,G) with
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C taken as given.57 We then compare the result of this exercise with the optimal
dynamic of G in the various versions of our New Keynesian economies with tax
rates fixed. We report the results in Figure 28. In line with Werning (2011), it is
clear that the time profile as well as the magnitude of the response in G is very well
explained by public finance considerations. One effect of such leaning against the
wind via G is that output becomes more stable but by not too much. Figure 30
which depicts optimal dynamics in the sticky-wage economy under different policy
options makes this point clear.
Finally, we add tax policy to our set of policy instruments used to stabilize the
economy (see Figure 29). The tax in our economy is labour income tax levied on
household earnings. This tax directly affects marginal cost, and therefore, is an
effective instrument deployed to deliver the desired evolution of prices. This view
of the role of tax policy is the same as in Correia et al. (2013). In our model,
taxes generally rise in the short-term which is consistent with the demand-side
considerations found in the literature. In particular, Eggertsson (2011) and Nakata
(2011) sought to justify tax increases through their impact on (expected) inflation
and the real interest rate. This is in turn different from Bils and Klenow (2008)
who concentrated on the income effect of a tax cut, which is the reasoning probably
closest to the philosophy behind similar real-world stimulus measures. In our model,
taxes lean against the wind: they counteract the dynamic of marginal cost resulting
primarily in a more stable inflation rate. This is best seen in the case of the sticky
wage economy, as shown in Figure 30, but the intuition is valid in our flexible wage
economies as well. In a sticky-wage economy, with only a fraction of wage-setters
reacting to tax policy (affecting the net gains from employment), tax policy needs
to act more robustly to achieve the desired aggregate outcome.
The overall budgetary impact of stabilization measures is close to zero initially
and public debt gradually falls towards a new lower steady state level. It is a
feature of the model that there is a continuum of steady states indexed by tax
rates with a corresponding debt level. As in Nakata (2011), the welfare-maximizing
tax rate is negative (eliminating the distortions to the steady state), and the
corresponding steady state features a higher output level, more government spending
and government holding net assets. Following the shock, the economy moves into a
57We adjust the preferences of the policy maker with respect to G so that in the steady state,
he would choose the G/Y ratio that prevails in the steady state of our economies.
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steady state located closer to such an outcome.58
3.2 Sensitivity analysis
In this section, we explore the sensitivity of our results to parameters that determine
the degree of strategic complementarity in the economy. By looking at parameters
that drive the extent to which (downward) marginal cost pressures arising from the
a shock with severe demand implications are reflected in price- and wage-setting
decisions of optimizing firms and households, we can verify if the intuition set out
in the previous section is correct. Finally, we check how the results are affected if
the economy has an inherited public debt level significantly above and below the
steady-state level.59
3.2.1 Concave production function
The link between the shape of the production function and strategic
complementarity is subtle. When the production function is no longer linear, changes
in the amount of labour are no longer proportional to the changes in demand for
production. Even in a non-segmented labour market, a profit-maximizing price
setter has to consider the situation that his production costs will be more-than-
proportionately affected if additional demand comes his way as a result of re-setting
prices, whilst others keep theirs unchanged. This, again, introduces caution into the
price setting. As a consequence, we observe reduced price volatility and increased
output response in the economy with a non-segmented labour market. The peak of
the inflation response drops by almost a half of what it was with a linear production
function and the time spent at the zero bound lengthens in this economy to 10
periods versus the 9 periods in the baseline version (see Figure 31). This result
confirms that real rigidity—whether induced by a particular labour market structure
or other factors such as the shape of the production function—is an important
determinant of the magnitude of the desired inflation response to shocks at the zero
bound, and the time spent at the zero lower bound.
58The optimal debt dynamic would likely differ in a model with a different role for government
expenditures (see Gomez (2004), Futagami et al. (2008) or D’Auria (2015), for example), given
that the zero-rate interest policy would likely affect public sector investment decisions, for example,
were they included in the model. Nevertheless, the model is relevant for real-world considerations
in the sense that it shows that stabilization and reduction of debt levels towards a lower efficient
level can go hand in hand.
59The results are quite predictably sensitive to parameters driving nominal rigidity. When the
degree of wage stickiness is lowered (from four to two quarters on average), inflation volatility
increases somewhat, and real volatility drops. Also, interest rates are kept at zero for only one
period longer than otherwise (two periods in the baseline calibration). However, the main intuition
still holds, and the quantitative impact is moderate.
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Somewhat counterintuitively, in the sticky-wage model, inflation volatility
increases moderately when production function is modelled to be concave. Inflation
now behaves similarly to the economy with segmented labour markets. The reason
for this dynamic can be traced back to what happens in the labour market in the
flexible price and wage version of our economy. The natural level of output in the
economy is determined as the intersection between labour supply and labour demand
functions in a (Y,w) plane (equations (6) and (13) with the left-hand sides equal
to one and the ξ’s equal to zero). With a linear production function, the demand
function is horizontal at a level determined by the steady-state markup. The labour
supply function is upward sloping. If a shock affects labour supply, the equilibrium
(natural) real wage rate will stay unaffected. With a concave production function,
labour supply still slopes upwards. The labour demand schedule, however, becomes
downward sloping in the (Y,w) plane. Marginal cost now depends on the quantity
of production and the equilibrium real wage rate thus must fall when output (labour
supply) increases.
In the full version of the model, it is a feature of our economy that a future boom
is generated to stabilize the economy in the short term. In this boom, labour supply
needs to expand, and real wages need to fall as they loosely track the natural rate.
A mild inflation facilitates this adjustment. This is shown in Figure 32. The role
of inflation in facilitating real wage adjustment in an economy with sticky nominal
wages has been highlighted in Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004).60
3.2.2 Degree of competition
With lower substitutability across sectors, one would expect strategic
complementarity to play a smaller role in the price setting decision. Firms should not
be wary of bold moves, as sizeable demand shifts from or to sectors where prices are
not re-optimized happen less easily. If our story about strategic complementarity is
true, we should expect larger swings in inflation, smaller volatility in real variables,
and a shorter time spent at the zero lower bound. Figure 33 confirms the intuition.
It shows that the optimal economy with a concave production function reverts back
towards our baseline model with linear production technology in terms of policies
and outcomes once the degree of competition (elasticity of subsitution in the goods
market) is lowered.
60The shape of the production function may indeed be one of the main contributing factors to
the opposite findings concerning optimal inflation volatility by Chugh (2006).
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3.2.3 Other parameters
In addition to the parameters reported above, we also checked the sensitivity with
respect to the elasticity of substitution in the labour market ε and the elasticity
of labour supply (the inverse of which is χN,1). The results confirm the intuition
conveyed above but in comparison with the analysis of different forms of the
production function, the sensitivity to changes in the elasticity was less pronounced
for plausible values of parameters. This is consistent with Ascari (2003) who makes
a similar point.
The intertemporal elasticity of substitution χC affects the model in a variety of
ways, making sensitivity tests less straightforward. It affects the transmission of the
shock and monetary policy in the model, and the wealth effect of labour supply (and
hence the slope of the Phillips curve). A shock of a given magnitude has smaller real
consequences as before and policy action has to be more forceful to have impact. In
our sensitivity analysis, we have increased the magnitude of the shock so that the
depth of the contraction is similar to the one observed in the flexible-wage economy
non-segmented labour markets above. The key messages from our paper survive this
modification. The differences across specifications, however, become relatively small
both in terms of policy and outcomes. Hence, we conclude that the characterization
of what constitutes ‘good’ policy in a New Keynesian setup at the zero lower bound
is most robust when the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is relatively small.61
3.2.4 Initial level of debt
Burgert and Schmidt (2014) demonstrated that inherited debt level matters for
both monetary and fiscal policy at the zero lower bound. We examined the state-
dependency of dynamics in our baseline economy by considering the following two
cases. In the ‘high debt’ scenario, the initial level of public debt was set at twice the
steady-state level of debt, i.e. at 100 percent of GDP. In the ‘low debt’ scenario, the
inherited indebtedness was half of the steady-state level of debt. As in Burgert and
Schmidt (2014), we find that the magnitude of the inflation response is increasing,
the initial increase in government spending is falling, and the initial response in
the tax rate is increasing in the level of inherited debt. Their conclusions obtained
under discretionary policy thus carry over into an economy with time-consistent
policy of the ‘timeless perspective’ type. In line with much of the New Keynesian
literature (see, for instance, Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2004)), the initial deviation
61For the sake of brevity, the results from these exercises are not displayed here but are available
upon request from the authors.
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of debt from its steady-state level is never fully undone.62 This is a manifestation
of intertemporal smoothing of welfare in tax and government spending policy.
As regards the interaction between the initial level of debt and labour market
structure, our results show that higher initial indebtedness tends to amplify the
differences observed across economies with different structures when it comes to
inflation volatility, in particular. In the economy with non-segmented labour
markets, a larger inflation response (a deeper fall in the real interest rate)—the
consideration behind which is to a great extent fiscal (directly and indirectly through
the tax rate)—enables a smoother adjustment in real variables. In line with that,
government spending barely moves (there is a slight contraction). Overall, as shown
in Figure 34, we see debt level falling well below its initial level, and stabilizing at
a level that is much higher than the calibrated steady-state level.
4 Conclusion
We have shown that the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning
interest rates at the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of expected
inflation or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend crucially on the
assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to simple parametric
assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about the nature of the
labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour market segmentation
and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown to have particularly
significant consequences for the type of policy one might wish to implement in an
economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In those circumstances, it is
a good idea for governments to lean against the wind in two different ways. First,
an increase in government spending when output is low (and vice versa) stabilizes
output (and prices) but this policy can be justified almost wholly with reference to
static public finance considerations. Second, an increase in taxes when output is
low (and vice versa) stabilizes prices via their impact on marginal cost. The results
interact in interesting ways with the initial conditions in the economy. With higher
inherited debt, fiscal sustainability considerations matter more for monetary and
tax policy and the explained differences across market structures grow larger.
The emphasis in the paper is on theory and intuition. Nevertheless, it should be
of interest to modellers working with medium-scale models in which sticky wages are
62In the case of low inherited debt, the debt-to-GDP ratio falls further, for the same reason as
debt falls below its steady-state level in the baseline economy. To economize on space, we do not
display this case.
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a standard feature. Different estimations of such models often yield diametrically
different parameter estimates. Our paper highlights that such shifts in parameter
values need not be inoccuous modifications of the setup but may require a different
way of thinking about policy, particularly at the zero lower bound.
There is a lot more work to be done in the broadest sense to build better models
to study economic cycles and their welfare consequences. The smallest departure
from the present setup would be to have a model with a better account of the
welfare costs of unemployment or financial market failures. Nevertheless, our paper
allows the reader to have a better understanding of how market structures matter




In this thesis, we try to understand the mortgage market and general credit
conditions, from macro-, micro- and policy perspectives. In the first chapter we
use disequilibrium econometric model to identify credit conditions in the market
over the business cycles. We found that the periods of recession coincide with the
periods of credit rationing (or depressed supply) and the Golden era in banking
coincides with the period of supply expansion.
We then looked at the role of brokers in the mortgage market and whether
there are evidence of misaligned incentives with consumers they serve in term
of finding the best deal. In particular, we investigated whether: i) the price of
mortgage products varies materially across intermediaries; ii) intermediaries that
receive higher procuration fees on average sell more expensive products to consumers;
iii) intermediaries that use fewer, familiar lenders on average sell more expensive
products. We find that the average price of mortgage products sold varies across
intermediaries. The difference can be as high as £800 over the incentivised rate
period for the median loan amount. We also found little evidence that intermediaries
selling highly priced mortgages also receive high procuration fees and that the
average price of the mortgages an intermediary sells is negatively correlated with the
number of lenders used. On average, intermediaries placing business with a greater
number of lenders sell cheaper products compared to intermediaries that use fewer
lenders.
In the following chapter, we looked how macro-prudential policy could have
an impact on consumers’ outcomes. We found that after implementation of the
recommendation the average loan size for high LTI mortgages increased by 4-7%.
This suggests that lenders originated high LTI loans for borrowers with higher
incomes. As a result, we find robust evidence of changes in composition of high
LTI borrowers: 1) an increase in the proportion of home movers; 2) a decrease
in the proportion of first-time buyers; 3) an increase in the proportion of joint
income applicants. After implementation, although the overall proportion of high
LTI mortgages to the total number of sales in the market stays around 10%, lenders’
individual exposure to high LTI mortgages changed. Some lenders, whose share of
high LTI mortgages had been closer to the 15% limit, reduced their proportion
of high LTI. In contrast, some lenders that previously had a low share of high
LTI mortgages increased their proportion of them. After controlling for borrower,
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product, and lender characteristics, we find that post-implementation the mortgage
price for high LTI mortgages on average decreased. The fall in the mortgage price
was stronger for lenders that used to be closer to the 15% constraint.
In the last chapter, we look at the monetary and fiscal policies in the context of
New Keynesian models with real rigidities and an economy at the zero lower bound.
We have shown that the optimal length of the forward commitment concerning
interest rates at the zero bound and key outcomes such as the magnitude of expected
inflation or the depth of the recession under optimal policy depend crucially on the
assumed degree of real rigidity in the model. In addition to simple parametric
assumptions, more fundamental structural assumptions about the nature of the
labour market play an important role in this regard. Labour market segmentation
and the presence of staggered wage adjustment were shown to have particularly
significant consequences for the type of policy one might wish to implement in an
economy hit by a large shock that depresses demand. In those circumstances, it is
a good idea for governments to lean against the wind in two different ways. First,
an increase in government spending when output is low (and vice versa) stabilizes
output (and prices) but this policy can be justified almost wholly with reference to
static public finance considerations. Second, an increase in taxes when output is
low (and vice versa) stabilizes prices via their impact on marginal cost. The results
interact in interesting ways with the initial conditions in the economy. With higher
inherited debt, fiscal sustainability considerations matter more for monetary and
tax policy and the explained differences across market structures grow larger.
121
Appendicies
A Credit Conditions in the UK Mortgage Market:
A Disequilibrium Approach
Table 18: Data sources and description.
Variable Source Description
Value of loans approved Bank of England Quarterly value of total sterling
approvals for secured lending to
individuals (in sterling millions) net of
cancellations seasonally adjusted;
Mnemonic LPQVTVQ
Mortgage interest rate DataStream Interest rate on building society
mortgages; Mnemonic UKXRMBS.R;
NSA
Household disposable income DataStream Household’s disposable income;
Mnemonic UKPERDISD; SA; Constant
Prices
House prices Nationwide House prices adjusted for retail prices;
NSA
Consumer’s confidence for major purchases European
Commission
Average of monthly consumer’s
confidence for major purchases at
present; CONS.UK.TOT.8.BS.M; SA
Long term government bond rate DataStream Long-term interest rate on government
bonds (AR) DS; Mnemonic
UKOCFILTR; SA
Index of industrial production ONS DIOP Detailed Index of Production,
IOP: B-E: PRODUCTION; Mnemonic
CVMSA; SA; Constant Prices
Time deposit rate DataStream Rate of return sterling time deposits
from corporates DS; Mnemonic
UKB5F5Q; SA
Bank deposits Bank of England Sum of sterling and foreign foreign
currency deposits from private sector,












log(value of loans approved, adjusted
for inflation)
4.31 0.25 3.89 4.76 0.5975
mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation 5.91 2.54 1.95 13.86 0.4003
log(house prices, adjusted for
inflation)
5.15 0.14 4.94 5.36 0.6875
log(household disposable income,
adjusted for inflation)
5.36 0.08 5.20 5.45 0.0823





long term government bond rate,
adjusted for inflation
5.08 2.26 0.59 10.64 0.8548
index of industrial production 105.29 5.72 95.50 113.80 0.5287
log(total bank deposits, adjusted for
inflation)
6.25 0.20 5.93 6.57 0.6401
4 (time deposits rate-mortgage
rate), adjusted for inflation
-1.46 0.67 -2.61 -0.18 0.0677




mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation 0.0649*** (0.0364)
long term government bond rate,
adjusted for inflation -0.1039*** (0.0405)
index of industrial production, lagged 0.0369*** (0.0057)
log(total bank deposits, adjusted for
inflation) 0.2763 (0.2741)
4(time deposits-mortgage rate),




mortgage rate, adjusted for inflation 0.0069 (0.0062)
log(households disposable income,
adjusted for inflation) 0.2444 (0.3420)
house prices, adjusted for inflation 1.6704*** (0.1221)




Figure 19: Probabilities of excess supply, an alternative specification.
Table 21: The multiple breakpoints test.
Break Test F-statistic Scaled F-statistic Critical Value**
0 vs. 1 * 44.51 311.59 21.87
1 vs. 2 * 7.34 51.35 24.17
2 vs. 3 * 5.12 35.81 25.13
3 vs. 4 * 3.88 27.16 26.03
4 vs. 5 0 0 26.65
Figure 20: CUSUMQ test for the coefficients stability.
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B Choice of Intermediary in the UK Mortgage
Market
B.1 Results of the regression and robustness check
In this section we present the main results of the regression on the full sample.
We have five specifications in total. As explained, each specification has a different
combination of intermediaries and lenders fixed effects. Table 22 shows the regression
estimates of the different specifications. We discuss the explanatory power of each
combination of fixed effects in Table 23. Here we only discuss the main results of
the regression. Estimates and their interpretation do not vary across specifications,
unless it is explicitly stated. Straightforward results (as those on loan-to-value)
suggest that the econometric model is well-specified. Table 22 shows the results of
the regression.
• Loan-to-value - As one can expect, the price of a mortgage increases with
LTV with greater coefficients for higher LTV bands. The coefficients are
economically and statistically significant particularly for high LTV levels. As
one can expect, mortgage products with LTV above 85 % may be several
percentage points more expensive than products with lower LTV.
• Borrower type - All else being equal, a First Time Buyer pay on average more
than a Home Mover or a Remortgagor. This result is plausible, as lender may
consider First Time Buyers as riskier customers (for example, because it is
their first time they take a mortgage out). Another possible interpretation is
that borrowers may become familiar with the mortgage process refinancing
or taking a new mortgage contract when moving home. All else being
equal, Remortgagors pay on average less than Home Movers. One possible
interpretation is that the refinancing process is simpler where consumers do not
move house. There may also be a smaller focus on price among Home Movers
(and First Time Buyers) who trade financial gains in favour of certainty or
speed of service.
• Major adverse marks in credit history - We find that borrowers with major
adverse marks in their credit history such as a County Court Judgment (CCJ),
mortgage arrears or Individual Voluntary Arrangements (IVA) pay on average
significantly higher prices for their mortgage.
• Credit scores - We find that borrowers with better credit history pay, on
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average, a lower price. This is plausible, as clean credit history may give
borrowers access to cheaper products.
• Personal Current Account (PCA) - We find that borrowers who hold a
PCA with the lender pay on average less for their mortgage. In fact, we
observe several large lenders offering preferential rates to their existing PCA
customers.36 Results suggest that the latter effect dominates the former.
• Loan size - The results of the regression also indicate that, on average, larger
loan sizes are associated with lower prices. One possible interpretation is that
borrowers (or intermediaries on borrower’ behalf) who borrow larger amounts
shop around more for a good deal or may trade-off unobservable characteristics
of the mortgage for a cheaper price.
• Loan-to-income - We find that the price of the mortgage is correlated with LTI
in a non-linear fashion. The average price increases with LTI when it is below
4.5. It then decreases with LTI for mortgages with the ratio above the 4.5.
This pattern might suggest that banks lend high LTI mortgages to less risky
consumers, resulting in the average price being smaller for these borrowers.
The result holds after controlling for consumers’ credit scores.
• Joint applications - Joint applicants pay on average higher prices on average
than single applicants.
• Self-employed - The coefficient of the self-employed dummy changes sign across
specifications. On the one hand, in the Baseline and Model 2, comparing across
lenders and keeping everything else constant, self-employed consumers get
more expensive deals than non-self-employed. On the other hand, in Models
1, 3 and 4, when controlling for the lender, self-employed consumers get on
average a cheaper deals keeping everything else constant. This suggests that
there exist some unobserved characteristics that makes self-employed less risky.
For example, when interacting the self-employed dummy with credit score, in
the Baseline and Model 2 specifications we find that self-employed with higher
credit score on average pay a lower price. As discussed earlier the amount
of accounting information a self-employed is able to provide is one proxy for
her riskiness and unfortunately this is an unobservable factor. We know that
different lenders have different risk appetite that may result in lending to
certain types of self-employed.
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• Older borrowers - Keeping everything else constant, we find that older
borrowers pay on average higher prices for their mortgage than younger
borrowers. Some lenders may have strict criteria on how to take into account
retirement income to repay the mortgage and therefore older borrowers may
pay, on average, higher prices if they have to use a lender with less strict
criteria.
• New build - The model controls for whether the mortgage is secured on a
new build property or on an older property. We also interact the new build
dummy with LTV, as some lenders have strict LTV criteria for mortgages on
new build. We find that mortgages on new build are on average more expensive
than those on older properties when LTV is low. For higher LTVs, mortgages
on new build result cheaper than mortgages on older property.63
• Indebtedness - We control for the amount of unsecured debt borrowers hold.
We find that borrowers with higher levels of debt pay on average higher price
for their mortgage. Different lenders may have different methods to calculate
the disposable income net of debt and, on average, lenders with less strict
criteria may offer more expensive products.
• Maturity - Finally, mortgages with longer maturity are likely to have, on
average, higher price than shorter maturity.
We now discuss the role of lender and intermediary attributes in explaining
price variation in the full sample. We do so by firstly assessing the explanatory
power of different combinations of intermediary and lender fixed effects. Table 23
shows that borrower and product characteristics explain around 59.24 % of the
variation. The explanatory power of lenders attributes is large. Lender fixed effects
explain an additional 10.73 % of the variation. This is expected, as lender attributes
capture different business models including different funding costs and distribution
strategies, as well as whether these banks are specialist or mainstream lenders.
Intermediary attributes explain a smaller proportion of the variation, adding around
63Intermediaries take into account additional factors when recommending a lender for a mortgage
on a new build property, such as i) Loan-to-value restrictions (many lenders do not allow for
smaller deposits (sub 20%) on new build site), ii) speed to offer (many lenders service levels do
not process their applications fast enough to meet the builders exchange of contracts deadlines),
iii) over-exposure on a site (lenders typically limit the number of apartments in a new building or
neighbourhood), iv) mortgage offer validity (consumers typically buy new build properties several
months before they are completed. However, many lenders’ mortgage offers are only valid for
3 or 6 months) and v) Governmental schemes (some lenders do not accept borrowers who use
government schemes to help home buyers). See the FCA Mortgage Market Study interim report
for more details (FCA (2018b)).
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Table 22: Regression results (full sample).
Baseline Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Intercept 7.758∗∗∗ 6.823∗∗∗ 7.633∗∗∗ 6.678∗∗∗ 6.830∗∗∗
(0.0684) (0.0501) (0.0588) (0.0454) (0.0729)
LTV band, 65%-75% 0.149∗∗∗ 0.1451∗∗∗ 0.147∗∗∗ 0.1438∗∗∗ 0.1478∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.0026) (0.0038) (0.0027) (0.0037)
LTV band, 75%-85% 0.4554∗∗∗ 0.4466∗∗∗ 0.452∗∗∗ 0.4446∗∗∗ 0.4221∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0033) (0.0045) (0.0034) (0.0039)
LTV band, 85%-95% 1.346∗∗∗ 1.343∗∗∗ 1.341∗∗∗ 1.339∗∗∗ 1.3470∗∗∗
(0.0087) (0.0071) (0.009) (0.0034) (0.0079)
LTV band, >95% 2.329∗∗∗ 2.456∗∗∗ 2.329∗∗∗ 2.455∗∗∗ 2.4310∗∗∗
(0.0114) (0.01) (0.0114) (0.0102) (0.0129)
LTI band, 2-3.5 0.0426∗∗∗ 0.0069∗∗∗ 0.043∗∗∗ 0.0056∗ 0.0169∗∗∗
(0.0041) (0.0033) (0.004) (0.0033) (0.0033)
LTI band, 3.5-4.5 0.0376∗∗∗ −0.0202∗∗∗ 0.0389∗∗∗ −0.0217∗∗∗ −0.0093∗∗∗
(0.0049) (0.0049) (0.0048) (0.0049) (0.0049)
LTI band, >4.5 −0.0337∗∗∗ −0.0945∗∗∗ −0.0322∗∗∗ −0.096∗∗∗ −0.0861∗∗∗
(0.0061) (0.0062) (0.006) (0.0063) (0.0066)
Loan value, log −0.3712∗∗∗ −0.3432∗∗∗ −0.3693∗∗∗ −0.3386∗∗∗ −0.3285∗∗∗
(0.0064) (0.0046) (0.055) (0.0044) (0.0060)
Age, 30-40 yo 0.0313∗∗∗ -0.0017 0.0306∗∗∗ -0.0008 0.0001
(0.0024) (0.0022) (0.0025) (0.0022) (0.0027)
Age, 40-50 yo 0.0838∗∗∗ 0.0235∗∗∗ 0.0836∗∗∗ 0.0261∗∗∗ 0.0309∗∗∗
(0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0038) (0.0029) (0.0036)
Age, >50 yo 0.1268∗∗∗ 0.0567∗∗∗ 0.1287∗∗∗ 0.0616∗∗∗ 0.0575∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.0058) (0.0067) (0.0057) (0.0066)
Self-employed, dummy 0.4066∗∗∗ −0.037∗ 0.398∗∗∗ -0.0344 −0.0825∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.0217) (0.0513) (0.0216) (0.0289)
Credit score −0.0014∗∗∗ −0.000075∗∗∗ −0.0013∗∗∗ −0.000075∗∗∗ −0.000036∗∗
(0.0001) (0.000015) (0.0001) (0.000015) (0.000019)
Credit score*Self-employed, dummy −0.0008∗∗∗ -0.000005 −0.0008∗∗∗ -0.000005 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.000044) (0.0001) (0.000044) (0.0001)
Impaired credit history, dummy 0.9088∗∗∗ 0.0886∗∗∗ 0.889∗∗∗ 0.0872∗∗∗ 0.0292
(0.066) (0.0185) (0.0656) (0.0185) (0.0243)
Home Mover, dummy −0.1188∗∗∗ −0.1257∗∗∗ −0.1196∗∗∗ −0.1252∗∗∗ −0.1442∗∗∗
(0.0045) (0.0038) (0.0044) (0.0038) (0.0037)
Remortagor, dummy −0.2921∗∗∗ −0.3036∗∗∗ −0.2916∗∗∗ −0.3008∗∗∗ −0.3079∗∗∗
(0.0054) (0.0043) (0.0051) (0.0041) (0.0047)
Joint income, dummy 0.0481∗∗∗ 0.0289∗∗∗ 0.0496∗∗∗ 0.0281∗∗∗ 0.0371∗∗∗
(0.0027) (0.002) (0.0025) (0.0019) (0.0023)
Personal current account, dummy −0.0262∗∗∗ −0.0194∗∗∗ −0.0265∗∗∗ −0.0196∗∗∗ −0.0185∗∗∗
(0.0059) (0.0023) (0.0058) (0.0022) (0.0021)
Monthly payments unsecured debt 0.000071∗∗∗ 0.000043∗∗∗ 0.00007∗∗∗ 0.000044∗∗∗ 0.000048∗∗∗
(0.000005) (0.000003) (0.000005) (0.000003) (0.000004)
New build, dummy 0.11∗∗∗ 0.1149∗∗∗ 0.1077∗∗∗ 0.1065∗∗∗ 0.1131∗∗∗
(0.0102) (0.0106) (0.0102) (0.0118) (0.0118)
New build, dummy*LTV band, 65% -75% −0.0669∗∗∗ −0.0519∗∗∗ −0.062∗∗∗ −0.0486∗∗∗ −0.0271∗∗∗
(0.012) (0.0112) (0.0114) (0.0105) (0.0097)
New build, dummy*LTV band, 75% -85% −0.2972∗∗∗ −0.2677∗∗∗ −0.2912∗∗∗ −0.264∗∗∗ −0.2570∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.0123) (0.0128) (0.0123) (0.0125)
New build, dummy*LTV band, 85%-95% −0.2289∗∗∗ −0.236∗∗∗ −0.2272∗∗∗ −0.2366∗∗∗ −0.1940∗∗∗
(0.0317) (0.0311) (0.0307) (0.0301) (0.0329)
New build, dummy*LTV band,>95% -0.1272 −0.2161∗∗∗ -0.1179 −0.2115∗∗∗ −0.2116∗
(0.0848) (0.0795) (0.0896) (0.081) (0.1278)
Mortgage term 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗ 0.0008∗∗∗ 0.0009∗∗∗
(0.000032) (0.000024) (0.000031) (0.000024) (0.000030)
N. of observations 525,038 525,038 525,038 525,038 376,926
Intermediary FE no no yes yes no
Lender FE no yes no yes no
Intermediary-Lender FE no no no no yes
Postcode FE yes yes yes yes yes
Month and Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
R-squared 59.24% 70.07% 59.54% 70.15% 70.27%
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0.3 % to the adjusted R-squared. Nevertheless, the tests on joint significance of
the intermediary fixed effects, comparing with models with lender fixed effects and
without lender fixed effects, are statistically significant. The marginal explanatory
power of the intermediary fixed effects suggests that they do not capture the lender
fixed effects. That is, intermediaries are not perfectly matched to lenders. This
means that, for example, there are no intermediaries that specialise only in specialist
providers, otherwise intermediary fixed effects would capture characteristics of the
specialist lender and its explanatory power would be larger.
Table 23: Explanatory power of intermediary and lender attributes (full
sample).







The additional explanatory power of the lender fixed effects in the mainstream
sample (see Table 24) drops from 13 % to 1.8 %. This result is plausible given
the sample construction, as the mainstream sample includes more homogeneous
consumer characteristics. The intermediary fixed effects add to explanatory power
only marginally, but remain jointly statistically significant. In the remaining of
the section we present further robustness checks on the specification of the baseline
regression.
B.2 Results using mainstream sample
Table 24 shows the explanatory power of intermediary and lender attributes in the
regression using the mainstream sample. As discussed above, lender fixed effects
have a smaller explanatory power because of the construction of the sample.
Figure 21 shows the variability of intermediary fixed effects on the mainstream
sample. The variation of intermediary fixed effects in the mainstream sample is
smaller than using the mainstream sample but still economically significant. The
difference between the 10th percentile and the 90th percentile intermediary is around
20bps.
Finally, Table 13 shows how the result on the number of lenders used by
intermediaries does not rely on the borrowers with non-standard characteristics
(who are more likely to use a specialist lender). In fact, even in the mainstream
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Table 24: Explanatory power of intermediary and lender attributes
(mainstream sample).







Figure 21: Estimates of intermediary fixed effects (mainstream sample).
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sample, intermediaries using fewer lenders sell on average more expensive products.
B.3 Results for five-year fixed vs. two-year fixed products
We run the same analysis on five-year fixed rate mortgages. Results do not change
significantly.
• We find a significant mortgage price variation across intermediaries, which is
persistent over time. The correlation coefficient of the fixed effects estimates
when we split the sample into two subsamples is 0.63 and it is statistically
different from zero.
• We do not find evidence that intermediaries selling more expensive mortgage
products also receive higher procuration fees. In particular, we find that the
coefficient of the procuration fees is negative and significant. One possible
interpretation for this result is that lenders that want to increase their market
share may use either low price for consumers or high procuration fees for
intermediaries. This result is consistent with the hypothesis whereby some
lenders use both these instruments to increase market share.
• Finally, we find that intermediaries that use a large number of lenders sell on
average cheaper mortgage products.
B.4 Price measure and APRC formula
In this section we provide more details about the methodology to calculate the price
measure, including sensitivity checks on some of the assumptions used. According
to the MCOB 10A.2.1, the APRC is the total cost of the credit to the consumer
and defined as the annual rate of charge which equates, on an annual basis, the
total present value of drawdowns on the one hand and the total present value of
repayments and payments of charges on the other. Given that we are interested in
calculating the cost for the two-year fixed mortgages and the drawdown of funds
happens once when the mortgage is completed, under the assumption of rolled-up





−1 +Df (1 +X)
−24
where:
• C is the total amount of credit excluding lender fee,
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• X is the APRC based price measure,
• Df is the last payment for the 24th month and it is the outstanding capital to
repay,
• Di is the monthly payment (constant for 23 months) calculated using the
following formula:
Di =
(C + f)(1 + r)n
r(1 + r)n
where:
• r is the initial interest rate in monthly terms (since mortgage is repaid
monthly),
• n is the number of monthly instalments,
• f is the lender fee,
To calculate annual cost of mortgage (APR), the following formula is applied:
APR = (1 +X)12 − 1
B.5 Results using the price measure that takes into account
the reversion rate
In this section we discuss an alternative price measure that takes into account the
reversion rates (which is typically the Standard Variable Rate) and it is calculated
over the whole term of the mortgage. This is equivalent to assume that the mortgage
product is held until maturity. The price measure taking into account the reversion
rate is fitted to the Baseline and Models 1-4. Table 25 presents the adjusted R-
squared of each specification. We find that only 17 % of the variation of the measure
is captured by borrower, product and property characteristics. This is significantly
lower than the adjusted R-squared of the regression using the price measure that
takes into account only the incentivised rate (around 60 %).
The adjusted R-squared increases to more than 90 % when the model controls for
lender-specific characteristics. In other words, lender attributes explain around 75
% of the price variation (compared to around 11 % in the regression using the price
measure that takes into account only the incentivised rate). This may be because
of several reasons.
• Firstly, reversion rates are typically significantly higher than the rate charged
during the initial period.
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Table 25: Adjusted R-squared of different specifications using the price
measure that includes the reversion rate.







• Secondly, given that the mortgage product is assumed to be held until
maturity, the effect of the reversion rates on the price measure is very
prominent and makes the level of the initial rate negligible.
• Thirdly, lenders typically have one (or a few) reversion rates for all their
products. This suggests that lender-specific characteristics capture the effect
of the reversion rate.
As a result, lender attributes explain most of the price variation while borrower,
product and property characteristics explain very little. Furthermore, while the
measure implicitly assumes that a borrower holds the product until maturity, we
observe that this is not true. In fact, the FCA found that the large majority
(around 80 %) of consumers on fixed and variable mortgages with 2 year and 5
year incentivised rate period expiring in 2015 either switched to a new product with
their existing lender, or redeemed their mortgage. All the above suggests that the
price measure including the reversion rate does not properly capture the price of a
mortgage.
B.6 Non-linear relationship between price and the number
of lenders
Table 26 reports the difference between coefficients of the dummies of the number
of lenders used. We also report the F-test statistics to check whether the differences
are statistically different from zero.
133
Table 26: F-test to assess whether the dummies on number of lenders
are statistically different from each other (mainstream sample).
Number of lenders Number of lenders
(baseline) 5-8 9-12 13-16 17-20 >20
5-8 -0.0681** -0.1454* -0.1068** -0.0602
(4.25) (3.46) (5.54) (1.04)







*** significant at 1%, ** significant at 5%, * significant at 10%
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C Impacts of the LTI Flow Limit in the UK
Mortgage Market








Note: this figure shows distribution of LTVs for different LTI buckets.
Relationship between LTI buckers and LTVs are nonlinear. Very high LTI
mortgages (above 5) and low LTI mortgages (below 3.5) are associated with lower
LTVs. Lenders balance risk of high LTIs with bigger down payment.
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Figure 23: Testing for the parallel trend assumption, loan value, a



































































































Note: baseline specification where LTI bucket d=[4.5,4.7) is a treatment and LTI
bucket d=[3.5,3.7) is a control. Regions with the low house price inflation are
North East, North West, Yorkshire and The Humber, East Midlands, and West
Midlands..
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Figure 24: Flexible DD estimates of the changes in borrowers’


















































































































































































D. changes in % of joint income applicants per LTI bucket
Note: all coefficients can be interpreted as the change in the variable of interest for a given LTI
bucket following the implementation of the FPC recommendation relative to the LTI bucket [3,
3.3). An economically significant change in the proportion of home movers, first-time buyers and
joint income applicants happens at the FPC 4.5 cut-off. This shows that changes in the
composition of borrowers are related to the LTI 4.5 cut-off rather than other changes in the
market.
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LTI >= 3.5 & LTI < 3.7 LTI >= 4.5 & LTI < 4.7














LTI [4.5;4.7) * Post -0.0522 *** -0.0760 *** -0.0571 *** -0.0437 ***
(0.0083) (0.0067) (0.0068) (0.0074)
Year-month Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Regions Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LTV Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
LTV*credit score Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lender*Year-month Fes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.67 0.65 0.65
Number of observations 108,329 142,512 130,754 96,390
*p<0.1; **p<0.05; ***p<0.01, standard errors are clustered at property area level. These results
are robust to winsorisation.
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D Real Rigidities and Optimal Stabilisation at the
Zero Lower Bound in New Keynesian Economies
Table 28: Baseline parameter values.
Notation Description Value
β discount factor 0.99
χC coefficient of relative risk aversion 1/6
χN,0 leisure preference parameter 1
χN,1 inverse Frisch elasticity of labour supply 1
χG,0 government spending preference parameter 0.25
χG,1 government spending preference parameter 1
θ elasticity of substitution in the goods market 11
ε elasticity of substitution in the labour market 21
ξp probability of no price adjustment 0.75
ξw probability of no wage adjustment 0.75
α production function parameter 1
εδ,1 shock to the discount factor 0.02
ρδ persistence of the shock 0.90
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Figure 26: Optimal response of the baseline economy with fiscal variables
held constant and solvency issues ignored (SLM denotes segmented
labour markets).
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Figure 27: Optimal dynamics in economies in which the tax rate is held
constant.
141
Figure 28: ‘Opportunistic’ versus optimal G.
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Figure 29: Optimal dynamics with all policy instruments switched on.
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Figure 30: The sticky-wage economy under various policy scenarios.
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Figure 31: Optimal dynamics when production function is concave.
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Figure 32: Optimal dynamics in the sticky wage economy with different
production functions.
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Figure 33: Optimal dynamics in the flexible-wage economy with
economy-wide labour markets under different degrees of product
market competition.
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This section lists the equilibrium conditions defining the evolution of the optimal
economy under the various scenarios we consider.64 When fiscal policy instruments
are held constant, the respective first-order condition from the Ramsey problem is
replaced by an equation that holds the value of the variable constant at its initial
steady-state level. Moreover, when nominal interest rates are the only tool used, we
assume that lump-sum taxes are available to satisfy the solvency constraint. The
conditions are time-invariant due to the fact that we automatically include the terms
that appear as a result of the penalty terms added to the objective function under
the timeless perspective approach. Such penalty terms summarize the commitments
concerning the initial period that a policy maker would adhere to should he be
implementing policies he would have set for the current period in the distant past.
See Benigno and Woodford (2012) for details.
64The ω’s are Lagrange multipliers associated with the constraints of the Ramsey problem.
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s : ω3,t − Etω3,t+1βδtξpΠθαt+1 + ω8,tY αt = 0
p∗ : ω3,tθα (1− ξp) (p∗t )
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t − ω9,t + ω10,t = 0
τn : −ω2,t − ω10,tNt = 0
b : −ω10,tR−1t + Etω10,t+1βδtΠ−1t+1 = 0
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t − ω2,tθαξpΠθα−1t st−1 − ω3,t (θ − 1) ξpΠθ−2t







s : ω2,t − Etω2,t+1βδtξpΠθαt+1 + ω7,tY αt = 0
p∗ : ω2,tθα (1− ξp) (p∗t )
−θα−1 + ω3,t (θ − 1) (1− ξp) (p∗t )
−θ
+ω4,t [1 + θ (α− 1)] (p∗t )
θ(α−1) = 0
Cn : −ω4,t θθ−1C
−1






+ ω6,t − ω6,t−1ξpΠθ−1t = 0
w∗ : ω10,t (1 + εχN,1) (w
∗
t )
εχN,1 − ω13,t (1− ξw) (1− ε) (w∗t )
−ε
+ω14,t (1− ξw) ε (1 + χN,1) (w∗t )[
−ε(1+χN,1)−1] = 0
Πw : −ω11,t−1ξwε (1 + χN,1) (Πwt )
ε(1+χN,1)−1Nn,t − ω12,t−1ξw (ε− 1) (Πwt )
ε−2Nd,t
−ω13,t−1ξw (ε− 1) (Πwt )
ε−2 − ω14,tξwε (1 + χN,1) (Πwt )
ε(1+χN,1)−1mt−1
−ω15,tΠ−1t = 0
Nn : −ω10,t εε−1
1
Nd,t























+ ω16,t = 0
G : χG,0G
−χG,1
t − ω8,t + ω9,t = 0
τn : −ω9,t + ω12,tC−χCt = 0
b : −ω9,tR−1t + Etω9,t+1βδtΠ−1t+1 = 0
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